Key Trends in Globalisation

'Market romanticism' is as damaging in China as everywhere else

China is by now strong enough to deal with any external threat to its development. Only major internal errors can block its progress. One well known such threat is any attempt to return to an administered, as opposed to a ‘socialist market’, economy. However negative financial events – increases in interbank lending rates, falls in share prices, much higher bond yields than in other major economies, falls in manufacturing and service sector PMIs - highlight another danger, that of ‘market romanticism’ as opposed to ‘market realism’. This consists of verbally adhering to a ‘market economy’ but in fact not understanding what a market economy is. Put formally, market romanticism is simply the economics of neo-liberalism.

Various negative trends which have shown themselves in China’s economy in the immediate last period in reality have a clear and simple market origin. As shown in the chart China’s total savings rate has significantly fallen from 53.2% of GDP in 2009 to 51.4% of GDP in 2012 – it is important to note that total savings are not only those of households but also company savings and the ‘negative savings’ of the government budget deficit. Total savings data is not yet published for 2013 but there is no indirect data, in particular for company profits, showing a major recovery in savings rates.

 

This decline in China’s savings rate has as consequences rising interest rates, a decline in investment, and therefore economic slowdown – tendencies at present expressing themselves.

Interest rates are the price of capital and express the balance between capital supply (savings) and demand for capital (investment). As savings rates have significantly fallen one of two things must occur – or both. Either interest rates must rise, as the supply of capital has fallen relative to demand, or investment, the demand for capital, must decline.

As frequently occurs, both trends are taking place in China. Demand for capital, that is investment, is slowing – a trend augmented by rising interest rates. Taking a three year moving average, to eliminate effects of purely short term fluctuations, the chart below shows that by 2012 the real inflation adjusted growth rate of China’s fixed investment fell to the lowest since 2001 at 9.9%.

Inflation adjusted data for investment in 2013 is not yet published, but current price data shows the annual increase in fixed asset investment fell from 21.2% in January 2013 to only 19.9% in the latest available data. As there has been no corresponding fall in inflation it is almost certain that the real rate of increase of fixed investment fell further in 2013.

Simultaneously with falling investment China’s interest rates have risen. This was partially disguised in 2012 as inflation was declining – therefore real interest rates could rise without the headline grabbing nominal rate increasing. But as China’s inflation ceased falling in 2013 nominal rates began to rise significantly.

The result is that not only have China’s interest rates risen in absolute terms, as shown in both bond and interbank lending markets, but they have particularly risen relative to the global benchmark US rates – US savings levels, in contrast to China, have been rising for the last four years. At the beginning of 2008 the yield on China’s 10 year government bond yields was only 0.5% higher than the US, whereas by the 2^nd week in January 2014 it was 1.9% higher. The sharp spikes in interbank interest rates last summer, and again late last year, were manifestations of the same process of rising interest rates.

 

With China’s growth rates falling, and interest rates rising, the recent fall in the share market was logical.

A slowing rate of investment and rising interest rates necessarily produces slows economic growth and therefore more slowly rising living standards – as the rate of increase of GDP is overwhelmingly the most important source of rising consumption. China’s GDP growth fell from 9.3% in 2011 to 7.7% in 2012, and its growth rate of consumption fell in parallel from 10.7% to 8.4%. Again inflation adjusted data for 2013 is not yet available, but without adjusting for inflation the rate of increase of retail sales fell from 14.9% in November 2012 to 13.7% in the same month in 2013. As in the same period the rate of increase of the CPI rose from 2.0% to 3.0% almost certainly the growth rate of consumption was falling.

These problems were accurately predicted in advance. A falling savings rate is merely another way of saying that the percentage of consumption in the economy is rising – that is ‘consumption led growth’ is occurring. But predictably such a rise in the percentage of consumption in the economy is making the situation worse not better.

Understanding how a market economy works equally shows the only way to strategically overcome these problems. That as a country becomes more economically advanced capital investment plays a larger role in its growth is both confirmed by modern econometrics and predicted by the great economists from Adam Smith onwards – in an advanced economy investment’s role is six times as important as productivity increases in economic growth, with 57% of growth coming from investment, and only 9% from productivity improvements. But without foreign borrowing investment requires exactly equivalent domestic saving.

The only strategic way to deal with present economic problems is therefore to raise the savings rate again –which will simultaneously allow a faster growth rate of investment and, by increasing the supply of capital, allow interest rates to fall, thereby lessening problems in the interbank and bond markets. As the largest contributor to savings comes from companies, this therefore requires increasing company profitability and limiting the diversion of company profits to consumption (via excessive dividend payment or other means).

The factual arithmetic of a market economy therefore requires understands that maintaining a high level of savings and investment is the single biggest challenging facing China’s development and all policies, including in finance, must therefore be aimed at sustaining it.

‘Market romanticism’, because it does not understand the facts of a market economy, wrongly believes productivity increases, achieved via tinkering with markets, can compensate for a fall in China’s savings and investment rates. It is ‘penny wise and pound foolish’ - concentrating on hoped for efficiency improvements which even if they were successful could not compensate for falls in savings and investment.

‘Market realism’ and ‘market romanticism’ are therefore clashing in the present economic situation in China. ‘Market realism’ concentrates on the key fact of the necessity to maintain the high savings and investment rates – increased market efficiency is useful but cannot compensate for problems in these more fundamental economic factors. ‘Market romanticism’ wrongly believes that increased efficiency in markets can compensate for declines in the savings rate or even advocates policies which would reduce the savings level further.

But as is said in the West ‘facts are stubborn things.’ Carrying out policies of ‘market romanticism’ necessarily produces financial and economic problems.

Developing a ‘socialist market economy’ is the way forward for China, and return to an administered economy would be disastrous. But as recent negative financial trends confirm it is necessary to reject the myths of ‘market romanticism’ to develop such an economy.

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An edited version of this article appeared originally in Chinese in a series of discussion articles on the market economy on Sina Finance.

China has overtaken the US to become the world's largest industrial producer

The period since the international financial crisis began has for the first time in over a century seen the US displaced as the world’s largest industrial producer – this position has now been taken by China. It has also witnessed the greatest shift in the balance of global industrial production in such a short period in world economic history. In 2010 China’s industrial output exceeded the US marginally but this has now been consolidated into a more than 20% lead with the gap still widening further.

In 2007, on UN data, China’s total industrial production was only 62% of the US level. By 2011, the latest available comparable statistics, China’s industrial output had risen to 120% of the US level. China’s industrial production in 2011 was $2.9 trillion compared to $2.4 trillion in the US – this data is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

 

When the comparable data is released for 2012, China’s lead will have increased substantially– between December 2011 and December 2012 China’s industrial output increased by 10.3% whereas US industrial production increased by only 2.7%. Calculations based on estimates in the CIA's World Factbook indicate in 2012 the value of China's industrial production was $3.7 trillion compared to $2.9 trillion for the US – which would mean China's industrial production was 126% of the US level.

Taking only manufacturing - that is excluding mining, electricity, gas and water production - in 2007 China’s output was 62% of the US level, by 2011 it was 123%. Again the gap has widened in 2012 and 2013.

No other country’s industrial production now even approaches China - in 2011 China’s industrial output was 235% of Japan’s and 346% of Germany’s.

World Bank data, using a slightly different calculation of value added in industry, confirms the shift. On World Bank data China’s industrial production in 2007 was only 60% of the US level, whereas by 2011 it was 121%.

Therefore in only a six year period China has moved from its industrial production being less than two thirds of the US to overtaking the US by a substantial margin. If China was the ‘workshop of the world’ before the international financial crisis it is far more so now

The trends producing such dramatic shifts in such a short period are shown in Figure 2. In six years China’s industrial output almost doubled while industrial production in the US, Europe and Japan has not even regained pre-crisis levels. To give precise statistics, between July 2007 and July 2013 China’s industrial production increased by 97% while US industrial output declined by 1%. Industrial production data for July is not yet available for the EU and Japan, but between June 2007 and June 2013 EU industrial output fell by 9% and Japan’s by 17%.

Figure 2

 

It is this enormous rise in China’s output which also drove the much discussed global shift in industrial production in favor of developing countries - in the six year period to June 2013, the latest date for which combined data is available, industrial production in advanced economies fell by 7% while output in developing economies rose by 65%.

As is clear from Figure 3, China accounted for the overwhelming bulk of the increase in the developing economies. Industrial production in Latin America rose by 5%, in Africa and the Middle East by 6%, and in Eastern Europe by 10%. But China’s industrial production in this period rose by 100% - industrial output in developing Asia as a whole rose by 65%, but the majority of this was accounted for by China.

Figure 3

The quite literally historic scale of these shifts makes clear that by far the most important development in world industrial production in the last period is this extraordinary rise of China. Between 2007 and 2011 China’s industrial production rose by $1,465 billion, in current prices, while US industrial output rose by only $88 billion in current prices and declined slightly in inflation adjusted terms. China’s industrial production rose by 17 times as much as the US.

Such a rise in China’s industrial production has consequences spreading far beyond industry itself. Industry has easily the most rapid increase in productivity of any economic sector – notably compared to services. The decline of industrial production in the EU and Japan, and relative stagnation in the US, means China is cutting the productivity gap between itself and the advanced economies. This is crucial for progress in raising China’s relative GDP per capita and living standards.

This rising productivity also explains why China’s exports have been able to maintain their competitiveness despite substantial increases in the exchange rate of China’s currency the RMB. On Bank for International Settlements data, the RMB’s nominal exchange rate rose by 25% between July 2007 and July 2013. But China’s real effective exchange rate, that is taking into account the combined effect of the nominal exchange rate and inflation, rose by 31% But despite this major currency revaluation China’s exports continued to exceed its imports.

The ability of China to successfully absorb such high increases in its exchange rate, due to high levels of industrial productivity increases, directly translates into relatively lower prices for imports and improved relative living standards for China’s population.

This data also settles the dispute between who believed there was a major industrial revival in the US, such as the Boston Consulting Group, and Goldman Sachs and other analysts who correctly concluded no such major revival has occurred. Those in China, such as Lang Xianping, who wrote that a great US industrial revival was taking place and China’s industry was in crisis look foolish in the light of data showing China’s industrial output doubled in a period when US industrial production did not grow at all. The only reason US industrial performance does not appear very weak, with negative net growth over a six year period, is because of the even worse performance of a major decline in industrial output in the other advanced economic centers – the EU and Japan.

It is naturally important not to exaggerate this scale of advance by China in industrial production. China’s industrial output is now considerably larger in value terms than the US, but the United States retains a substantial technological lead which it will take China a considerable period to catch up with. Due to a long period of globalization and consolidation by US companies, both processes which are only at early stages in China, US manufacturing firms are still four times the size of China’s in terms of overall global revenue– although between 2007 and 2013 Chinese manufacturing firms overtook Germany to become the third largest manufacturing companies of any country.

The scale of these changes in world industrial production also make clear that in comparison to developments in China gas and oil ‘fracking’ in the US, which have attracted widespread media attention, is merely a statistical sideshow – as already noted overall US industrial production has not even recovered to pre-crisis levels.

For the first time for over a century the US has been definitively replaced as the world’s largest industrial producer. Such a once in a century shift can literally only be described as historic.

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An earlier version of this article appeared at China.org.cn 

The US economic slowdown is much greater than China's

Publication of US 2nd quarter GDP data, following that for China, makes it possible to accurately compare the recent performance of the world's two largest economies. The results are extremely striking as they show that in the last year the slowdown in the U.S. economy has been far more serious than in China. Consequently the data shows that while both economies are being adversely affected by current negative trends in the world economy, China is dealing with these more successfully than the U.S. Intense media discussion in China about its ‘slowdown’  is therefore misplaced unless equivalent attention is paid to understanding why the US  economic slowdown is much worse than China’s.

To accurately establish the facts, it should be noted China and the U.S. publish their economic data in slightly different forms. It is therefore necessary to ensure that like is compared with like. The U.S. emphasizes annualized change in GDP in the latest quarter compared to the previous one; for the newest data this means it takes the growth between the 1st and 2nd quarters of 2013 and basically multiplies it by four. China emphasizes the growth between the 2nd quarter of 2013 and the same quarter in 2012.

Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. Quarter by quarter comparisons depend on seasonal adjustments being accurate, which is not always the case, while year by year comparisons are less sensitive in registering short term shifts.

But in the present case the conclusion is not fundamentally changed whichever method is used. If the method emphasized by China is used, then, as shown in Figure 1, in the 2nd quarter of 2013 China's GDP grew by 7.5% compared to a year earlier, while U.S. GDP grew by 1.4%. This means that China's economy grew at over 500% of the rate of the U.S. economy. Using the method preferred by the U.S. China's annualized GDP growth in the 2nd quarter was 6.8% and the U.S.'s was 1.7%, which means that China's economy grew at 400% of the rate of the U.S. economy.

Due to the difficulties of making accurate seasonable adjustments in both China and the U.S., the author would emphasize the year on year comparison; but whichever method is preferred China's economy was growing at 4-5 times the speed of the U.S. economy.

Figure 1

 

If the whole period since the international financial crisis began is taken then the disparity in growth between China and the U.S. is even more striking. In the five years up to the 2nd quarter of 2013 China's GDP grew by 50.7% and U.S. GDP by 4.5% (Figure 2). China's GDP grew more than ten times as rapidly as the U.S.

