Key Trends in Globalisation

China is winning the new global industrial contest

The international financial crisis brought about a radical change in the structure of international industrial competition, and China is winning this new contest. That is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the pattern of industrial expansion and contraction in the major industrial centres in the five years since the beginning of the international financial crisis in 2008.

As taking comparisons only for single years can obscure this fundamental trend, Figure 1 shows the changes in industrial output during the entire last five year period in the world’s four major industrial centres – China, the U.S., the European Union (EU) and Japan. The pattern is clear and striking.

• U.S. industrial production on the latest data, for February 2013, remained 1.3% below its level five years previously – essentially stagnating over the five year period taken as a whole.
• Industrial output in the EU remains at 12.2%, i.e., significantly below its level five years ago. EU industrial production has fallen since February 2011.
• Japan’s industrial production remains at 19.2%, i.e., substantially below its levelof five years ago and has also fallen since February 2011.
• China’s industrial output is 76.1% above the level five years previously.

Figure 1

 

China’s industrial production therefore increased by over three quarters during a period when U.S. industrial production stagnated and EU and Japanese industrial production significantly declined. That is a conclusive victory by China in this competitive struggle.

Extending the comparison to other developing economies, there is no individual industrial centre matching the four major global ones. Figure 2 therefore shows aggregated data for developing economic regions. As statistics for all developing economies are not available for February 2013, the period January 2008 to January 2013 is considered. Data for China is also shown. As no separate China data was published for January, due to the Spring Festival holiday, China’s January data is taken as the mid-point between December and the combined January-February statistics.

Again the pattern is clear over the five year period.

• China’s industrial production grew by 77.9%.
• Total developing Asian industrial production expanded by 53.9% – China accounting for the largest part of this.
• Latin American industrial production increased by 3.0%.
• Eastern Europe and the former USSR’s industrial production increased by 2.0%.
• Industrial output in Africa and Middle East fell by -0.2%.

Figure 2

 

China was therefore successful in industrial competition not only with developed but with developing economies. As the increase in China’s industrial production was over 75%, and it was already one of the world’s main industrial centres, this constitutes a major shift in the balance of world industrial production in China’s favour.

What conclusions follow from these developments?

First, the claim of some Chinese commentators that there is a great revival of U.S. industry and China is lagging behind is factual nonsense. Not only has China’s industrial growth far outperformed that of the U.S., but U.S. industrial production has not even yet recovered to pre-financial crisis levels. Their arguments, based on citing purely individual examples such as that Apple will manufacture a few Macs in the U.S., are based on one of the most elementary and worst forms of statistical distortion – citing individual anecdotes and not overall trends.

Second, these differences in development have long-term consequences spreading to outside industries. Productivity increases in the industrial sector are much greater than in non-industrial sectors. Therefore China’s success in industrial competition raises its overall rate of productivity growth relative to less successful competitors.

These factual trends do not mean China will not face major future challenges within the industrial sector. China has already successfully shifted the centre of gravity of industrial production from low technology products (textiles, toys etc.) into medium technology (construction equipment, smartphones, personal computers, ships etc.). But China’s transition to very high technology industrial production still lies ahead – outside non-market sectors such as military and space production.

But it is not abnormal that China’s industry is currently dominated by medium, not yet high, technology production. China’s GDP per capita is approximately that of Japan in 1966 or South Korea in 1988. At those times Japan and South Korea had successfully made the transition from agricultural and low value added industrial economies to dominance through medium technology sectors – ship building, steel etc. Today China globally dominates the same industries. But at that time the period of domination of Japan and South Korea by high technology product innovation – Sony’s PlayStation and Walkman, Samsung’s high-end televisions and mobile phones – lay 10-15 years ahead.

As Lin Yifu, former chief economist and senior vice president of the World Bank rightly stresses, it is impossible for an economy to develop market sectors greatly out of line with its overall level of development. The full transition of China’s industry to dominance by high technology production lies a decade ahead. The key fact at present is that comparison of trends in the major industrial centers shows that in the intensified global competition created by the international financial crisis China is clearly winning.

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This article was originally published in Chinese at Sina Finance and in English at China.org.cn. 

The shape of the new EU downturn

The data released by the OECD for 2nd quarter GDP for the EU shows clearly the shape of Europe's new economic downturn. The situation is dominated by the decline in fixed investment – see charts below.

In the US$ Parity Purchasing Power (PPP) terms in which the OECD now releases such data EU GDP, in inflation adjusted terms, is still $307 billion below its peak in the 1st quarter of 2008. However EU fixed investment is down by $485 billion – that is the decline in fixed investment more than accounts for the entire fall in EU GDP. EU consumer expenditure is also down, by $122 billion, but this is only one quarter of the decline in fixed investment. Net trade and government consumption are positives.

In short the EU’s economic situation, as in the developed economies as a whole, is dominated by the fixed investment decline.