Figure 2

 

Turning to the most recent period, it is widely understood that since the beginning of the international financial crisis, China's economy has far outperformed the U.S., even if the dimensions of this are not clearly grasped. What is not so often understood is what has happened during the last year. During that period the economies of both China and the U.S. slowed, indicating the negative trends in the international economic situation. But the U.S. slowed far more than China.

China's year on year GDP growth fell from 7.6% in the 2nd quarter of 2012 to 7.5% in the same quarter of 2013 - a decline of 0.1%, or a 1.3% deceleration from the initial growth rate. However the year on year growth rate of the U.S. in the same period fell from 2.8% to 1.4% - that is by 1.4% or by 50% of the initial growth rate (Figure 3). Consequently China's growth fell marginally but the U.S.'s growth rate halved.

Figure 3

 

Furthermore, as the Financial Times correctly pointed out in its editorial on the latest U.S. data, U.S. economic growth has been particularly depressed in the last nine months. In that total period the U.S. economy grew by only 0.7%, or an annualized rate of under 1%. In the same period China's economy grew by 5.3%, or an annualized rate of slightly over 7%. Therefore if over the entire course of last year China's economy has been growing at 4-5 times the speed of the U.S. economy, in the last nine months China's economy has been growing at 7 times the speed of the U.S.

This does not mean that the US cannot partially recover from its extremely depressed 1.4% annual growth rate in the last year – the 10 year moving average of US annual growth is 1.8% and its 20 year annual moving average is 2.5%. But even recovery to these rates would leave the US growing at only one third of the rate of China. 

The latest data therefore shows that the global economic discussion about the present world economic situation is not about China's "slowdown" and U.S. "recovery". It is "why is China coming so much more successfully through an adverse global economic situation than the U.S.?" And "why has the U.S. economy slowed so much more dramatically than China's in the last year?

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An earlier version of this article appeared at China.org.cn.

Claims of big success by 'Abenomics' are a fake

The claims 'Abenomics' is a big success are so far fake.

Headlines have appeared such as 'Japan revises up Q1 growth to annual 4.1%' with commentary this, 'was much higher than the preliminary estimate of 3.5 per cent, which was already the fastest rate recorded by any Group of Seven economy.' This ignores that this annualized 4.1% growth in the 1st quarter of 2013 was only recovery from a 3.6% fall in the second quarter of 2012.

Year on year GDP growth in Japan in the 1st quarter of 2013 was only 0.2%, the lowest since the 4th quarter of 2011 - see Figure 1, Table 1, and Figure 2

Figure 1

Table 1

Figure 2

 

Japan’s GDP remains 1.2% below its peak in the 1st quarter of 2008 and its recovery remains slow – Figure 3.

Figure 3

 

At best all ‘Abenomics’ has done so far is stop the renewed decline which commenced in Japan’s economy in 2011. But the ‘Abe recovery’ is simply in line with the trend since 2009. Only if the growth seen in the 1st quarter of 2013 continued for a significant period could ‘Abenomics’ really claim any significant success.

In short the claims to date of a big success by ‘Abenomics’ are fake.

China’s investment stimulus ensures it will retain its international growth lead in 2013

In the 4^th quarter of 2012 China’s economy speeded up, with GDP growth rising to 7.9%. For 2012 as a whole China’s GDP rose by 7.8%. Internationally this contrasted sharply with the EU and Japan, both of which have passed into new downturns, and the US where economic growth in 2012 was 2.2% - anaemic compared to previous recoveries. China’s industrial production in the year to December rose by 10.3% - compared to 2.9% in the US. China’s annual economic expansion now exceeds the US in dollar as well as percentage terms – China’s GDP in 2012 rose by $982 billion compared to $600 billion for the US.

 

 

The scale of changes in the world economy involved can be seen even more clearly if the period since the international financial crisis began is taken. Peak US GDP prior to the financial crisis was in the fourth quarter of 2007. Since then China’s GDP has grown by 52.5%. But in the 4th quarter of 2012 US GDP was only 2.4% above its pre-crisis level.

In the last five years China’s economy has therefore grown more than twenty times as fast as the US while the economies of the EU and Japan have shrunk. In current dollar prices China’s GDP has risen by $4.7 trillion and the US by $1.65 trillion.

In industrial production, the most internationally traded sector, and the one with the fastest productivity growth, the change in the last five years is even more dramatic. On the latest available data EU industrial production is 12% below its pre-crisis peak and Japan’s 22% below. In the US, despite unsubstantiated talk of ‘industrial revival’, in December US industrial output was still over 2% below its peak of more than five years previously. In the five years up to December 2012 US industrial production had fallen by 3%, but China’s industrial production had risen by 80%.

These huge economic shifts pose two questions entering 2013. This year can China maintain the pickup in economic momentum that was clear in the fourth quarter of 2012? Can China maintain this over the medium/longer term with the consequences for further changes in the structure of the world economy flowing from this? Examining the economic processes unfolding at the beginning of 2013 gives the answer ‘yes’ to both questions – and for the same reason.

Turning back to short terms trends, undoubtedly at the beginning of 2012 China's economic policy makers had underestimated the difficulties in the developed economies. China's official prediction of a 10% export increase in 2012 could not be achieved without significant growth in developed markets. This did not materialize and exports rose only 7.9%.

As external demand was overestimated there was a delay in launching a program to stimulate domestic demand. Therefore China’s economy slowed. By May 2012 annual fixed asset investment growth had fallen to 20.1%, the lowest for a decade. In August the yearly increase in industrial production declined to 8.9%. In the same month the annual increase in industrial company profit fell to 6.2%.

However, by mid-2012 policy was adjusted appropriately. In late May Premier Wen Jiabao announced an infrastructure centred investment program that grew to $157 billion. Theoretical support to this new stimulus was given by former World Bank Chief Economist and Vice President Lin Yifu - who has now returned to Beijing to be a major influence in China’s economic policy making.

The correctness of these policies was rapidly shown. By December the investment decline reversed, with the annual increase in fixed asset investment rising to 20.6%, and industrial output growth accelerating to 10.3%. Industrial company profits grew – rising to a 22.8% annual increase in November. These trends underlay the GDP growth increase from 7.4% in the third quarter to the fourth quarter’s 7.9%.

In a perfect world doubtless China would have launched its domestic stimulus a few months earlier. But in economics it is impossible, due to the enormous number of variables involved, to make precisely accurate projections, only orders of magnitude can be accurately predicted. In particular policy makers had to take into account that China’s population is extremely inflation adverse. If export demand had been at the level expected, launching a domestic stimulus would have threatened economic overheating with inflationary dangers. In the grand economic scheme of things, with China’s GDP rising at 7.8%, the US at 2.2%, and the EU and Japan not at all, a few months delay is virtually neither here nor there.

Nevertheless there exists a small industry of those claiming China is ‘soon’ to suffer deep economic crisis – the ‘soon’ merely progressively moving forward in time when it doesn’t materialize. A few examples will give the flavor of the genre:

• Gordon Chang in The Coming Collapse of China in 2002 declared ‘A half-decade ago the leaders of the People's Republic of China had real choices. Today they do not. They have no exit. They have run out of time.' Actually rather than collapse China was entering a decade of the most rapid growth ever experienced by a major economy in human history.
• Michael Pettis of Beijing University, a frequent predictor of ‘sharp slowdown’ or ‘crisis’ in China, in 2009 reiterated: ‘I continue to stand by my comment [made] last year... that the US would be the first major economy out of the crisis and China one of the last.’ In fact since the peak of the last US business cycle, in the fourth quarter of 2007, China’s GDP has grown by 53% and US GDP by 3%.
• The Economist magazine, in a special supplement in 2002, ‘A Dragon Out of Puff’, predicted: 'In the coming decade, therefore, China seems set to become more unstable. It will face growing unrest as unemployment mounts.' And 'the economy still relies primarily on domestic engines of growth, which are sputtering. Growth over the last five years has relied heavily on massive government spending. As a result, the government's debt is rising fast. Coupled with the banks' bad loans and the state's huge pension liabilities, this is a financial crisis in the making.' In fact in the next 10 years China underwent the most rapid growth of any major economy in history.

The fact that such predictions are regularly refuted by events does not stop them being put forward. A slight delay in China launching a domestic stimulus in 2012 therefore created a frenzy of speculation in such circles regarding a ‘hard landing’ or ‘crash’ in China’s economy – which as always failed to materialize and instead, as already noted, China’s economy accelerated.

A new ‘theory’ therefore had to be put invented of why China’s economy will substantially slow – that China’s government is allegedly sacrificing the long term interest of its economy for a short term ‘fix’. According to one formulation of this, by Jamil Anderlini and Simon Rabinovitch in the Financial Times: ‘China went into reverse in the second half of 2012 in its efforts to rebalance its economy… Though steady, consumption took a back seat to capital spending as a driver of growth.’

Unfortunately this line of argument makes as little sense as, and will be therefore be just as refuted by events as, the numerous others.

First, taking the long run, modern econometrics shows clearly that as an economy develops it becomes more dependent on investment for growth, not less. As China moves from a developing to a developed economy investment would be expected to play a greater role in its growth.

Second Lin Yifu has rightly stressed that the industrial upgrading of an economy consists of it moving from labor intensive to increasingly investment intensive industries. This is precisely the path China is following with its exports increasingly switching from labour intensive products such as textiles and toys into more capital intensive ones such as ships, construction equipment, smartphones and cars.

Finally, in the purely short term, the present global economy conforms to economic theory showing that investment fluctuates more than consumption, and it is investment downturns which therefore create economic recessions. The latest data shows in developed economies fixed investment is nearly 10% below its peak and has been declining since the first quarter of 2012. China’s ability to counter such threats by an investment stimulus program is therefore a sign of the strength of its economy, not a weakness. It is this ability to control and raise investment which determined that China’s economy continued to grow rapidly, while the sharp decline of investment in the developed economies led to their stagnation or renewed recession.

Consequently, rather than China’s government’s policies sacrificing the long term strength of the economy to short term expedients, the stimulus launched from summer 2012 integrates both short and long term considerations in economic development. This is why the majority of predictions for growth in China’s economy in 2013, from both Chinese and the majority of international experts, are for a further speed up in GDP growth to more than 8% - the World Bank’s 8.4% being fairly typical.

The main dangers to China’s growth in 2013 are therefore not domestic but those from external weakness in developed economies. The latest prediction by the World Bank for growth in 2013 is 1.9% in the US, 0.8% in Japan and -0.1% in the Euro Area. For this reason the World Bank’s overall projection for global growth is a low 2.4% in 2013.

Naturally China, as the world’s second largest economy, and the world’s largest goods exporter, cannot isolate itself from world economic trends. If the world economy slows in 2013 China is likely to slow, and if the world economy accelerates China’s economy is likely to speed up. But whatever the short term ups and downs China will continue to enjoy its 6-7% growth lead over the developed economies.

In regard to the medium term a major turning point in world history is being approached. The IMF projects that, in comparable price levels, that is parity purchasing powers, China will overtake the US to become the world’s largest economy in 2017. At market prices China will overtake the US to become the world’s largest economy a few years later. Exactly when the latter transition will take place depends on the assumption on exchange rates, with 2019-20 being the most central date. To be safe it may be said China will become the world’s largest economy ‘within 10 years’. Given the short time scale, unless China’s economy slows very drastically and very quickly this transition is inevitable.

No one alive has ever lived in a world in which the US was not the largest economy – it gained that position in approximately 1870. It is, among other reasons, because it is mentally difficult for humans to adjust to the new and never experienced that constant theories are put forward that China’s economy must be about the slow substantially. But, for the reasons already outlined, China will maintain its rapid economic growth. That is 2013’s realistic economic perspective.

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An earlier shorter version of this article appeared in China Daily.

Investment will boost China’s economy

The underlying weakness in the US, European and Japanese economies was underestimated in China’s forecasts for 2012. The US is currently consuming more capital than it creates, while its percentage of investment in GDP is near post-World War II lows. Japan’s investment levels have declined for two decades while its savings rate has fallen. EU investment is the lowest percentage of GDP since World War II and declining. These economies cannot achieve rapid recovery under such conditions.

These structural features dictated the poor short term performance of Western economies during 2012. The EU entered a new recession with GDP still 2.1% below 2008’s peak levels. Japan’s latest GDP data shows tortoise like 0.8% annualized growth with output still 1.9% below its peak. US GDP growth decelerated from 4.1% at the end of 2011 to 1.7% in the last quarter. The US PMI fell for three months to 49.6 in August. US industrial production in the same month only rose 2.8% compared to a year previously – less than a third of China’s growth.

The problems in developed economies directly affected China. China’s 10% projected export increase in 2012 will not be achieved, helping explain why China's economy significantly decelerated in the first part of the year. GDP growth fell to 7.8 percent in the first half of the year, while August’s industrial growth declined to 8.9 percent and the official manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index fell to 49.2.

Weakness in Western economies can to a certain degree be compensated for by China’s export growth to developing countries as the latter now constitute 53% of China’s exports. But as Western economies still account for almost half China’s current global market the growth prospects for China’s exports are structurally limited. Consequently, as the great majority of analysts conclude, China’s economic expansion in the next few years must be based primarily on domestic demand. It is therefore good news for China’s economy later this year that lessons drawn by China’s economic policy makers have begun to overcome some confusions which existed earlier regarding the dynamics of China’s domestic demand. This process has been aided by policy recommendations by Lin Yifu - China’s former World Bank Senior Vice President and Chief Economist.

Problems had earlier been created in discussion of China’s economic policy by confusing ‘domestic demand’ with ‘domestic consumption’. The two are not the same. Domestic demand consists not only of domestic consumption but also domestic investment. Formulas such as the following, which were regularly used, were therefore erroneous: ‘China will not be able to rely on exports for its economic growth. Therefore, China will have to adopt a consumption-driven growth strategy.’

From the viewpoint of increasing domestic demand, China’s exports can just as much be replaced by raising China’s domestic investment as by increasing consumption. Indeed whether, and in what proportion, to expand China’s domestic demand by expanding investment or consumption is a crucial economic policy choice.

The clarity necessary on this has been highlighted by Lin Yifu and confirmed by trends in China’s economy in the first part of 2012. Lin argued that, compared with boosting consumption, encouraging investment is a more sustainable and successful path. This analysis, which is justified by factors set out in Lin’s writings on long term economic growth, was also clearly confirmed by trends in China’s economy during 2012.

Some deceleration in China’s economy was inevitable in 2012 due to negative international trends. Nevertheless this was magnified earlier in the year by errors in China’s normally surefooted economic policy which are now being overcome.

China’s economic policy during the last period took as a key aim raising consumption – i.e. living standards. This indeed should be economic policy’s aim – the target should be maximizing the sustainable rate of increase of consumption. But unfortunately this became confused with a different idea of sharply increasing the percentage of consumption in China's GDP. These two goals are actually contradictory as GDP growth, which is largely fueled by investment, underpins sustainable consumption. Sharply increasing consumption’s percentage in GDP cuts investment levels, thereby inadvertently leading to lower GDP and consequently lower consumption growth.

The practical consequences of this confusion were clear in 2012. To attempt to raise the share of consumption in China's GDP, wage increases far above the economy's growth rate were pushed through. In the most striking examples, Sichuan raised the 2012 minimum wage by 23 percent, and Shenzhen announced a 16 percent increase to the 2012 minimum wage following a 20 percent increase in 2011.

Such measures increased inflationary pressures in China’s economy and squeezed private and state company profits, helping create in the first half of 2012 a trend accurately termed ‘profitless growth’. Falling profits in turn led to investment reductions, with fixed asset growth declining from 25.0% in August 2011 to 20.2% in August 2012. Falling economic growth also reduced government tax receipts, pressuring the state budget.

This process illustrates why the phrase ‘consumer-led growth’, sometimes used in China, is fatally confused. In a market economy production does not take place because there is a demand for consumption. It only occurs if production is profitable. As profits declined in 2012 investment fell, the economy slowed, and consumption's growth rate therefore declined. The growth rate of retail sales, before adjusting for inflation, fell by 4.9 percent between December 2011 and August 2012 while the CPI fell by 2.2 percent. Real retail sales growth, the main factor in consumption, therefore fell. Predictably, attempting to sharply increase consumption's percentage in GDP led to the population’s consumption rising more slowly!

But while consumption was boosted the government initially did not use available policy tools to halt the decline in fixed investment – as shown by the fall in fixed asset formation. These policies are now being corrected. Instead of the confused formula of ‘consumer-led growth,’ Premier Wen Jiabao has rightly emphasized ‘a pattern in which economic growth is jointly driven by consumption, investment and exports.‘ A $154 billion state-stimulated investment program has been announced. These practical steps by the government are clearly broadly in line with the economic policy arguments advanced by Lin Yifu.

If China's government continues these corrections, China’s growth will stabilize and then accelerate towards the end of 2012.

*   *   *

This article originally appeared in China Daily.

Quantitative easing - US and non-US markets

An important article by Gavyn Davies on his Financial Times blog analyses the effects of US quantitative easing (QE) on bond, share and commodity markets and the relation of these to trends in the productive economy.

Gavyn Davies charts the graph in Figure 1.

Figure 1

 

His commentary is self-explanatory:

‘A quick glance at the graph suggests that equities, bonds and commodities have all been in bull market trends ever since the successive rounds of quantitative easing started. However, a closer inspection reveals that this is not in fact the case. Only bonds have been in a continuous uptrend. The behaviour of global equities and commodities can more meaningfully be split into two separate phases.

‘From the start of the recovery to the end of April 2011, both equities and commodities recorded extremely strong bull markets, with both asset classes rising by some 90 per cent.

‘Since then, however, the bull market in risk assets has fizzled out. In the second phase (shaded blue), equities have been volatile around a broadly flat trend, and commodities have actually fallen by 16 per cent from the peak, despite their recent rally. Quantitative easing has not been powerful enough, at least up to now, to restore the 2009-11 bull market.’

As regards bond markets the essentially continuous upward trend of prices noted by Gavyn Davies naturally indicates that the intended goal of QE of depressing interest rates has been achieved. As regards commodity prices he is accurate that these have not yet regained their post-financial crisis peaks reached in April 2011 – as is clear from Figure 2.

Figure 2

 

World share prices have also not significantly risen above their April 2011 post-international financial crisis highs – see Figure 3. However this graph also illustrates the sharp difference between US and non-US share price performance.

US shares have continued to advance since April 2011, more than overcoming their decline in the second half of 2011. Non-US shares have, however, fallen back from April 2011 levels.

Whereas up to April 2011 US and non-US share markets moved in the same direction, both showing recovery, since April 2011 US and non-US share markets have moved in opposite directions with the former having risen and the latter fallen.

Figure 3

 

In order to illustrate this more clearly Figure 4 shows the changes in world, US and non-US share prices since 31 March 2011. By 21 September US share prices were 9.9% above their 31 March 2011 levels whereas non-US share prices were 9.2% below them.

Figure 4

 

These contrary trends in US and non-US share prices naturally don't contradict Gavyn Davies’s fundamental argument. But they highlight an important trend within its overall framework.

US QE policies have been accompanied by, almost certainly caused, a significant and continuing rise in US share prices which continued after April 2011. But US QE policies have been accompanied since April 2011 by a fall in non-US share prices. Any analysis of trends in world markets must take into account and explain these divergent trends.

It is also unlikely that the explanation can simply be more rapid economic growth in the US compared to other economies . Despite some recent slowdowns emerging economies have grown significantly more rapidly than the US, but emerging economy share prices have performed significantly worse than the US – Figure 5. Whereas emerging economy share prices have fallen by 14.2% since 31 March 2011 US shares have risen by 9.9%.

Figure 5

 

The Federal Reserve could, therefore, argue that it has created a ‘wealth effect’ within the US through QE – US house prices have also stabilised and then risen slightly this year. However the data from commodity markets and non-US share markets indicates no such effect has been created by QE outside the US.

Whether US QE has contributed to the negative trends in non-US economies, as countries such as Brazil have argued, would of course requires a separate article. The distinction between US and non-US markets is however relatively clear.

The shape of the new EU downturn

The data released by the OECD for 2nd quarter GDP for the EU shows clearly the shape of Europe's new economic downturn. The situation is dominated by the decline in fixed investment – see charts below.

In the US$ Parity Purchasing Power (PPP) terms in which the OECD now releases such data EU GDP, in inflation adjusted terms, is still $307 billion below its peak in the 1st quarter of 2008. However EU fixed investment is down by $485 billion – that is the decline in fixed investment more than accounts for the entire fall in EU GDP. EU consumer expenditure is also down, by $122 billion, but this is only one quarter of the decline in fixed investment. Net trade and government consumption are positives.

In short the EU’s economic situation, as in the developed economies as a whole, is dominated by the fixed investment decline.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Misanalysis in China of Europe’s economic crisis

The following article originally appeared in Beijing Times.

* * *

This week Greece’s Prime Minister Samaras met, and publicly argued, with German Chancellor Merkel over the EU’s latest attempt to solve the Greek economic crisis. Given that earlier misunderstandings in China of the dynamics of Europe’s crisis have damaged its own economy it is therefore important that a correct assessment is made of this new stage in Europe.

The reason China was previously damaged by a wrong analysis was that the seriousness of Europe’s economic crisis was considerably underestimated. By July 2012 China’s exports to the EU had declined by 16% in a year – easily the most serious blow to China’s exporters. Yet a year previously few analysts in China were predicting such negative European trends.

The reason for this widespread underestimation of the seriousness of the situation was that many analysts in China supported austerity policies being pursued in Europe and rejected the alternative proposal for European governments to launch economic stimulus programs. As most European governments were following austerity, and austerity was considered the correct policy, such Chinese analysts concluded Europe’s crisis would be overcome.

However the results clearly show that Europe’s austerity policies have worsened the situation and analysts who supported Europe’s austerity policies were dangerously mistaken.

To assess accurately Europe’s real economic dynamics, and their consequences for China, first the overall results of the different policies pursued internationally to deal with the financial crisis can be summarized and then the situation in individual European countries analyzed.

Internationally three types of policies were adopted in response to the financial crisis:

· The EU combined loose monetary policy with no stimulus to the productive economy – the ‘austerity’ approach. The outcome is that EU GDP is 2.1% below its peak of four years ago and Europe is in ‘double dip’ recession.

· The US combined loose monetary policy with a stimulus to consumer spending via a large budget deficit. The outcome is that average annual US GDP growth in the last four and a half years is only 0.4%

· China combined loose monetary policy with an investment focused stimulus to the productive economy. China’s GDP grew by more than 40% in four years.

The EU’s ‘austerity’ policy was therefore easily the least successful approach to dealing with the financial crisis. This is further confirmed by analyzing the individual EU countries committed to austerity. In the UK, where Cameron’s government voluntarily implemented the policy, GDP is 4.5% below its peak output and the UK is in a new recession. Considering countries which adopted austerity as a condition for bailouts, Ireland’s economy is 8.8% below its peak, Portugal’s GDP is 5.2% below its peak and has been declining for two years; Spain’s economy is 4.7% below its peak and is in a new recession, while in Greece the economy has contracted by 13.0%.

Given these dreadful economic results analysts in China should realize support for Europe’s austerity policies was mistaken. Instead they should hope European leaders will initiate an EU wide economic stimulus. As Greece is clearly too small to launch this, a stimulus must be started by the main European economies. International experience confirms such a stimulus will be more effective if concentrated on investment, as in China, rather than on consumption as in the US. If neither stimulus is launched then China must prepare for a long drawn out European crisis with negative consequences for China’s economy.

The incredible shrinking UK economy - an update

Earlier this year this blog published an article entitled ‘The Incredible Shrinking UK Economy’. It noted: ‘The magnitude of the blow suffered by the UK economy since the beginning of the financial crisis is very considerably minimized by not presenting it in terms of a common international yardstick. Gauged by decline in GDP, using a common international purchasing measure, dollars, no other economy in the world has shrunk even remotely as much as the UK.’ .

Data at that time was only available up until the end of 2010. Since then the World Bank has updated its data to cover 2011 and the pattern remains the same.

Taking first the situation of the world’s major economies, the G7 and BRICS, this is summarised in Table 1. The comparison made is between the last year before the financial crisis started, 2007, and the last available comprehensive international data – for 2011. As may be seen the $381 billion decline, in current dollar terms, of UK GDP is, without comparison, the worst of any major economy – indeed it is easily the worst in the world. As a percentage of world GDP the UK lost 1.6 percentage points – easily the worst performance of any European economy. The advance of all BRICS economies is also clear from this data. 

Table 1

 

Taking the situation within Europe this is shown in Table 2. As the UK, Ireland, and Iceland are the three economies which have suffered the biggest losses in GDP in dollars during the financial crisis this table may also be taken to show the ‘sin bin’ of world economic performance. The way in which the UK economy has declined in absolute terms far more than any other European economy is again evident.

Table 2

Where does this leave the UK in the world rankings of economies? In terms of current dollar exchange rates. as shown in Table 3, the UK has slid from 5th to 7th position under the impact of the international financial crisis – being overtaken by France and Brazil

Table 3

 

However, as is well known, current exchange rates substantially understate the size of developing economies compared to calculations in internationally equivalent prices (Parity Purchasing Powers - PPPs). This is particularly strikingly the case for India which at current exchange rates is only ranked 10th but in terms of PPPs in 2011 overtook Japan to rank as the world's 3rd largest economy . In PPPs the UK has declined from 7th to 9th position – also being overtaken by France and Brazil on this measure.

Table 4

 

The data is therefore clear. In terms of its real international position the decline in the position of the UK is by far the worst of any major economy. There is no reason to change the analysis. In terms of international comparisons the UK’s is truly ‘the incredible shrinking economy’

What the world economy should learn from China

I have a new article at the Guardian's Comment is Free analysing China's economic success both during the international financial crisis and in general since since 1978. It analyses the theoretical bases of China's economic policies in terms of both Chinese and Keynesian economic theory. The article starts: 

'Few things better illustrate the difference between the state of China's economy and that of the rest of the world than the fact that its newly announced GDP growth figures of 7.6% were analysed as a "slowdown". In any other major economy this would have been considered blistering growth threatening overheating. Instead, it is clear China has room for further stimulus measures in the second half of the year.