Figure 1

Figure 2

To get out of its economic crisis Europe needs to learn from China

Four years into the international financial crisis, it is clear that the economic policies followed in Europe to deal with it have failed to do so. For a long time, there was a refusal to examine the real facts of Europe's economic situation and take the appropriate policy measures. Once Europe does start to analyse its economic problems correctly, however, it will see that it has a lot to learn from China. Naturally this does not mean that Europe can mechanically copy China's approach, but there are important trends which Europe can study.

The fundamental trends in Europe's economy are illustrated in Figure 1. This shows the changes in different components of the European Union (EU)'s GDP since the first quarter of 2008 – the peak of the last business cycle and immediately before the onset of the financial crisis. It may be seen that the negative trend in the EU economy is entirely dominated by its fall in investment. The EU's trade balance has improved during the financial crisis, government consumption has risen, and the fall in personal consumption is relatively small. But the fall in fixed investment is huge, amounting to 150 percent of the total decline in GDP. This fall far more than offsets the performance in other economic sectors. The economic situation in Europe is therefore entirely dominated by this investment fall.

Figure 1

 

After four years of failing to look at the real situation, an identification of this actual core problem in Europe's economy is beginning to emerge. European Parliament President Martin Shulz recently wrote on Europe's crisis: "…what is to be done? First, targeted investment should be given priority." José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission president, and Olli Rehn, the European commissioner charged with dealing with the euro crisis, have now said it is likely that EU leaders will agree next month to increase the capital of the European Investment Bank by €10bn ($13 billion), which could be used as collateral to start large infrastructure "pilot projects" on a pan-European scale.

These policy changes, while a step in the right direction, are too small to turn the situation around. The EU is a US$16 trillion economy. The idea that a $13 billion program, only 0.06 per cent of the EU GDP, can offset the US$343 billion decline in EU investment since the first quarter of 2008 is clearly unrealistic.

The European Commission admits that there is €82 billion (US$106 billion) in unused structural funds in the EU's medium-term budget. This could theoretically be used to tackle the investment decline. But firstly, even the use of this entire sum is less than one third of the decline in investment which has taken place in Europe. Secondly, national governments have not yet agreed that these funds can be used for a European investment program.

Therefore four years after the beginning of the crisis, EU governments are beginning to discuss the right issues, but the practical measures they are proposing are still much too small to deal with the scale of problems that Europe faces.

The difference with China can be seen clearly in Figure 2, which shows the results of the stimulus program launched by China in 2008 to counter the international financial crisis. This stimulus program directly targeted raising investment – in particular infrastructure and now housing. The results are evident. Far from falling sharply, as in Europe and the US, China's investment rose. Consequently, compared to the situation on the eve of the financial crisis, China's economy expanded by over 40 per cent in four years compared to growth of 1 per cent in the US and a contraction of 2 per cent in Europe. China's stimulus program was $586 billion, or about 13 per cent of China's 2008 GDP – the majority part directly targeted investment.

Figure 2

 

China's stimulus, in terms of proportion of GDP, is equivalent to a program of US$2 trillion in the EU today. An investment program on that scale would be substantially too large in the EU at present – the situation is not as critical as in 2008. Nevertheless it is only necessary to compare this number to the $13 billion discussed by EU commissioners today, to see how inadequate is the scale of the proposed EU response to the present situation.

Jens Weidman, president of Germany's Bundesbank, has complained about the lack of policy tools available in Europe: "Now that fiscal stimulus has reached the bounds of feasibility in many countries, monetary policy is often seen as the 'last man standing'…However…contrary to widespread belief, monetary policy is not a panacea and central banks' firepower is not unlimited." But Weidman's conclusion exists only because Europe, somewhat arrogantly, refuses to study the country which passed most successfully through the international financial crisis – China.

Two years ago I wrote: "The dispute… between the US and Europe over'economic stimulus' versus 'deficit reduction' convincingly demonstrates the superiority of China's system of macro-economic regulation. China has faced no similar dilemma. It has simultaneously carried out the world's biggest economic stimulus package while running a budget deficit which is entirely sustainable – under 3 percent of GDP. China has therefore not had to face the choice between continuing fiscal economic stimulus measures and placing the priority on budget consolidation."

This remains the key problem. Unless Europe is prepared to grasp the nettle of a large "China style" program, one based on state-led investment, Europe is likely to face, at best, years of economic stagnation.

China's authorities have always rightly clarified that it is not arguing for its economy to be a model for others. It rightly insists every country is specific and therefore no country can or should mechanically copy another. But nevertheless China learned many things from other countries. For its own sake, Europe should start to learn from China

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This is an edited version of an article which originally appeared at China.org.cn.

Changing perceptions of China in Europe

Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping's visit to Ireland last month highlighted the way in which the impact of the international financial crisis is bringing about a change in the perception of China in Europe.

It is useful to go back four years, in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, to see the difference. At that time, according to a poll in the Irish Times, a campaign for an Olympic boycott, promoted by figures from most Irish political parties, had the support of 43 per cent of Ireland’s population – compared to 57 per cent favouring participation. In comparison, during Xi Jinping’s visit, every major party and newspaper spoke in favour of closer links with China.