'Indeed, as the international financial crisis has unfolded, there have been few starker contrasts than those between China, the US and the EU. Europe has combined loose monetary policy with little or no stimulus to the productive economy – the "austerity" approach. The result has been that the EU's economy shrank by 2% over four years – the UK's shrank by 4.4%. The US has combined loose monetary policy with a consumer stimulus delivered via the budget deficit. The result? The US economy has grown by 1.2% in four years. India, which followed the US model of a budget deficit delivering a consumer stimulus, saw its growth decline from 9.4% in the first quarter of 2010 to 5.3% in the first quarter of 2012.

'Meanwhile China, which combined expansionary monetary policy with an investment-led stimulus, has experienced more than 9% annual average growth throughout the four years of the financial crisis.'

The rest of the article can be found here.

 

To get out of its economic crisis Europe needs to learn from China

Four years into the international financial crisis, it is clear that the economic policies followed in Europe to deal with it have failed to do so. For a long time, there was a refusal to examine the real facts of Europe's economic situation and take the appropriate policy measures. Once Europe does start to analyse its economic problems correctly, however, it will see that it has a lot to learn from China. Naturally this does not mean that Europe can mechanically copy China's approach, but there are important trends which Europe can study.

The fundamental trends in Europe's economy are illustrated in Figure 1. This shows the changes in different components of the European Union (EU)'s GDP since the first quarter of 2008 – the peak of the last business cycle and immediately before the onset of the financial crisis. It may be seen that the negative trend in the EU economy is entirely dominated by its fall in investment. The EU's trade balance has improved during the financial crisis, government consumption has risen, and the fall in personal consumption is relatively small. But the fall in fixed investment is huge, amounting to 150 percent of the total decline in GDP. This fall far more than offsets the performance in other economic sectors. The economic situation in Europe is therefore entirely dominated by this investment fall.

Figure 1

 

After four years of failing to look at the real situation, an identification of this actual core problem in Europe's economy is beginning to emerge. European Parliament President Martin Shulz recently wrote on Europe's crisis: "…what is to be done? First, targeted investment should be given priority." José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission president, and Olli Rehn, the European commissioner charged with dealing with the euro crisis, have now said it is likely that EU leaders will agree next month to increase the capital of the European Investment Bank by €10bn ($13 billion), which could be used as collateral to start large infrastructure "pilot projects" on a pan-European scale.

These policy changes, while a step in the right direction, are too small to turn the situation around. The EU is a US$16 trillion economy. The idea that a $13 billion program, only 0.06 per cent of the EU GDP, can offset the US$343 billion decline in EU investment since the first quarter of 2008 is clearly unrealistic.

The European Commission admits that there is €82 billion (US$106 billion) in unused structural funds in the EU's medium-term budget. This could theoretically be used to tackle the investment decline. But firstly, even the use of this entire sum is less than one third of the decline in investment which has taken place in Europe. Secondly, national governments have not yet agreed that these funds can be used for a European investment program.

Therefore four years after the beginning of the crisis, EU governments are beginning to discuss the right issues, but the practical measures they are proposing are still much too small to deal with the scale of problems that Europe faces.

The difference with China can be seen clearly in Figure 2, which shows the results of the stimulus program launched by China in 2008 to counter the international financial crisis. This stimulus program directly targeted raising investment – in particular infrastructure and now housing. The results are evident. Far from falling sharply, as in Europe and the US, China's investment rose. Consequently, compared to the situation on the eve of the financial crisis, China's economy expanded by over 40 per cent in four years compared to growth of 1 per cent in the US and a contraction of 2 per cent in Europe. China's stimulus program was $586 billion, or about 13 per cent of China's 2008 GDP – the majority part directly targeted investment.

Figure 2

 

China's stimulus, in terms of proportion of GDP, is equivalent to a program of US$2 trillion in the EU today. An investment program on that scale would be substantially too large in the EU at present – the situation is not as critical as in 2008. Nevertheless it is only necessary to compare this number to the $13 billion discussed by EU commissioners today, to see how inadequate is the scale of the proposed EU response to the present situation.

Jens Weidman, president of Germany's Bundesbank, has complained about the lack of policy tools available in Europe: "Now that fiscal stimulus has reached the bounds of feasibility in many countries, monetary policy is often seen as the 'last man standing'…However…contrary to widespread belief, monetary policy is not a panacea and central banks' firepower is not unlimited." But Weidman's conclusion exists only because Europe, somewhat arrogantly, refuses to study the country which passed most successfully through the international financial crisis – China.

Two years ago I wrote: "The dispute… between the US and Europe over'economic stimulus' versus 'deficit reduction' convincingly demonstrates the superiority of China's system of macro-economic regulation. China has faced no similar dilemma. It has simultaneously carried out the world's biggest economic stimulus package while running a budget deficit which is entirely sustainable – under 3 percent of GDP. China has therefore not had to face the choice between continuing fiscal economic stimulus measures and placing the priority on budget consolidation."

This remains the key problem. Unless Europe is prepared to grasp the nettle of a large "China style" program, one based on state-led investment, Europe is likely to face, at best, years of economic stagnation.

China's authorities have always rightly clarified that it is not arguing for its economy to be a model for others. It rightly insists every country is specific and therefore no country can or should mechanically copy another. But nevertheless China learned many things from other countries. For its own sake, Europe should start to learn from China

*   *   *

This is an edited version of an article which originally appeared at China.org.cn.

US economic recovery is only one eighth of its rate in previous business cycles

A convenient statistical coincidence shows just how slow US economic recovery is in this business cycle compared to previous ones. The new US GDP data for the 1st quarter of 2012 is for the 17th quarter since the peak of the previous business cycle in the 4th quarter of 2007. In all US business cycles since 1973 by the 17th quarter in the cycle the economy had expanded by almost exactly 10.5% – as can be seen in the chart. In this cycle US growth since the previous peak has been only 1.3%. That is the US economy has been growing at only 12.6%, one eighth, of its rate in previous business cycles.

New US GDP figures are not 'disappointing' - they confirm long term deceleration in the US economy

The new US GDP data was widely seen as 'disappointing'. But the most important trend is not the short term figure of 2.2% annualised growth for 1st quarter of 2012 but the confirmation of the long term deceleration of the US economy. The charts below show that the moving average for US 20 year GDP growth has fallen to 2.6% and the moving average for 10 year US GDP growth has fallen to 1.6%. In both cases the declining long term trend for growth is clear from the charts.

It is because there is a persistent long term slowing of the US economy that the US growth data is consistently seen as 'disappointing'. In fact the problem is a wrong perception. Analysts are surprised by new data only when they have not internalised or built into their models this long term deceleration of the US economy. A more fundamental and longer term analysis of this long term slowing of the US economy can be found here.

PS for those interested more detailed analyses of the new US GDP figures will be found on my Sina Weibo - the Chinese equivalent of Twitter. Having used both Weibo is a better product than Twitter for economists as it has built in facilities for showing charts. Posts are in both English and Chinese. My Weibo is here.

Figure 1 – 10 year moving average of US annual GDP growth

Figure 2 – 20 year moving average of US annual GDP growth

Analysing China's new 3.6% inflation data and its implications for the world economy

This blog has frequently drawn attention to the extremely close correlation between China’s consumer inflation (CPI) trends and world commodity prices – Figure 1. It is world commodity prices, rather than monetary data, which provides the best indicator of China’s inflation trends. In that light how is China’s 3.6% CPI figure for March to be analysed? As China’s inflation trend is a major determinant of China’s ability, or otherwise, to pursue expansionary economic policies this is a major issue not only for that country but for the world economy.

Figure 1

 

It is evident China’s CPI is not powerful enough to drive world commodity prices. The correlation between the two indicators therefore necessarily shows either, or both, that world commodity prices determine China’s CPI shifts, or more probably that some third factor, for example overall global economic trends, determines both. In either case China’s CPI would be expected to follow trends in global commodity prices.

In that light China’s 3.6% CPI for March is not particularly surprising. Despite the monthly increase from 3.2% in February the overall downward trend in China’s inflation continues – Figure 2. The 3.6% CPI figure in March is a decline of almost half since the 6.5% peak in July 2011 and is within the government’s 4.0% target.

Figure 2

 

The fact that March saw an upward tick within a descending trend of China’s inflation is in line with the fact that, as this blog has analysed, world commodity prices stopped falling between December and the end of March – Figure 3. This, as was noted here, was likely to slow the decline of China’s inflation rate and therefore the March figure was not highly surprising. What is significant, however, is that late in March and so far in April a new downturn in international commodity prices started, probably under the impact of softening in the global economy – Figure 3. If that downturn continues then, as analysed here, it would be expected that China’s CPI would start to decline again.

Figure 3

 

Therefore, to have a perspective on China’s economy, world commodity prices and China’s CPI in April must be watched closely. If global commodity price changes continue their downwards trend it would also be anticipated, on the basis of existing trends, that China’s CPI will also fall – creating further room for expansionary policies. If world commodity prices were to fall, but China’s CPI did not, it would indicate that existing correlations between global commodity prices and China’s CPI no longer held.

April will therefore be a significant month not only for China’s economy but for the theoretical analysis of it.

Commodity price falls suggest global economic slowdown but good news for China's inflation

After stability from December to March world commodity prices have started falling again - Figure 1. This indicates global economic softening but good news for China’s inflation and therefore increased possibilities for China’s economic policy to adopt an expansionary approach.

Figure 1

 

Looking at the trends in greater detail, world commodity prices fell sharply during the second half of 2011. The Dow Jones-UBS spot commodity index fell from a year on year increase of 46.4% in June 2011 to a fall of minus 7.8% in December 2011. However then until mid-March 2012 no further decline occurred. As China’s consumer price index (CPI) is highly correlated with global commodity prices this raised the danger that inflationary pressures in China had ceased lessening - with negative consequences for the ability of China to undertake expansionary economic policies.

However during the latter part of March and the beginning of April 2012 commodity prices resumed their year on year fall. By 5 April the Dow Jones-UBS spot commodity index had fallen 12.9% below its level a year previously.

As commodity prices are an extremely sensitive and up to date indicator of global economic conditions two conclusions may be drawn from this.

• Global economic conditions may be softening – which would be in line with the latest unfavourable US jobs report for example.
• A decline in global commodity prices will significantly reduce inflationary pressures in China – creating more space for expansionary economic policies.

Because of the significance of such trends further development of world commodity prices must be be watched closely.

Globalization not protectionism remains the main trend in the world economy

Protectionist measures by the US government have received considerable publicity. These include tariffs against China's solar panel exports, the dispute over rare earths, a bill against "subsidized" exports passed by both houses of the US Congress and other steps.

These measures are real. But it is also important not to exaggerate them. Protectionism is not the main trend in the global economy. This is shown both by factual economic trends and considering the underlying forces at work. Protectionist measures affect trade at the margins but do not alter the core of world trade which continues to expand.

To show this first consider the facts. The volume of world trade fell severely during the international financial crisis, declining by 19.7 percent between April 2008 and May 2009. But it then more than recovered. According to the latest available data, by January 2012 the volume of world trade was 4.8 percent above pre-crisis levels - Figure 1.

Figure 1

 

After the financial crisis US imports fell sharply, from 15.7 percent of GDP in the third quarter of 2008 to 10.6 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 2009, but then recovered to 14.8 percent of GDP by the fourth quarter of 2011.

Regarding relations between China and the US, frequently seen as the main area of protectionism, in dollar terms China's exports to the US rose 22 percent between their pre-crisis peak in September 2008 and the same month in 2011, well above the 15.4 percent increase to the EU, and not far behind the 27 per cent increase to Japan. In short, US post-financial crisis trends showed trade recovery, not deepening protectionism. Nor was protectionist actions even the main trend in trade between the US and China.

Claims that protectionism is the dominant trend in the world economy are therefore factually exaggerated, and take individual developments out of context without examining their overall weight.

Analysis of fundamental economic forces confirms why protectionism is not the main trend. Modern production is on such a large scale that it cannot find an adequate market for its volume of production, at efficient levels, purely within a national economy. That is why, for example, China's reform and opening-up was necessary, but exactly the same pressures affect the US.

Even in 1929 serious retreat into protectionism led to disastrous economic decline and crisis, culminating in economic and political destabilization of all countries and finally world war. Today, when production is on a far larger scale than 1929, the economic results would be more catastrophic. This is why all major economies have so far rejected large-scale protectionism.

Fundamental economic analysis therefore confirms what the facts reveal, that certainly there will be some protectionist actions, but these will be at the margins, and globalization, not protectionism, will remain the main trend in the world economy.

Nor is protectionism likely to be the main instrument of US 'neo-cons' or a Republican president. US neo-cons have much experience in how to slow Asian economies. This was successfully achieved against Japan and then the South East Asian "Tiger" economies during the 1997 debt crisis. In neither case was protectionism the main weapon.

The first 'neo-con' strategy was to transfer disputes from the economic realm, where the US is gradually weakening, to the military and political fields, where the US remains much stronger.This tactic is followed in the US 'pivot' toward the Asia-Pacific region.

Within the economic realm the main methods US 'neo-cons' used were forcing other countries to overvalue their currency, forcing cuts in investment levels, which slow economies, and lower foreign inward investment to reduce technology transfer. All these methods are being attempted against China. Protectionism is not dominant in any of these methods.

Attention must certainly be paid to real protectionist measures but exaggerating the degree of protectionism is factually incorrect, not based on analysis of the world economy's main forces, and fails to identify the main economic tactics used by US 'neo-con' circles. 

Competition within globalization, not protectionism, is still the world economy's main trend.