Taking another example, in early 2008, French President Sarkozy threatened to boycott the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, the 11th meeting of the EU-China summit was postponed because of Sarkozy’s attacks on China, and the mayor of Paris was saying he would hang a banner outside his office denouncing China. In contrast, when President Hu Jintao visited France in November 2010, President Sarkozy did him the unusual honour of meeting him personally at the airport.

Trade between key European countries and China has advanced in the intervening period - Germany now exports more to China than the US. China’s investments in Europe have moved beyond bond purchases to Chinese companies signing significant deals – particularly in infrastructure. China’s Three Gorges Corp bought a 21 per cent stake in EDP-Energias de Portugal SA for $3.5 billion, and China Investment Corp, China’s sovereign wealth fund, bought a 9 per cent stake in the holding company of the UK’s Thames Water. In finance, in January the UK signed an agreement with the Chinese government for London to act as an offshore centre for RMB transactions.

What in most European countries has essentially become an all-party welcome for closer economic ties with China contrasts with the political atmosphere in the US. Vice-President Xi was treated respectfully by President Obama’s administration during his US visit - although no major agreements were arrived at. But leading Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney declared he would designate China as a currency manipulator on his first day if elected president.

In contrast to Europe, the US has adopted a position blocking Chinese inward investment. The most famous case was China’s National Offshore Oil Corp being prevented from purchasing Californian oil company Unocal. But China’s Huawei, the world’s second-largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer, has effectively been blocked from bidding for US contracts.

There are are of course those in Europe opposing better relations with China. Britain’s Daily Telegraph, for example, carried a headline regarding Vice-President Xi’s visit to the US that ‘China’s upcoming leader Xi Jinping has been wined, dined... and warned.’ But in contrast, the UK’s Guardian newspaper carried an editorial headlined, ‘Chinese economy: headaches to die for,’ arguing: ‘Any appraisal of China's prospects must begin by admitting that the Middle Kingdom is the most astonishing development success story in the world today.’ Even a tabloid newspaper, such as the UK’s Daily Mirror, carried a major story emphasizing the positive role of UK trade relations with China.

It is clear that the political atmosphere for China’s trade and investment in Europe is currently more favourable, and enjoys far wider support, than in US politics.

This situation is significant not only for China but for Europe and the US themselves. Trade growth between both the US and China and between the EU and China is larger than between the US and EU.

Comparing the latest available data, for the 4^th quarter of 2011, with the 4^th quarter of 2007, before the financial crisis, U.S. exports to the EU increased by an annualized $21 billion and EU exports to the US by an annualized $8 billion. US exports to China, however, increased by an annualized $47 billion, while EU exports to China grew by an annualized $83 billion. Growth of US exports to China, therefore was more than twice those to the EU, and EU exports to China grew by more than 10-fold those to the US. This data also shows the EU gained more from increased exports to China than the US.

A parallel investment pattern exists. Europe is now the largest destination for Chinese companies’ foreign investment. It also accounted for 34 per cent of China’s outward investment in mergers and acquisitions in 2011. In contrast, China’s investment in the US fell from $4.2 billion in 2010 to $3.2 billion last year.

Naturally there are downs as well as ups in Europe’s economic relations with China – a current down is the row over the EU’s airline tax. But overall the current types of deals being done are well founded because they are mutually beneficial. The Economist magazine noted: ‘In welcoming China, Europe is swimming with the tide of history; America is struggling against it.’

The reason that at present the EU is gaining more from trade and investment with China than the US is certainly not due to China’s political bias – China’s government must consider its relations with the US as the world’s most important bilateral one. But, in addition to the different scale of openings being offered them, China’s companies have to evaluate ‘political risk’ just as much as Western ones do. ‘Political risk’ is clearly now lower in Europe.

Good relations between Europe and China are evidently capable of generating what China characterises as 'win-win' outcomes. China is a huge market for technologically advanced and high-value exports from the EU, as Germany’s export success shows, which improves China’s industry, while the EU also gains from China’s continued support for the euro.

The change in the perception of China in Europe is not merely a success for China’s diplomacy but has economic foundations.

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An earlier version of this article appeared in China Daily.

Europe's largest economic failure is not in Greece - but in the UK, Italy and Spain

With the European Union (EU) heading into a double dip recession, even before the peak level of GDP of the previous business cycle has been regained (Figure 1), it is evident that the solutions adopted to deal with Europe's economic crisis have failed. But the focus of financial markets on Greece's debt crisis should not obscure the fact that the largest scale economic failures in Europe, with the most direct impact on world growth, are not in Greece, the GDP of which accounts for only 1.8 per cent of the EU’s, but in the UK, Italy and Spain. The latter economies collectively account for over one third, 34.7 per cent, of EU GDP. Furthermore these large EU economies, having failed by significant margins to regain their previous peak levels of GDP, are again turning down.

To give some idea of the relative scale of these problems it may be noted that the combined GDP of the UK, Italy and Spain is equivalent to 40.9 per cent of US GDP, whereas Greece’s GDP is equivalent to a mere 2.0 per cent of US GDP. Even the combined GDP of the three economies under EU bailout measures (Portugal, Ireland and Greece) is only 5.1 per cent of US GDP. In short, while they pose significant problems for financial markets the recessions in the peripheral Eurozone economies are simply to small to make a direct significant difference to global growth prospects.

In contrast the failures in the UK, Italy and Spain - respectively Europe’s 3rd, 4th and 5th largest economies - are on quite large enough scale to create a serious negative impact on global growth – economies approaching half the size of the US are, at best, essentially stagnant and now facing new downturns.

The aim of this article, therefore, is to place the financial difficulties in Greece against the background of these larger growth failures in Europe.

Overall trends in the EU

The overall trends in the EU’s GDP are compared to the US and Japan in Figure 1. They are shown in detail in Table 1 below.

GDP data for the EU for the 4th quarter of 2011 is not yet available – on the basis of partial statistics it is highly likely to show downturn. But on the most up to date data available, for the 3rd quarter of 2011, EU GDP was still 1.7 per cent below its peak in the previous business cycle and Eurozone GDP 1.9 per cent below, In contrast by the 4th quarter of 2011 US GDP was 0.7 per cent above its last business cycle peak. With EU GDP likely to have turned down in the 4th quarter of 2011, Europe is suffering a strictly defined ‘double dip’ recession - i.e. a fall in output before the previous peak level of GDP has been regained .

Figure 1

 

Considering the detailed data for the EU economies, plus those in Eastern Europe, in Table 1 below, the overwhelming majority of European economies have not regained the peak levels of GDP recorded in the previous business cycle. All three economies which have published official Eurostat data for the 4th quarter of 2012 (Spain, Lithuania and the UK) showed a renewed fall in output - a more detailed analysis of the groupings within the European economies is given below.

Failure of recovery in the UK, Italy and Spain

The focus of attention in the European crisis has been on small peripheral Eurozone economies – Portugal, Ireland and Greece – or on a 'Germany v the periphery' divide. But from the point of view of EU GDP by far the most serious situation is the failure of recovery in three large EU economies – the UK, Italy and Spain. These are respectively the 3rd, 4th and 5th largest EU economies. The GDP trends in the five largest EU economies are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2

 

By themselves the peripheral Eurozone economies are far too small to pull the Eurozone economy into recession - for comparison the combined economies of Portugal, Ireland and Greece are only one eighth of the size of combined economies of the UK, Italy and Spain. The key problem in European output is that while Germany’s economy has recovered - up to the 3rd quarter of 2011 its GDP performance since the peak of the last business cycle was marginally better than the US, and France’s recovery was significant, reaching only 0.6 per cent below the pre-financial crisis peak, the EU’s other large economies had not recovered and were heading into a new downturn. On the latest available data the UK’s GDP was still 3.8 per cent below its peak in the previous business cycle, Spain’s GDP was 3.9 per cent below and Italy’s was 4.7 per cent below. Furthermore in all three economies the latest available data shows a further downturn in GDP.

Failure in the European bail-out economies

In addition to the failure of recovery in the EU as a whole, primarily due to this situation in the UK, Italy and Spain, a further striking feature is that none of the economies subject to special EU bail out programmes – Portugal, Ireland, Greece – shows any sign of recovery (Figure 3). The latest data for both Ireland and Portugal shows renewed economic downturn, while no Eurostat certified Greek GDP data has been published since the 1st quarter of 2011 – it would be highly likely to show further economic decline. This failure of recovery is despite the fact that Ireland, for example, has undergone almost four years of economic downturn and Portugal is well into the third year of downturn.

The EU bailout programmes may therefore be correctly characterised as having failed.

Figure 3

 

Widespread downturn in Eastern Europe

An equallly severe, although less reported, decline in European production than in the bail-out countries has taken place in the Baltic republics – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Figure 4). The downturn in Latvia (16.6 per cent) is the worst for any European country while those in Estonia (8.6 per cent) and Lithuania (9.0 per cent) are only slightly better than Greece (9.9 per cent) and Ireland (11.6 per cent)

This crisis in the Baltic Republics, incidentally, as with the different case of the UK, shows that the European crisis spreads to far more than Eurozone – only Estonia of the Baltic republics is a Eurozone member.

Figure 4

 

In addition to the Baltic Republics economic downturn has continued in most of Eastern Europe (Figure 5) – with only Poland and Slovakia having recovered to pre-crisis levels of output (Figure 6).

Figure 5

 

Recovery economies

The trends above leave only two large European economies, Germany and France, together with a number of medium sized ones (Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and Poland) having undergone serious economic recovery (Figure 6). However, although Germany and France are the 1st and 2nd largest economies in the EU their combined GDP, at 36.2 per cent of the EU total, is only slightly greater than the 34.7 per cent of the UK, Italy and Spain combined.