*   *   *

An earlier version of this article appeared, in Chinese and English, in Global Times.

Changing perceptions of China in Europe

Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping's visit to Ireland last month highlighted the way in which the impact of the international financial crisis is bringing about a change in the perception of China in Europe.

It is useful to go back four years, in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, to see the difference. At that time, according to a poll in the Irish Times, a campaign for an Olympic boycott, promoted by figures from most Irish political parties, had the support of 43 per cent of Ireland’s population – compared to 57 per cent favouring participation. In comparison, during Xi Jinping’s visit, every major party and newspaper spoke in favour of closer links with China.

Taking another example, in early 2008, French President Sarkozy threatened to boycott the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, the 11th meeting of the EU-China summit was postponed because of Sarkozy’s attacks on China, and the mayor of Paris was saying he would hang a banner outside his office denouncing China. In contrast, when President Hu Jintao visited France in November 2010, President Sarkozy did him the unusual honour of meeting him personally at the airport.

Trade between key European countries and China has advanced in the intervening period - Germany now exports more to China than the US. China’s investments in Europe have moved beyond bond purchases to Chinese companies signing significant deals – particularly in infrastructure. China’s Three Gorges Corp bought a 21 per cent stake in EDP-Energias de Portugal SA for $3.5 billion, and China Investment Corp, China’s sovereign wealth fund, bought a 9 per cent stake in the holding company of the UK’s Thames Water. In finance, in January the UK signed an agreement with the Chinese government for London to act as an offshore centre for RMB transactions.

What in most European countries has essentially become an all-party welcome for closer economic ties with China contrasts with the political atmosphere in the US. Vice-President Xi was treated respectfully by President Obama’s administration during his US visit - although no major agreements were arrived at. But leading Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney declared he would designate China as a currency manipulator on his first day if elected president.

In contrast to Europe, the US has adopted a position blocking Chinese inward investment. The most famous case was China’s National Offshore Oil Corp being prevented from purchasing Californian oil company Unocal. But China’s Huawei, the world’s second-largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer, has effectively been blocked from bidding for US contracts.

There are are of course those in Europe opposing better relations with China. Britain’s Daily Telegraph, for example, carried a headline regarding Vice-President Xi’s visit to the US that ‘China’s upcoming leader Xi Jinping has been wined, dined... and warned.’ But in contrast, the UK’s Guardian newspaper carried an editorial headlined, ‘Chinese economy: headaches to die for,’ arguing: ‘Any appraisal of China's prospects must begin by admitting that the Middle Kingdom is the most astonishing development success story in the world today.’ Even a tabloid newspaper, such as the UK’s Daily Mirror, carried a major story emphasizing the positive role of UK trade relations with China.

It is clear that the political atmosphere for China’s trade and investment in Europe is currently more favourable, and enjoys far wider support, than in US politics.

This situation is significant not only for China but for Europe and the US themselves. Trade growth between both the US and China and between the EU and China is larger than between the US and EU.

Comparing the latest available data, for the 4^th quarter of 2011, with the 4^th quarter of 2007, before the financial crisis, U.S. exports to the EU increased by an annualized $21 billion and EU exports to the US by an annualized $8 billion. US exports to China, however, increased by an annualized $47 billion, while EU exports to China grew by an annualized $83 billion. Growth of US exports to China, therefore was more than twice those to the EU, and EU exports to China grew by more than 10-fold those to the US. This data also shows the EU gained more from increased exports to China than the US.

A parallel investment pattern exists. Europe is now the largest destination for Chinese companies’ foreign investment. It also accounted for 34 per cent of China’s outward investment in mergers and acquisitions in 2011. In contrast, China’s investment in the US fell from $4.2 billion in 2010 to $3.2 billion last year.

Naturally there are downs as well as ups in Europe’s economic relations with China – a current down is the row over the EU’s airline tax. But overall the current types of deals being done are well founded because they are mutually beneficial. The Economist magazine noted: ‘In welcoming China, Europe is swimming with the tide of history; America is struggling against it.’

The reason that at present the EU is gaining more from trade and investment with China than the US is certainly not due to China’s political bias – China’s government must consider its relations with the US as the world’s most important bilateral one. But, in addition to the different scale of openings being offered them, China’s companies have to evaluate ‘political risk’ just as much as Western ones do. ‘Political risk’ is clearly now lower in Europe.

Good relations between Europe and China are evidently capable of generating what China characterises as 'win-win' outcomes. China is a huge market for technologically advanced and high-value exports from the EU, as Germany’s export success shows, which improves China’s industry, while the EU also gains from China’s continued support for the euro.

The change in the perception of China in Europe is not merely a success for China’s diplomacy but has economic foundations.

*   *   *

An earlier version of this article appeared in China Daily.

China's inflation increase - not just a holiday effect?

The increase in China’s January annual consumer price index (CPI) to 4.5 per cent, from January’s 4.1 per cent, ending a five month period of decline, has been generally ascribed to inflationary effects caused by China’s Spring Festival (Chinese New Year). The Financial Times, for example, tagged its coverage ‘Spike blamed on food prices ahead of New Year celebrations‘. The FT’s report noted: 'Chinese inflation jumped in January, breaking a streak of five straight monthly declines, but seasonal factors were largely to blame and price pressures were expected to weaken in the coming months.’

It is certainly true that China’s Spring Festival has powerful, and well known, distorting effects on statistical comparisons, and therefore undoubtedly not too much should be read into one month’s figures. Nevertheless there are reasons to consider that the inflation increase was not purely a holiday effect but reflects international factors.

As this blog has noted previously China’s CPI is not, contrary to claims to the contrary, closely linked to China’s money supply data but it is extremely closely tied to international commodity prices. In this regard it is important to note that since December the annual change in international commodity prices has stopped falling. This may be seen clearly in the end of the decline in the year on year data for the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Spot Price Index – see Figure 1.

Furthermore year on year data somewhat flatter as they are affected by the base effects of the rapid rise in prices during the early part of 2011. If absolute price levels are analysed then commodity prices reached their recent minimum on 4 October 2011, since which they have risen by 8.2 per cent – Figure 2.

Figure 1

Figure 2

 

International commodity prices, as always, show strong fluctuations and it would be too early to definitively state that a new round of commodity price inflation is taking place. But certainly the sharp fall in commodity prices, which took place from spring to autumn 2011, has ended. In that case, given the very close correlation between China’s inflation and global commodity prices, this substantial downward pressure on China’s CPI will also have halted.

The halt to the downward trend in global commodity prices is logical given two factors -  that talk in the second half of last year of a double dip US recession, popularised by Nouriel Roubini and others, was exaggerated and that the US Federal Reserve and European Central Bank (ECB) are both engaged in major rounds of quantitative easing (QE) – i.e. printing money. This monetary stimulus is further added to by the financial support the Federal Reserve is giving to the ECB. This new wave of QE has been supporting both bond and share prices and may now be spilling into commodity markets. The partial recovery of gold prices from recent lows is another indicator of the same process. In short upward pressure on commodity prices may well not be temporary.

What conclusions follow?

• International commodity prices need to be very carefully tracked.
• Inflation data not only in China but in other developing economies, notably India and Brazil, needs to be carefully watched to see whether an international effect of a slowing or reversal of the decline in inflation takes place.
• China’s authorities are clearly correct to have taken a relatively cautious approach so far to economic loosening – inflationary pressures may be stronger than generally assumed outside China.

There certainly was a seasonal effect in China’s higher January CPI data. For that reason it is likely China's CPI will fall in February. But nevertheless there is also evidence that the rise in the CPI figure was not only a seasonal holiday effect. As it continues to be the case that international commodity prices, not money supply, shows a close correlation with China’s inflation the data on global commodity prices must be extremely carefully watched to understand trends in China's economy.

Higher international commodity prices, of course, are not due to, or under the control of, China’s economic authorities. But China cannot escape their effect. Both global commodity prices and the inflationary situation in other major developing economies must be carefully followed. While China's inflation is likely to continue to decline from its peak levels there are grounds to consider that China’s, and other countries, CPI will continue to be above market expectations.

Europe's largest economic failure is not in Greece - but in the UK, Italy and Spain

With the European Union (EU) heading into a double dip recession, even before the peak level of GDP of the previous business cycle has been regained (Figure 1), it is evident that the solutions adopted to deal with Europe's economic crisis have failed. But the focus of financial markets on Greece's debt crisis should not obscure the fact that the largest scale economic failures in Europe, with the most direct impact on world growth, are not in Greece, the GDP of which accounts for only 1.8 per cent of the EU’s, but in the UK, Italy and Spain. The latter economies collectively account for over one third, 34.7 per cent, of EU GDP. Furthermore these large EU economies, having failed by significant margins to regain their previous peak levels of GDP, are again turning down.

To give some idea of the relative scale of these problems it may be noted that the combined GDP of the UK, Italy and Spain is equivalent to 40.9 per cent of US GDP, whereas Greece’s GDP is equivalent to a mere 2.0 per cent of US GDP. Even the combined GDP of the three economies under EU bailout measures (Portugal, Ireland and Greece) is only 5.1 per cent of US GDP. In short, while they pose significant problems for financial markets the recessions in the peripheral Eurozone economies are simply to small to make a direct significant difference to global growth prospects.

In contrast the failures in the UK, Italy and Spain - respectively Europe’s 3rd, 4th and 5th largest economies - are on quite large enough scale to create a serious negative impact on global growth – economies approaching half the size of the US are, at best, essentially stagnant and now facing new downturns.

The aim of this article, therefore, is to place the financial difficulties in Greece against the background of these larger growth failures in Europe.

Overall trends in the EU

The overall trends in the EU’s GDP are compared to the US and Japan in Figure 1. They are shown in detail in Table 1 below.

GDP data for the EU for the 4th quarter of 2011 is not yet available – on the basis of partial statistics it is highly likely to show downturn. But on the most up to date data available, for the 3rd quarter of 2011, EU GDP was still 1.7 per cent below its peak in the previous business cycle and Eurozone GDP 1.9 per cent below, In contrast by the 4th quarter of 2011 US GDP was 0.7 per cent above its last business cycle peak. With EU GDP likely to have turned down in the 4th quarter of 2011, Europe is suffering a strictly defined ‘double dip’ recession - i.e. a fall in output before the previous peak level of GDP has been regained .

Figure 1

 

Considering the detailed data for the EU economies, plus those in Eastern Europe, in Table 1 below, the overwhelming majority of European economies have not regained the peak levels of GDP recorded in the previous business cycle. All three economies which have published official Eurostat data for the 4th quarter of 2012 (Spain, Lithuania and the UK) showed a renewed fall in output - a more detailed analysis of the groupings within the European economies is given below.

Failure of recovery in the UK, Italy and Spain

The focus of attention in the European crisis has been on small peripheral Eurozone economies – Portugal, Ireland and Greece – or on a 'Germany v the periphery' divide. But from the point of view of EU GDP by far the most serious situation is the failure of recovery in three large EU economies – the UK, Italy and Spain. These are respectively the 3rd, 4th and 5th largest EU economies. The GDP trends in the five largest EU economies are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2

 

By themselves the peripheral Eurozone economies are far too small to pull the Eurozone economy into recession - for comparison the combined economies of Portugal, Ireland and Greece are only one eighth of the size of combined economies of the UK, Italy and Spain. The key problem in European output is that while Germany’s economy has recovered - up to the 3rd quarter of 2011 its GDP performance since the peak of the last business cycle was marginally better than the US, and France’s recovery was significant, reaching only 0.6 per cent below the pre-financial crisis peak, the EU’s other large economies had not recovered and were heading into a new downturn. On the latest available data the UK’s GDP was still 3.8 per cent below its peak in the previous business cycle, Spain’s GDP was 3.9 per cent below and Italy’s was 4.7 per cent below. Furthermore in all three economies the latest available data shows a further downturn in GDP.

Failure in the European bail-out economies

In addition to the failure of recovery in the EU as a whole, primarily due to this situation in the UK, Italy and Spain, a further striking feature is that none of the economies subject to special EU bail out programmes – Portugal, Ireland, Greece – shows any sign of recovery (Figure 3). The latest data for both Ireland and Portugal shows renewed economic downturn, while no Eurostat certified Greek GDP data has been published since the 1st quarter of 2011 – it would be highly likely to show further economic decline. This failure of recovery is despite the fact that Ireland, for example, has undergone almost four years of economic downturn and Portugal is well into the third year of downturn.

The EU bailout programmes may therefore be correctly characterised as having failed.

Figure 3

 

Widespread downturn in Eastern Europe

An equallly severe, although less reported, decline in European production than in the bail-out countries has taken place in the Baltic republics – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Figure 4). The downturn in Latvia (16.6 per cent) is the worst for any European country while those in Estonia (8.6 per cent) and Lithuania (9.0 per cent) are only slightly better than Greece (9.9 per cent) and Ireland (11.6 per cent)

This crisis in the Baltic Republics, incidentally, as with the different case of the UK, shows that the European crisis spreads to far more than Eurozone – only Estonia of the Baltic republics is a Eurozone member.

Figure 4

 

In addition to the Baltic Republics economic downturn has continued in most of Eastern Europe (Figure 5) – with only Poland and Slovakia having recovered to pre-crisis levels of output (Figure 6).