In short the stagnant and declining situation in the UK, Italy and Spain is enough to essentiallly entirely offset recovery in Germany and France.

Figure 6

 

Large stagnant economies

Finally the position of the UK, Italy and Spain as large economies which have failed to significantly recover, together with smaller economies in the same situation, is clear in Figure 7.

Figure 7

 

Conclusions

A number of clear conclusions follow from these factual trends in Europe.

• Financial crisis may be focussed at present in Greece, but the most serious drags in output are not the peripheral Eurozone economies but the UK, Italy and Spain.
• Remaining outside the Eurozone is unlikely by itself to be sufficient to ensure economic recovery. Economic downturn in the UK, which is outside the Eurozone and has undergone substantial devaluation during the international financial crisis, is as severe as in the other large sluggish economies of Italy and Spain within the Eurozone. The non-Eurozone Baltic Republics of Latvia and Lithuania have undergone as serious declines in GDP as Eurozone member Estonia. Poland, which is outside the Eurozone, has largely escaped recession but due to large scale public investment. 
• Given these trends, overcoming the financial crisis in Greece is unlikely to relaunch economic growth as the largest problems in Europe's economic recovery are located in the UK, Italy and Spain. Of these UK is not even a number of the Eurozone, while the lack of growth in Italy's economy has been prolonged - annual average GDP growth in Italy in the last decade has been only 0.2 per cent.

The overall conclusion is clear. The Eurozone crisis was predictable - the present author noted 15 years ago in 'Fundamental Economic Implications of a Single European Currency' that: '‘The process that would unfold with the creation of a single currency by this method [the Treaty of Maastricht] may be predicted with certainty. Substantial parts of the EU… will be pushed into severe recession if they join. There will be sharply deepening regional imbalances and inequalities. The malignant expressions of economic depression — unemployment, poverty, collapse of the welfare system, weakening of trade unions, racism, chauvinism, crime — will multiply. The end will be either an economic tragedy, or the deepest crisis in the history of the EU, or more probably both.’

This analysis has clearly been vindicated. But it would, nevertheless, as seen above, be wrong to conclude that the exclusive core of the problems in Europe's economy is the Euro - or to see the situation exclusively in terms of a 'Germany and periphery' situation.

The greatest drag on economic growth in Europe is its 'stagnant middle' of the UK, Italy and Spain. These three economies together are equivalent in size to Germany and France. If Germany and France are supposed to provide the 'growth engine' of Europe these three economies may be conceived of as currently providing its 'drag factor'.

Unless the situation within the UK, Italy and Spain can  be resolved it is most unlikely that overcoming the economic problems in Greece will relaunch substantial European growth. For this reason, whatever occurs in Greece, the European crisis is going to be prolonged and other parts of the world economy must both take this into account and understand the more powerful factors in European economic stagnation.

Table 1

The incredible shrinking UK economy

The magnitude of the blow suffered by the UK economy since the beginning of the financial crisis is very considerably minimized by not presenting it in terms of a common international yardstick. Gauged by decline in GDP, using a common international purchasing measure, dollars, no other economy in the world has shrunk even remotely as much as the UK (Figure 1 and Table 1).

As most countries produce only annualized GDP data it will be necessary to wait before a comprehensive global comparison can be made for 2011. However it is clear no substantial growth in dollar terms took place in the UK economy during that year – GDP at national current prices rose only 1.4 per cent between the 1^st and 3^rd quarters and the change in the pound’s exchange rate against the dollar during the year was a marginal 0.3 per cent. Therefore there will have been no significant recovery from the UK data set out in Table 1 below, and the gap between the UK and other European economies, which form the next worst performing major group, is too great to have been qualitatively affected by changes in the Euro’s exchange rate – the Euro declined against the pound by only 3.3 per cent in 2011.

Table 1 shows that the fall in UK GDP in 2007-2010 was $562 billion compared to the next worst performing national economy, Italy, with a decline of $65 billion – i.e. the decline in UK GDP in the common measuring yardstick of dollars was more than eight times that of the next worst performing national economy. Table 1 shows the 10 national economies suffering the greatest declines in dollar GDP.

It is also extremely striking that the UK’s decline was more than two and a half times that of the entire Eurozone. The UK accounted for a somewhat astonishing 77 per cent of the EU's decline.

Table 1

Figure 1

 

Expressed in percentage terms the situation is no better. of all economies for which World Bank data is available only Iceland, with a decline in dollar GDP of 38.4 per cent, suffered a worst percentage fall than the UK - even bail out economy Ireland, with a fall of 18.4 per cent, outperformed the UK economy.

Two trends intersected for the UK's performance to be so much worse than that of any other economy. First, contrary to the government's anti-European rhetoric, UK economic performance in constant price national currency terms has been significantly worse than the Eurozone during the financial crisis (Figure 2). Up to the latest available data, for the 3rd quarter of 2011, UK GDP was still 3.6 per cent below its pre-financial crisis peak compared to the Eurozone's 1.7 per cent below. Second, between the beginning of 2008 and the beginning of 2012, the pound's exchange rate has fallen by 21.0 per cent against the dollar compared to the Euro's 11.4 per cent drop in the same period. The multiplicative effect of the severity of the relative drop in constant price GDP and the fall in the pound's exchange rate accounts for the unequalled decline in UK GDP in dollars.

Figure 2

 

As at present the UK economy shows no substantial sign of recovery, the present UK government, which maintains a steadfastly ostrich like attitude towards Europe in particular, and most other countries in general, may argue that a measure in terms of dollars at current exchange rates is irrelevant – the UK currency is the pound and what counts is constant price shifts. Such an argument is false and an attempt to disguise the true scale of the decline of the UK economy.

The internationally unmatched decline in UK dollar GDP is a huge fall in real international purchasing ability. The far higher than targeted inflation in the UK during the last two years, which has substantially eroded the population's living standards, is itself in part a reflecton of the decline in the UK's exchange rate and consequent raising of import prices. In short, the decline in the international purchasing power of the UK's economy translates into a direct fall in real incomes. The decline in the UKs ranking among world economies in terms of GDP, being recently overtaken by Brazil, statistically reflects the same process.

It may also be seen that the government's claim that the UK is outperforming Europe and the Eurozone is entirely without foundation even in constant price national currency terms. But when measured in terms of real international comparisons, i.e. in dollars, the UK's performance is incomparably worse than Europe's.

It appears extremely unlikely that the UK's economy will escape from this circle of decline in the next period. The austerity policies pursued by the present UK government have substantially slowed the economic recovery that was taking place in 2009 and the first part of 2010 - between the 3rd quarter of 2010 and the 3rd quarter of 2011 the UK economy grew by only 0.5 per cent. The opposition Labour Party has recently also endorsed essentially the same austerity policies which have failed not only in the UK but in other European economies, such as Greece and Ireland, where they have been pursued.

Even if any partial recovery takes place, for example by some increase in the exchange rate of the pound against the Euro, the sheer magnitude of the decline in the UK economy makes it implausible that this could be on a scale sufficient to reverse the fall in its relative international position.

 

China's stronger economic structure than the US and Europe means its fast growth will continue in 2012

The beginning of 2012 is a suitable moment to assess China's economic prospects for the year and coming period. This overall perspective is clear – China will grow strongly, remaining the world's fastest growing major economy, and will continue to substantially outperform Western pessimist predictions. This is the same fundamental analysis maintained by the author over the last two decade period. Factual results during these twenty years have confirmed such projections - as opposed to the opposite perspective. As accurate or inaccurate predictions do not depend on personal characteristics, but on different fundamental analyses, therefore what leads to repeatedly correct and incorrect projections regarding China's economic growth?

The core issue is simple but difficult for the majority of non-Chinese analysts to admit, despite constant confirmation by economic facts and repeated falsification of predictions of China's serious slowdown. This core issue is that statements by Chinese analysts that China has a stronger economic structure than the US and Europe, and that this therefore produces stronger economic performance, is not a boast but actually factually correct. As this stronger character of China's economic structure is not understood by many Western analysts, they therefore systematically, and each year, underestimate China's economic growth potential.

Nevertheless, a genuine difficulty for non-Chinese analysts is that explanations of this economic strength are frequently posed only in terms of specifically 'Chinese characteristics'. It is therefore worth spelling out more generally why China has a stronger economic structure than the US and Europe, and how this relates to global economic issues that will be faced in 2012.

 

 A model performance [By Jiao Haiyang/China.org.cn]

 

China self-definition of its system is a 'socialist market economy'. This denotes it differs fundamentally from the economy, modeled on the former USSR, which existed prior to China's 1978 economic reforms, in that economic policy is not run by administrative but by market means. China has a large and vibrant private sector – indeed the world's most rapidly growing private sector. However China differs from the US or Europe in having a sufficiently large state sector, and a nationalised core banking system, that it can directly set the economy's overall investment level – the state sector is too small in the US or Europe to achieve this. This combination of market system and a state sector sufficiently strong to determine the overall level of investment is what gives China its greater economic strength than the US or Europe - such a structure can be understood either from a Chinese 'socialist' point of view or a Western 'Keynesian' one, and for present purposes it  is unimportant which is chosen. 

To illustrate this, consider a key contemporary economic problem – the current situation in the US. The Financial Times on December 15 accurately described the situation in the US economy. It noted that the share of wages in US GDP had fallen to the lowest level since records began and concluded: 'The decline in the labor share, along with a shift of labor income towards higher earners, may be an important part of why the US economic recovery is so sluggish. Workers on lower wages consume much of their income, while higher wage earners and those with capital income are more likely to save. That will not affect total demand if savers lend to those who want to consume or invest in buildings and start-ups – but investment has been slow to recover in the wake of the recession.'