Figure 5

 

Recovery economies

The trends above leave only two large European economies, Germany and France, together with a number of medium sized ones (Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and Poland) having undergone serious economic recovery (Figure 6). However, although Germany and France are the 1st and 2nd largest economies in the EU their combined GDP, at 36.2 per cent of the EU total, is only slightly greater than the 34.7 per cent of the UK, Italy and Spain combined.

In short the stagnant and declining situation in the UK, Italy and Spain is enough to essentiallly entirely offset recovery in Germany and France.

Figure 6

 

Large stagnant economies

Finally the position of the UK, Italy and Spain as large economies which have failed to significantly recover, together with smaller economies in the same situation, is clear in Figure 7.

Figure 7

 

Conclusions

A number of clear conclusions follow from these factual trends in Europe.

• Financial crisis may be focussed at present in Greece, but the most serious drags in output are not the peripheral Eurozone economies but the UK, Italy and Spain.
• Remaining outside the Eurozone is unlikely by itself to be sufficient to ensure economic recovery. Economic downturn in the UK, which is outside the Eurozone and has undergone substantial devaluation during the international financial crisis, is as severe as in the other large sluggish economies of Italy and Spain within the Eurozone. The non-Eurozone Baltic Republics of Latvia and Lithuania have undergone as serious declines in GDP as Eurozone member Estonia. Poland, which is outside the Eurozone, has largely escaped recession but due to large scale public investment. 
• Given these trends, overcoming the financial crisis in Greece is unlikely to relaunch economic growth as the largest problems in Europe's economic recovery are located in the UK, Italy and Spain. Of these UK is not even a number of the Eurozone, while the lack of growth in Italy's economy has been prolonged - annual average GDP growth in Italy in the last decade has been only 0.2 per cent.

The overall conclusion is clear. The Eurozone crisis was predictable - the present author noted 15 years ago in 'Fundamental Economic Implications of a Single European Currency' that: '‘The process that would unfold with the creation of a single currency by this method [the Treaty of Maastricht] may be predicted with certainty. Substantial parts of the EU… will be pushed into severe recession if they join. There will be sharply deepening regional imbalances and inequalities. The malignant expressions of economic depression — unemployment, poverty, collapse of the welfare system, weakening of trade unions, racism, chauvinism, crime — will multiply. The end will be either an economic tragedy, or the deepest crisis in the history of the EU, or more probably both.’

This analysis has clearly been vindicated. But it would, nevertheless, as seen above, be wrong to conclude that the exclusive core of the problems in Europe's economy is the Euro - or to see the situation exclusively in terms of a 'Germany and periphery' situation.

The greatest drag on economic growth in Europe is its 'stagnant middle' of the UK, Italy and Spain. These three economies together are equivalent in size to Germany and France. If Germany and France are supposed to provide the 'growth engine' of Europe these three economies may be conceived of as currently providing its 'drag factor'.

Unless the situation within the UK, Italy and Spain can  be resolved it is most unlikely that overcoming the economic problems in Greece will relaunch substantial European growth. For this reason, whatever occurs in Greece, the European crisis is going to be prolonged and other parts of the world economy must both take this into account and understand the more powerful factors in European economic stagnation.

Table 1

Deng Xiaoping and John Maynard Keynes

 

 

Introduction

The international importance of China’s economy is twofold. The first is practical - the scale of China’s economic growth, its global impact, and the consequences for the improvement of the social conditions of China and the world’s population. The second is theoretical, including the potential international applicability of conclusions drawn from China’s economic policies.

Regarding the latter it is necessary to clearly state that no country can mechanically copy another. As China’s political leaders and economic theorists stress its economy has unique ‘Chinese characteristics’. This was formulated as a cardinal principle by the initiator of China's economic reform, Deng Xiaoping: ‘To accomplish modernization of a Chinese type, we must proceed from China’s special characteristics.’ (Deng, 30 March 1979) Therefore China must: ‘blaze a path of our own.’ (Deng, 21 August 1985). As recently reiterated by Justin Yifu Lin, Chinese Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank: ‘we can never be too careful when it comes to the application of a foreign theory, because with different preconditions, no matter how trivial they seem, the result can be very different.’ (Lin, 2012, pp. 66 - emphasis in the original) In that sense, therefore, there is no ‘Chinese model’. However as Lin simultaneously states: ‘Some may think that the performance of a country as unique as China, with more than 1.3 billion people, cannot be replicated. I disagree. Every developing country can have similar opportunities to sustain rapid growth for several decades and reduce poverty dramatically if it exploits the benefits of backwardness, imports technology from advanced countries, and upgrades its industries.’ (Lin, 2011)

There is, however, no contradiction between these different statements. The fundamental structural elements of which an economy is composed (consumption, investment, savings, primary industry, secondary industry, tertiary industry, trade, money etc.) are universal. However the particular way in which these elements combine and are interrelated in any economy is unique and entirely specific both in place and time – which is why no country can copy another’s economic policy, while it can learn from other economies. As analysed below, China has solved in practice problems stated in general macro-economic theory. For that reason such elements, in very different forms and combinations, are of major importance for economic policy elsewhere. However the specific forms and combinations in which such policies are applied are entirely unique both in each country and at different points in time.

The practical impact of China’s economic rise have been considered extensively elsewhere.¹ The focus of this article is on the theoretical economic issues. In particular it aims to relate China’s economic performance to Western economic theory which will be more familiar to most readers.

China and macro-economic theory in Keynesian and Marxist terms

China’s ‘reform and opening up’ process under Deng Xiaoping was, of course, formulated in a Marxist economic framework. It can indeed be clearly outlined in those terms – see the appendix below, for a more detailed account of Chinese discussions on these issues see (Hsu, 1991), but an alternative statement in Western economic terms, those of Keynes, is considered here.

Stated briefly in Marxist terms, China’s reform policy included a critique of Soviet economic policy that this had made the error of confusing the ‘advanced’ stage of socialism/communism, in which the regulation of the economy is ‘for need’, and therefore not market regulated, with the socialist, or more precisely ‘primary’ developing stage of socialism, during which the transition from capitalism to an advanced socialist economy takes place and in which market regulation takes place. This transition should be conceived as extending over a prolonged period. The final formulation arrived at was that China’s was a ‘socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics’. Contrary to suggestions by some writers, for example (Hsu, 1991), such an analysis is in line with Marx’s own writings although, as shown below, it is not necessary to be a Marxist understand it - a more detailed analysis is given in the appendix.

This debate was framed in Chinese terms, without primary reference to previous economic theory in other countries other than Marx himself. The approach, in a Chinese phrase emphasised by Deng, was to ‘seek truth from facts’ (Deng, 2 June 1978). In practical terms in China, such analysis meant abandonment of an administratively planned economy and substitution of a market economy in which the state would control certain key macroeconomic parameters. In terms of ownership it led to ‘Zhuada Fangxiao’ – maintaining large state firms and releasing small ones to the non-state/private sector.

Restatement of Chinese economic policy in terms of Keynesian economics

Most people in the US and Europe are unaware of, or disagree with, Marxist economic categories. To make the essential economic policies clear, therefore, this article will put them in more familiar terms of Western economics – those of Keynes. The proviso is that this is the actual Keynes of The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money - not the vulgarised version in economics textbooks. Geoff Tily’s Keynes Betrayed (Tily, 2007) is one of the best in a series of works outlining the difference between the two. However, there is no substitute for reading Keynes General Theory itself, which differs sharply from the presentation of what is frequently presented as ‘Keynesian’ economics. For example, budget deficits play only a secondary role in both Keynes General Theory and in China’s stimulus packages – even during 2009’s maximum anti-crisis measures China’ s budget deficit was only 3% of GDP. The core of Keynes’ General Theory itself, unlike vulgarisations, centres on factors determining investment. It is therefore through this optic that both Keynes and Chinese economic strategy can be best approached.

The rising proportion of the economy devoted to investment

In the founding work of classical economics, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith identified division of labour as the fundamental force raising productivity, stating as the opening sentence of the first chapter: ‘The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgement with which it is any where directed, or applied, seems to have been the effects of the division of labour.’ (Smith, 1776, p. 13) Smith concluded that a necessary consequence of the increasing division of labour was that the proportion of the economy devoted to investment rose with economic development: ‘accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in proportion only as stock is previously more and more accumulated… As the division of labour advances, therefore, in order to give constant employment to an equal number of workmen, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater stock of materials and tools than what would have been necessary in a ruder state of things must be accumulated beforehand.’ (Smith, 1776, p. 277) A more comprehensive treatment of Smith’s views may be found in (Ross, 2011). Marx reached the same conclusion as Smith, concluding that the contribution of investment rose as an economy developed, which he termed the rising ‘organic composition of capital’ (Marx, 1867, p. 762).

Keynes similarly analysed that the proportion of the economy devoted to investment rose with economic development. His explanation was, however, somewhat different to Smith’s as Keynes rooted this in rising savings levels accompanying development. As the percentage of income consumed fell with increasing wealth, the proportion devoted to saving necessarily rose proportionately: ‘men are disposed… to increase their consumption as their income increases, but not by as much as the increase in their income… a higher absolute level of income will tend… to widen the gap between income and consumption.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 36) As total savings necessarily equals total investment, a rising proportion of saving therefore necessarily means a rising proportion of investment.

A necessary consequence of an increase in the proportion of the economy devoted to investment is that any investment decline will have increasingly serious consequences: ‘the richer the community, the wider will tend to be the gap between its actual and its potential production… For a poor community will be prone to consume by far the greater part of its output, so that a very modest measure of investment will be sufficient to provide full employment; whereas a wealthy community will have to discover much ampler opportunities for investment if the saving propensities of its wealthier members are to be compatible with the employment of its poorer members. If in a potentially wealthy community the inducement to invest is weak… the working of the principle of effective demand will compel it to reduce its actual output, until, in spite of its potential wealth, it has become so poor that its surplus over its consumption is sufficiently diminished to correspond to the weakness of the inducement to invest.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 31)

Failure of attempts to refute Keynes on the rising proportion of investment

In the mid-20^th century attempts were made to dispute this conclusion of classical economics, originally deriving from Smith, of a rising proportion of investment in the economy - Milton Friedman devoted a book, A Theory of the Consumption Function, to attempting to refute Keynes on this (Friedman, 1957). However modern econometrics findings are conclusive in support of Smith and Keynes and against Friedman – the definitive demonstration, as frequently on matters of long term economic growth, being given by Angus Maddison. (Maddison, 1992) Factually, as classical economics and Keynes analysed, the trend is for the proportion of the economy devoted to investment to rise. To illustrate this, Figure 1 shows the percentage of fixed investment in GDP of the leading economies of successive periods of growth over the 300-year period for which meaningful statistics exist.

Figure 1

 

A reason Friedman attempted, unsuccessfully, to refute Keynes over the rising proportion of investment in the economy is that such a trend, as will be seen, is potentially destabilising - Friedman noted: ‘the central analytical proposition of the [theoretical] structure is the denial that the long-run equilibrium position of a free enterprise economy is necessarily at full employment.’ (Friedman, 1957, p. 237)

Effective demand

There is a parallelism between Keynes’s analysis and Marx’s regarding the role of profit and investment. The latter noted that without offsetting factors, a rise in the proportion of investment in the economy would led to a falling rate of profit as a necessary consequence of a rise in capital relative to the profits stream – i.e. Increasing division of labour, through its effect in raising investment as proportion of the economy, as analysed by Smith, created a tendency to a declining rate of profit (Marx, 1894, pp. 317-375).

Keynes also approached economic fluctuations via profit: ‘The trade cycle is best regarded… as being occasioned by a cyclical change in the marginal efficiency of capital.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 313) However, Keynes specific development was to approach the potentially destabilising consequences of the rising proportion of investment in the economy via effective demand.

Effective demand is composed of both consumption and investment, with the latter, as noted, tending to rise relative to the former over time. Keynes therefore noted: ‘when aggregate real income is increased aggregate consumption is increased but not by as much as income… Thus to justify any given amount of employment there must be an amount of current investment sufficient to absorb the excess of total output over what the community chooses to consume when employment is at the given level… It follows… that given what we shall call the community’s propensity to consume, the equilibrium level of employment, i.e. the level at which there is no inducement to employers as a whole either to expand or to contract employment, will depend on the amount of current investment.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 27)

Keynes noted no automatic mechanism ensures a necessary volume of investment to maintain effective demand: ‘the effective demand associated with full employment is a special case… It can only exist when, by accident or design, current investment provides an amount of demand just equal to the excess of the aggregate supply price of the output resulting from full employment over what the community will choose to spend on consumption when it is fully employed.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 28) Put aphoristically: ‘An act of individual saving means – so to speak – a decision not to have dinner today. But it does not necessitate a decision to have dinner or buy a pair of boots a week hence or a year hence.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 210). In more technical terminology: ‘The error lies in proceeding to the … inference that, when an individual saves, he will increase aggregate investment by an equal amount.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 83)

Any investment shortfall would be amplified by the well known economic ‘multiplier’ into much stronger cyclical fluctuations: ‘It is… to the general principle of the multiplier to which we have to look for an explanation of how fluctuations in the amount of investment, which are a comparatively small proportion of the national income, are capable of generating fluctuations in aggregate employment and income so much greater in amplitude than themselves.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 122) Such fluctuations in investment, combined with consumption, in turn determined employment: ‘The propensity to consume and the rate of new investment determine between them the volume of employment.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 30)

From this analysis Keynes derived key policy conclusions.