In short, the US economy is growing slowly not because there is a shortage of funds for investment, on the contrary profits are at a record high, but because investment is very low – indeed the entire decline in US GDP in the current 'Great Recession' is accounted for by the investment fall. The problem is that in the US there is no mechanism which ensures that the huge funds available for investment are actually invested.

In China no such problem exists. If funds are not directly invested by companies, then the state owned banking system and state sector can invest them. Therefore no shortfall of demand occurs of the type analysed by the Financial Times in the US. During the entire international financial crisis China, unlike the US, suffered no investment decline – on the contrary investment increased. The problem of accumulation of unused funds of the US type, that is in Keynesian terms a shortage of effective demand, does not arise in China. Equally if China's economy is booming, and companies are utilizing all funds for investment, the state steps back and cuts its own investment – reducing it to cool overheating. That is why China's macroeconomic policy is stronger than that in the US - the problems of either shortage of or excessive demand, which plague the US and European economies, are smoothed in China.

This evidently does not mean China escapes all macroeconomic issues. No policy maker can judge absolutely accurately how strongly the international economy will grow, what will be all the inflationary or deflationary pressures present, exactly how China's own economy will respond to a given measure etc. Therefore there are always issues of overheating, undershooting, inflation, deflation etc. But these are qualitatively smaller fluctuations than in the US or Europe.

The period since the onset of the international financial crisis showed this strength of China's economic structure clearly. Faced with the international financial crisis in 2008, China was able to launch a massive stimulus package which meant its economy did not suffer a recession at all. The recovery of the world economy in 2010-2011 combined with the aftermath of the stimulus package to create some economic overheating and 2011 was therefore mainly spent damping inflation. In 2012, with negative trends dominating the world economy, China will loosen policy.

The overall result is evident. In the four years to the latest economic data, for the 3rd quarter of 2011, the US grew by 0.5 percent, the EU shrank by 0.3 percent, and China grew by 42.2 percent. China's economy therefore suffered some fluctuations on a strong growth path, whereas the US and Europe suffered overall economic stagnation. The stronger character of China's economic system was shown by these facts – those predicting crisis for China, on the same scale as the US or Europe, made the wrong predictions because they failed to analyze that strength.

It is this superior strength of China's economic structure that also makes it clearly possible to predict for 2012 that China's economy will continue to grow strongly, that it will remain the fastest growing major economy in the world, and that it will outperform on the upside Western pessimists predictions – as in previous years the facts of 2012 will confirm that analysis. Not until they understand the greater structural strength of China's economy will current critics be able to make persistently accurate predictions.

 *   *   *

 A shorter and edited version of this article originally appeared on China.org.cn.

Fairy stories about China's 'economic crisis'

The present rapid shifts in the international and Chinese economic situations, resulting from the second wave of the international financial crisis centred on the Eurozone, are a challenge both to policy makers and a major opportunity for those with an accurate analysis of China's economy.

 

China speed [By Jiao Haiyang/China.org.cn]

 

The reasons for this are the same as those when I ran a consulting company and knew inaccurate media analysis was an opportunity to make a profit. Businesses need accurate information to take correct decisions. If a newspaper writes an economy is going to boom when actually it suffers recession, the paper doesn't directly lose anything, but a company acting on the wrong analysis can lose a great deal of money. Economic and business writing therefore operates under an objective discipline which doesn't necessarily exist elsewhere - companies rationally pay a great deal of money for accurate information.

The reason a similar opening exists in China at present is that attempts are being made to convince businesses that China faces an 'economic crisis' on the same scale as that hitting the European Union (EU) and the US. This view is factually nonsense, as any comparison of economic data shows. In the four years to the latest data the US economy grew by 0.5 per cent, the EU's shrank by 0.3 per cent, and China's economy grew by 42.2 per cent. Given such comparisons claims that China is suffering from 'crisis' is rather like saying the US has cholera, the EU has typhoid, and China has a cold and therefore they are basically in the same situation as 'all are ill'. Such claims destroy rational scales of comparison and are therefore wholly misleading in predicting what will happen.

China's economy naturally faces problems - all economies always face problems. It has had excessive house price increases, which are now gradually coming under control, and its consumer price index has been too high - although again it is now falling. Recession in the Eurozone will reduce orders to China's exporters. But China's economic year on year growth rate in the last quarter was 9.1 per cent compared to 1.5 per cent for the US and 1.4 per cent for the EU. If the US and EU were paralleling China's growth far from claiming, this was a 'crisis' they would be calling it an unprecedented boom!

A typical example of such fairy stories regarding China's 'economic crisis' was a recent article in the Wall Street Journal by Nouriel Roubini and Ian Bremmer president of the Eurasia Group - a risk analysis company. This was entitled 'Whose economy has it worst?' and was introduced: 'With Europe, China and the US in crisis, the real question is which of them will stumble first.' The data already given above show such statements are bombast - there is no crisis in China's economy similar to the US or EU.

Why, therefore, are such economic fairy stories published, why are they are publicized, and how to profit, not purely monetarily, from them?