Budget deficits

One, well known, is countering recession with budget deficits, which Keynes dealt with as ‘loan expenditure’ – vulgarisation of Keynes lies in reducing his theories to support for budget deficits, not in the fact that he supported deficit spending. Keynes noted: ‘”loan expenditure” is a convenient expression for the net borrowing of public authorities on all accounts, whether on capital account or to meet a budgetary deficit. The one form of loan expenditure operates by increasing investment and the other by increasing the propensity to consume.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 128)

Therefore, in a famous passage: ‘If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coalmines… and leave it to private enterprise… to dig the notes up again... with the help of repercussions, the real income of the community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a good deal greater… It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the like; but if there are political and practical difficulties in the way of this, the above would be better than nothing.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 130)

Such a view of deficit spending naturally did not mean Keynes was indifferent to what deficits should be spent on - today environmentally sustainable investment would be added to his existing list. He had scathing contempt for double standards regarding when deficits were justifiable: ‘Pyramid-building, earthquakes, even wars… may serve to increase wealth, if… our statesmen… stands in the way of anything better… common sense… has been apt to reach a preference for wholly “wasteful” forms of loan expenditure rather than for partly wasteful forms, which because they are not wholly wasteful, tend to be judged on strict “business” principles. For example, unemployment relief financed by loans is more readily accepted than the financing of improvements at a charge below the current rate of interest…wars have been the only form of large-scale loan expenditure which statesmen have thought justifiable.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 129)

Interest rates

While Keynes supported deficit spending, the causes of recession lay in more fundamental factors affecting investment, which in turn were affected by interest rates: ‘the succession of boom and slump can be described and analysed in terms of the fluctuations of the marginal efficiency of capital relatively to the rate of interest.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 144) This was because marginal efficiency of capital was ‘equal to the rate of discount which would make the present value of the series of annuities given by returns expected from the capital-asset during its lift just equal to its supply price.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 135) Consequently, ‘inducement to invest depends partly on the investment-demand schedule and partly on the rate of interest.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 137)

As investment was affected by interest rates, therefore, a crucial issue to maintain investment at a sufficient level to sustain effective demand was a low interest rate. This problem, in turn, tended to become more acute because of the rising proportion of the economy devoted to investment: ‘Not only is the marginal propensity to consume weaker in a wealthy community, but owing to its accumulation of capital being already larger, the opportunities for further investment are less attractive unless the rate of interest falls at a sufficiently rapid rate; which brings us to the theory of the rate of interest and… reasons why it does not automatically fall to the appropriate levels.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 31)

The aim of low interest rates was to relaunch investment by ensuring that the return on investment was above the rate of interest plus whatever was the required premium to overcome liquidity preference. But, as Keynes openly acknowledged, such low term interest rates destroy the ability to live from income from interest – which is why, in his famous phrase, Keynes foresaw ‘euthanasia of the rentier.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 376) He concluded: ‘I see… the rentier aspect of capitalism as a transitional phase which will disappear.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 376)

‘A somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment’

Nevertheless, despite support for low interest rates Keynes, did not judge these would be likely by themselves to overcome the effects of an investment decline. It would therefore be necessary for the state to play a greater role: ‘Only experience… can show how far management of the rate of interest is capable of continuously stimulating the appropriate volume of investment… I am now somewhat sceptical of the success of a merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of interest… I expect to see the State… taking an ever greater responsibility for directly organising investment.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 164) Consequently Keynes believed that regulating the level of investment would have to be undertaken by the state and not by the private sector: ‘I conclude that the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 320) It was necessary, therefore, to aim at ‘a socially controlled rate of investment.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 325)

If, however, the state were to determine ‘the current volume of investment’ then this led Keynes to the conclusion: ‘It seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine an optimum rate of investment. I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 378)

Keynes noted that this ‘somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment’ did not mean the elimination of the private sector, but socialised investment operating together with a private sector: ‘This need not exclude all manner of compromises and devices by which public authority will co-operate with private initiative… the necessary measures of socialisation can be introduced gradually and without a break in the general traditions of society… apart from the necessity of central controls to bring about an adjustment between the propensity to consume and the inducement to invest there is no more need to socialise economic life than there was before…. The central controls necessary to ensure full employment will, of course, involve a large extension of the traditional functions of government.’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 378)

The conclusion

It is now possible to clearly see the structure of Keynes’s argument. The rising proportion of the economy devoted to investment meant any downturn in the latter would have increasingly destabilising consequences. Budget deficits could deal with this to some degree, but as the key element was investment, which was determined by interaction between profits and interest rates, low interest rates was necessary. This would lead to the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’. However it was unlikely interest rates would be sufficient themselves and therefore the state would need to step in with ‘a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment’ which would however work alongside a private sector.

Tracing this argument one has now arrived at a ‘Chinese’ economic structure - although approaching it via a Keynesian and not a Marxist framework. ‘Zhuada Fangxiao’, grasping large state firms and releasing small ones to the non-state/private sector, coupled with abandonment of quantitative planning, means that China’s economy is not being regulated via administrative means but by general macro-economic control, including centrally of the level of investment – as Keynes advocated.

Implications

What is the overall significance of this? Deng Xiaoping’s most famous economic statement is ‘cats theory’ – ‘it doesn’t matter whether a cat is black or white provided it catches mice’. But ‘cats theory’ can be applied to economics itself – it doesn’t matter whether something is described in Marxist or Western economic terms provided the same economic policies exist. ‘Zhuada Fangxiao’ may be arrived at from either a Keynesian or a Marxist framework.

But while one may be indifferent to the colour of theoretical cats it is not possible to be indifferent as regards the policy measures to be taken – steps in budget deficits, interests rates, investment etc are material and precise. Here there is a radical difference in between the US and Europe on one side and China on the other.

In the US and Europe budget deficits have been utilised – although they are under increasing attack. Low central bank interest rates have been pursued and some forms of quantitative easing, driving down long term interest rates through central bank purchases of debt, have been used. But no serious programmes of state investment have been launched – let alone Keynes’s ‘somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment’.

In China, in contrast, relatively limited budget deficits have been combined with low interest rates, a state owned banking system (‘euthanasia of the rentier’) and a huge state investment programme. While the West’s economic recovery programme has been timid, China has pursued full blooded policies of the type recognisable from Keynes General Theory as well as its own ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ Why this contrast and why has China’s stimulus package been so much more successful than the West’s?

Because in the US and Europe, of course, it is held that the colour of the cat matters very much. Only the private sector coloured cat is good, the state sector coloured cat is bad. Therefore even if the private sector cat is catching insufficient mice, that is the economy is in severe recession, the state sector cat must not be used to catch them. In China both cats have been let lose – and therefore far more mice are caught.

The recession in the Western economies, as foreseen by Keynes, is driven by decline in investment – in most countries decline in fixed investment accounted for two thirds to more than ninety per cent of the GDP fall (Ross, Li, & Xu, 2010). Keynes’s calls for not only budget deficits and low interest rates but also for the state to set about ‘organising investment’ are evidently required. But this is blocked because the state coloured cat is not allowed to catch mice.

To put it another way, the US and Europe insist on participating in a race while hopping on only one leg – the private sector. China is using two legs, so little wonder it is running faster.

To turn from metaphors to economic measures, a large scale state financed house building programme, or large scale expansion of transport, of the type China is following as part of anti-crisis measures not only delivers goods that are valuable in themselves but boosts the economy through macro-economic effects in raising investment. But in the West such state investment is blocked as it creates competition for the private sector. As the top aim in the US and Europe is not to revive the economy, but to protect the private sector, therefore such large-scale investment must not be undertaken.

It is an irony. Keynes explicitly put forward his theories to save capitalism. But the structure of the US and European economies has made it impossible to implement Keynes’s policies even when confronted with the most severe recession since the Great Depression. The anti-crisis measures of China’s ‘socialist market economy’ are far closer to those Keynes foresaw that any capitalist economy. Whereas in the US, for example, fixed investment fell by over twenty five per cent during the financial crisis in China urban fixed investment rose by over thirty per cent. Consequently, there is no mystery why China’s economy has grown by 41.4 per cent in the four years since the peak of the last US business cycle, in the 4^th quarter of 2007, while the US economy has grown by 0.7 per cent.

Deng Xiaoping famously said his death was ‘going to meet Marx’. But Deng may also be having an intense talk with John Maynard Keynes. And Keynes would be interested to discuss with Deng’s two cats – who appear to have read the  General Theory more closely and accurately than any administration in the West.

Put in more prosaic terms, China’s economic structure, because it allowed ‘a socially controlled rate of investment’ and a ‘somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment’, could utilise policy tools developed by Keynes but the US and European economies could not. Although Keynes explicitly wished to save capitalism it turned out that Western capitalism could not use his tools, but China’s ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ could. Deng Xiaoping could not fit in the framework of Keynes, but Keynes could fit rather neatly within the framework of Deng Xiaoping.

Appendix – the issues restated in Marxist terms

In the article above an account has been given of China’s macro-economic policy in terms of a theoretical framework derived from Keynes. Deng Xiaoping, however, as a Communist naturally explicitly formulated China’s economic policy in Marxist terms - China’s economic reform policies were seen as the integration of Marxism with the specific conditions in China. More precisely Deng stated: ‘We were victorious in the Chinese revolution precisely because we applied the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism to our own realities.’ (Deng, 28 August 1985) Consequently: ‘Our principle is that we should integrate Marxism with Chinese practice and blaze a path of our own. That is what we call building socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ (Deng, 21 August 1985)

Authors, including (Hsu, 1991), have contended that Deng’s economic policies were not in accord with those of Marx. However while China’s economic policies clearly differed from those of the USSR after the introduction of the First Five Year Plan in 1929, which introduced comprehensive planning and essentially total state ownership, it is clear that China’s economic policies were in line with those indicated by Marx. Whether people wish to formulate Chinese economic policy in Keynesian or Marxist terms may be left to them. What is most crucial is not the colour of the cat but whether it catches mice – that is, the practical policy conclusions drawn. This appendix therefore briefly shows that Deng’s essential concepts in launching China’s economic reform in in 1978 corresponded to Marx’s.

The primary stage of socialism

Regarding China’s economic reform policies Deng noted, as stated in Marxist terms, that China was in the socialist and not the (higher) communist stage of development. Large scale development of the productive forces/output was the prerequisite before China could make the transition to a communist society: ‘A Communist society is one in which there is no exploitation of man by man, there is great material abundance, and the principle of from each according to their ability, to each according to his needs is applied. It is impossible to apply that principle without overwhelming material wealth. In order to realise communism, we have to accomplish the tasks set in the socialist stage. They are legion, but the fundamental one is to develop the productive forces.’ (Deng, 28 August 1985) More precisely, in a characterisation maintained to the present, China was in the ‘primary stage’ of socialism, which was fundamental in defining policy: ‘‘The Thirteenth National Party Congress will explain what stage China is in: the primary stage of socialism. Socialism itself is the first stage of communism, and here in China we are still in the primary stage of socialism – that is, the underdeveloped stage. In everything we do we must proceed from this reality, and all planning must be consistent with it.’ (Deng, 29 August 1987)

The fundamental characterisations by Deng have been maintained to the present – thus for example in July 2011 President Hu Jintao stressed that ‘China is still in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time to come’ (Xinhua, 2011), while speaking to the UN premier Wen Jiabao noted ‘Taken as a whole, China is still in the primary stage of socialism’ (Xinhua, 2010). The conclusion flowing from this as noted by Hsu, was that: ‘From this perspective, a serious error in the past was the leftist belief that China could skip the primary stage and practice full socialism immediately.’ (Hsu, 1991, p. 11)

The conclusion of such a contrast between a primary socialist stage of development and and the principle of a communist society (which, as noted by Deng above, was regulated by ‘from each according to their ability to each according to each according to his needs’) was that in the present 'socialist' period the principle was ‘ to each according to their work’: ‘We must adhere to this socialist principle which calls for distribution according to the quantity and quality of an individual’s work.’ (Deng, 28 March 1978) In Marxist theory, outlined by Marx in the opening chapter of Capital (Marx, 1867), economic distribution according to work/labour is the fundamental principle of commodity production – and a commodity necessarily implies a market. In this socialist period a market would therefore exist – hence the eventual Chinese terminology of a ‘socialist market economy.’ As presented by Deng Xiaoping and his successors above such Chinese analysis is highly compressed but clearly in line with Marx himself.

It is clear Marx envisaged that the transition from capitalism to communism would be a prolonged one, noting in The Communist Manifesto: ‘The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible.’ (Marx & Engels, 1848, p. 504) The ‘by degree’ may noted – Marx therefore clearly envisaged a period during which state owned property and private property would exist. China’s system, after Deng, of simultaneous existence of sectors of state and private ownership is therefore clearly more in line with Marx’s conceptualisation than Stalin’s introduction ‘all at once’ of essentially 100 per cent state ownership in 1929.

Regarding Deng’s formulations on communist society being regulated by ‘to each according to their need’ versus the primary stage of socialism regulated by ‘each according to their work’ Marx noted in the Critique of the Gotha Programme of the post-capitalist transition to a communist society: ‘What we are dealing with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society, which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.’ (Marx, 1875, p. 85)

In such a transition Marx outlined payment in society, and distribution of products and services, necessarily had to be 'according to work' even within the state owned sector of the economy:‘Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society - after the deductions have been made - exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his individual quantum of labour. For example, the social working day consists of the sum of the individual hours of work; the individual labour time of the individual producer is the part of the social working day contributed by him, his share in it. He receives a certificate from society that he has furnished such-and-such an amount of labour (after deducting his labour for the common funds); and with this certificate, he draws from the social stock of means of consumption as much as the same amount of labour cost. The same amount of labour which he has given to society in one form, he receives back in another.

‘Here obviously the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is exchange of equal values…. as far as the distribution of the latter among the individual producers is concerned, the same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity equivalents: a given amount of labour in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labour in another form.

‘Hence, equal right here is still in principle - bourgeois right… The right of the producers is proportional to the labour they supply; the equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal standard, labour.’ (Marx, 1875, p. 86)

In such a society inequality would necessarily still exist: ‘one… is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labour in the same time, or can labour for a longer time; and labour, to serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard of measurement. This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labour... it tacitly recognises the unequal individual endowment and thus the productive capacities of the workers as natural privileges. It is, therefore, a right of inequality in its content like every right. Right by its very nature can consist only as the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) are measurable by an equal standard only insofar as they are made subject to an equal criterion, are taken from a certain side only, for instance, in the present case, are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored. Besides, one worker is married, another not; one has more children than another, etc. etc.. Thus, given an equal amount of work done, and hence an equal share in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer than another, and so on. To avoid all these defects, right would have to be unequal rather than equal.’ (Marx, 1875, pp. 86-87)

Marx considered only after a prolonged transition would payment according to work be replaced with the ultimately desired goal, distribution of products according to members of society’s needs.

‘Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development which this determines.

‘In a higher phase of communist society… after the productive forces have also increased with the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of common wealth flow more abundantly - only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!’ (Marx, 1875, p. 87)

It is therefore clear that post-Deng policies in China were more in line with Marx’s prescriptions than post-1929 Stalin policies in the USSR. Given the essentially 100 per cent state ownership of industry in China in 1978 'Zhuada Fangxiao' – maintaining the large enterprises within the state sector and releasing the small ones to the non-state sector – together with the creation of a new private sector created an economic structure clearly more in line with that envisaged by Marx than the essentially 100 per cent state ownership in the USSR after 1929. Deng’s insistence on the formula that in the transitional period reward would be ‘according to work’ and not ‘according to need’ was clearly in line with Marx’s analyses. It is notable that in the USSR itself a number of economists opposed Stalin’s post-1929 policies on the same or related grounds – including Buhkarin (Bukharin, 1925) , Kondratiev (Kondratiev), Trotsky (Trotsky, 1931) and Preobrazhensky (Preobrazhensky, 1921-27) (Preobrazhensky, 1921-27). Their works were, however, almost unknown as these issues were ‘resolved’ by Stalin killing those economists who disagreed with him and banning their works - although several accounts have been published outside the USSR – see for example (Jasny, 1972) (Lewin, 1975). China’s economic debates therefore appear to have preceded with reference to China’s conditions and Marx and not any preceding debates in the USSR.

It is therefore clear that China’s post-reform economic policy is in line with Marx’s analysis and that, as stated in Chinese analysis, post-1929 Soviet policy departed from Marx’s analysis – the argument that the converse is true, by Hsu and others, is invalid.

As China’s economic policy and structure can be understood in either Keynesian or Marxist terms it is a more general issue which is to be preferred. ‘It doesn’t matter whether a cat is black or white provided it catches mice’ might appear an appropriate response.

* * *

An earlier and shorter version of this article appeared in Soundings.

Notes and Bibliography

US workers dropping out of the labour force, not jobs creation, dominates in this US business cycle

Considerable publicity was given to the decline in the official US unemployment rate to 8.3 per cent in January 2012 and the creation of 243,000 non-farm payroll jobs. The problem is that, as usual, no baseline or serious study of overall trends was given to evaluate this monthly data.

The reality is the number in US non-farm employment still remains 5.6 million, 4.1%, below its peak level in January 2008 (Figure 1). But this figure very substantially flatters as since then the US population has grown by almost 4%.

In fact there has been no significant increase in the percentage of the US population of working age in employment since the depth of the recession, and the participation rate in the labour force of the US population of working age continues to drop.

Figure 1

 

The sharp drop in the participation of the US participation of working age in the total labour force (i.e. employed and unemployed) is shown in Figure 2. Between January 2008, the peak of US non-farm employment, and January 2012 the participation rate in the US labour force of the population over the age of 16 fell by 2.5 per cent – from 66.2 per cent to 63.7 per cent.

Figure 2

 

 

Regarding those actually in employment the situation is worse. The percentage of the US population over the age of 16 in employment fell by 4.4 per cent, from 62.9 per cent to 58.5 per cent, between January 2008 and January 2012. There has been essentially no significant recovery from the low point of 58.2 per cent in December 2008 to the 58.5 per cent in January 2012 (Figure 3).

Figure 3

 

US GDP recovery is the slowest in this business cycle of any since World War II, and in December 2011, the latest available data, US industrial production was still 5.4% below its level in the previous business cycle. As productivity growth means that less workers are required even when previous peak levels of output are regained it will be a substantial period before the US regains its previous employment level. Paul Krugman therefore noted the situation accurately: ‘the gap remains huge. Suppose that we need 100,000 jobs a month to keep up with population growth, and that we’re 10 million jobs in the hole — both conservative estimates. Then we need about 7 years of growth at this rate to restore full employment.’

It remains to be seen whether US employment growth can continue at its present rate for seven years, But the fundamental trend so far during this business cycle has not been a decline in real unemployment but an increase in the proportion of the US population dropping out of the labour force.

The myth of US industrial revival

Currently a number of attempts are being made to claim a major revival of US industry is taking place. For example Harold L. Sirkin, of the Boston Consulting Group, writes: ‘A resurgence of U.S. manufacturing seems to be in the offing. With production costs rising in China, some companies are bringing their manufacturing back to the U.S…. That's partly confirmed by the data: The Institute for Supply Management (ISM) recently reported that U.S. manufacturing had expanded for 24 consecutive months. Likewise, the Federal Reserve reported a 0.6% increase in manufacturing in July 2011, with a year-on-year gain of 3.8%.’ Washington Post columnist Vivek Wadha claims: ‘America is destined to once again gain its supremacy in manufacturing, and it will soon by China’s turn to worry.’

It is therefore important to be clear that these claims are a myth. As may be seen in Figure 1 US industrial production has not even regained pre-financial crisis levels. In December 2011, the latest available data, US industrial production was 5.4 per cent below its peak in the previous business cycle. Equally striking, for the long term, is that since June 2000, the peak of the last but one business cycle, average annual US industrial growth has been only 0.3 per cent. In short, far from a ‘rebirth’ of US industry occurring, US industrial production has scarcely grown for over a decade and so far in the present business cycle it has not even regained its previous peak level of output. On the latest monthly data it would take US industry two years to regain its previous peak output.

Figure 1

 

Sirkin presents as evidence to justify his claims: ‘Volkswagen, for example, recently opened a new $1-billion factory in Chattanooga, Tennessee; Embraer, the Brazilian manufacturer of mid-size commuter jets, recently opened an assembly plant in Melbourne, Florida; and Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Systems, which builds nuclear power plants and components, is locating a new engineering center in Charlotte, North Carolina.’ Publicity was given by others to a US company exporting chopsticks to China.

Unfortunately presentation of individual examples proves nothing. Industrial production is an aggregate, an average of different movements by companies. There will therefore always necessarily be cases above and below the average. Finding individual companies which are expanding, whether in chopsticks or anything else, therefore doesn’t constitute proof – even if US industry were sharply declining individual expanding companies may well exist.

Sirkin’s statistic that US manufacturing has been expanding for 24 months also doesn’t prove anything. Choosing particular starting dates, rather than considering the overall trend, has a well understood effect in distorting analysis. For example take 1933, the depth of the Great Depression, as a starting point for measuring US economic growth during the 1930s. By 1939 the US economy had expanded by 50 per cent. Solely from this one might conclude that the 1930s were a period of prosperity, whereas actually they were the worst decade in US economic history. The statistical distortion is to measure from the lowest point of the business cycle, ignoring the enormous fall in US GDP which took place in 1929-33. To avoid such statistical distortion economic analysis must state what points in the business cycle it is comparing and consider the economic process as a whole.

To see how this error distorts perception of US industry note that by the time US industrial output reached its bottom in the present recession, in June 2009, it had to grow by 21 per cent to regain its previous peak output. By December 2012, which indeed was after two and a half years of expansion, the increase was 14 per cent. Such an expansion of 14 per cent might sound impressive – it is a growth of over five per cent a year. But such an 'optimistic' conclusion distorts the reality – because 21 per cent growth was required to even regain the previous peak level of production!

Apple’s Steve Jobs stated the reality of US manufacturing reality at a dinner with President Obama last February. Asked what would shift iPhone production to the US, Jobs bluntly replied ‘those jobs aren’t coming back’.

US manufacturing ‘rebirth’ can only be claimed when there is statistical evidence to support it, not when output has not even regained previous peak levels.

*   *   *

An earlier, non-technical, version of this article appeared in Global Times.

 

The incredible shrinking UK economy

The magnitude of the blow suffered by the UK economy since the beginning of the financial crisis is very considerably minimized by not presenting it in terms of a common international yardstick. Gauged by decline in GDP, using a common international purchasing measure, dollars, no other economy in the world has shrunk even remotely as much as the UK (Figure 1 and Table 1).

As most countries produce only annualized GDP data it will be necessary to wait before a comprehensive global comparison can be made for 2011. However it is clear no substantial growth in dollar terms took place in the UK economy during that year – GDP at national current prices rose only 1.4 per cent between the 1^st and 3^rd quarters and the change in the pound’s exchange rate against the dollar during the year was a marginal 0.3 per cent. Therefore there will have been no significant recovery from the UK data set out in Table 1 below, and the gap between the UK and other European economies, which form the next worst performing major group, is too great to have been qualitatively affected by changes in the Euro’s exchange rate – the Euro declined against the pound by only 3.3 per cent in 2011.

Table 1 shows that the fall in UK GDP in 2007-2010 was $562 billion compared to the next worst performing national economy, Italy, with a decline of $65 billion – i.e. the decline in UK GDP in the common measuring yardstick of dollars was more than eight times that of the next worst performing national economy. Table 1 shows the 10 national economies suffering the greatest declines in dollar GDP.

It is also extremely striking that the UK’s decline was more than two and a half times that of the entire Eurozone. The UK accounted for a somewhat astonishing 77 per cent of the EU's decline.

Table 1

Figure 1

 

Expressed in percentage terms the situation is no better. of all economies for which World Bank data is available only Iceland, with a decline in dollar GDP of 38.4 per cent, suffered a worst percentage fall than the UK - even bail out economy Ireland, with a fall of 18.4 per cent, outperformed the UK economy.

Two trends intersected for the UK's performance to be so much worse than that of any other economy. First, contrary to the government's anti-European rhetoric, UK economic performance in constant price national currency terms has been significantly worse than the Eurozone during the financial crisis (Figure 2). Up to the latest available data, for the 3rd quarter of 2011, UK GDP was still 3.6 per cent below its pre-financial crisis peak compared to the Eurozone's 1.7 per cent below. Second, between the beginning of 2008 and the beginning of 2012, the pound's exchange rate has fallen by 21.0 per cent against the dollar compared to the Euro's 11.4 per cent drop in the same period. The multiplicative effect of the severity of the relative drop in constant price GDP and the fall in the pound's exchange rate accounts for the unequalled decline in UK GDP in dollars.

Figure 2

 

As at present the UK economy shows no substantial sign of recovery, the present UK government, which maintains a steadfastly ostrich like attitude towards Europe in particular, and most other countries in general, may argue that a measure in terms of dollars at current exchange rates is irrelevant – the UK currency is the pound and what counts is constant price shifts. Such an argument is false and an attempt to disguise the true scale of the decline of the UK economy.

The internationally unmatched decline in UK dollar GDP is a huge fall in real international purchasing ability. The far higher than targeted inflation in the UK during the last two years, which has substantially eroded the population's living standards, is itself in part a reflecton of the decline in the UK's exchange rate and consequent raising of import prices. In short, the decline in the international purchasing power of the UK's economy translates into a direct fall in real incomes. The decline in the UKs ranking among world economies in terms of GDP, being recently overtaken by Brazil, statistically reflects the same process.

It may also be seen that the government's claim that the UK is outperforming Europe and the Eurozone is entirely without foundation even in constant price national currency terms. But when measured in terms of real international comparisons, i.e. in dollars, the UK's performance is incomparably worse than Europe's.

It appears extremely unlikely that the UK's economy will escape from this circle of decline in the next period. The austerity policies pursued by the present UK government have substantially slowed the economic recovery that was taking place in 2009 and the first part of 2010 - between the 3rd quarter of 2010 and the 3rd quarter of 2011 the UK economy grew by only 0.5 per cent. The opposition Labour Party has recently also endorsed essentially the same austerity policies which have failed not only in the UK but in other European economies, such as Greece and Ireland, where they have been pursued.

Even if any partial recovery takes place, for example by some increase in the exchange rate of the pound against the Euro, the sheer magnitude of the decline in the UK economy makes it implausible that this could be on a scale sufficient to reverse the fall in its relative international position.