One reason they appear, of course, is simply that people make wrong analyses. But the reason they are publicized is different. Take for example Gordon C Chang. He wrote a book in 2001 entitled 'The Coming Collapse of China'. This argued 'A half-decade ago the leaders of the People's Republic of China had real choices. Today they do not. They have no exit. They have run out of time.'

In the ten years since China's economy more than doubled in size. After such radically wrong predictions you might expect that Chang would find it difficult to obtain coverage for his analysis. But instead he is regularly published by Forbes magazine with articles posing such questions as 'Can Beijing rescue a stumbling economy'. Some 'stumbling' with nine percent GDP growth! Such analyses have nothing to do with reality but fit the politics of Forbes - which specializes in analyzing the ultra-rich in the US and is hostile to China. 

Business people caught up in such political maneuvers can lose huge sums of money. For example, in a case rather similar to the one of China at present, those backing a particular political grouping in Russia in the 1990s persuaded US hedge fund manager George Soros to become involved in a takeover battle around a Russian telecommunications company Svyazinvest. I was retained as a consultant by others involved and concluded Svyazinvest was a terrible investment. Therefore Soros was being pulled in for reasons of political maneuvers and not serious financial analysis. Soros lost approximately a billion dollars.

Companies rightly analyzing that China's economy will continue to grow, GE and Goldman Sachs immediately come to mind, are those most successful in business in China. Equally there are Western analysts who correctly predicted China's growth over the last period - Goldman Sachs Jim O'Neill, who invented the term BRIC, and the specialized consultancy Dragonomics for example.

This gives a major opportunity to those with an accurate analysis of China’s economy. Businesses following the erroneous view that China's economy is going to drastically slow or enter crisis will lose money. Those who rightly predict China's economy will continue to grow rapidly will gain credibility. This requires accurate analysis and reporting - not pretending there are no problems in China's economy but correctly contextualizing that these are far less than in the US and EU. The facts over the next year, as in previous years, will simply show that China’s economy continues to grow strongly, suffering no economic crisis qualitatively equivalent to that in the EU and US at present.

*   *   *

This article originally appeared on China.org.cn. It has been amended to remove references only relevant to readers in China.    

During the last four years the EU's economy has grown by -0.3%, the US by 0.6%, and China by 42.2%

The full scale of the difference in economic performance of China compared to the US, Europe and Japan during the international financial crisis is shown in Figure 1. It is summarised in the following figures:

• In the four years to the latest available data, for the 3rd quarter of 2011, China’s GDP expanded by 42.2%
• In the four years to the latest available data, also for the 3rd quarter of 2011, US GDP increased by 0.6%.
• In the four years to the latest available data, for the 2nd quarter of 2011, European Union (EU) GDP shrank by 0.3%.
• In the four years to the latest available data, for the 2nd quarter of 2011, Japan’s GDP contracted by 5.2%.

Figure 1

 

 

These are evidently extraordinary statistics. During this four year period China’s economy expanded 70 times as fast as the US.

Such data also clearly refutes the current attempt to claim that in China there is an economic ‘crisis’ in some sense equivalent to that in the US or Europe. Such arguments are intellectually sloppy (at best) attempts to undermine rational thought by destroying any serious quantitative comparisons.  

To give examples of such claims, a recent article by Nouriel Roubini and Ian Bremmer in the Wall Street Journal is introduced: ‘With Europe, China and the U.S. in crisis, the real question is which of them will stumble first.’ Similarly Will Hutton in the UK’s Observer claims: ‘Nobody would start from here – an ill-designed single currency interacting with an insupportable burden of private debt created by oversized, undercapitalised banks. And it's as much a problem in the US and China as in Europe.’

The data given above shows such claims are false. GDP growth of 42.2% in China, an annualised 9.8%, is not remotely comparable to the US’s annualised 0.2%, or the EU’s annualised minus 0.1%.

Naturally it is impossible to have an annual 9.8% growth rate for almost four years and have no problems at all – in fact no economy ever has no problems! China has had consumer price inflation, primarily due to international commodity price increases, which reached 6.5% before falling and it has had excessively high house price increases – which are also now falling. But none of this constitutes a ‘crisis’ on anything quantitative scale remotely approaching that of the US and Europe.

Nor, to take Hutton’s point, does the EU financial crisis have anything like the same impact in China, or even the US, as in the EU. The effect of the decline in imports from the EU on China’s exports is noticeable but only in the sense that it reduces China’s overall export growth from a very high to a high rate of growth – 15.8% last month, in a factual situation in which none which China’s GDP growth in the last four years has come from net trade. Indeed reduction of China’s trade surplus means that net trade has been a subtraction from China’s GDP growth during that period. The exposure of China’s banks to Europe’s debt crisis is also minimal. While the financial exposure of the US to the Eurozone is certainly higher than China’s there is also no indication that the actual scale of crisis or defaults in Europe is pushing the US into recession – whereas a double dip recession in Europe itself is extremely possible.

Hutton, in short, is engaging in inflated rhetoric to attempt to create a relative equals sign between the situation in China (and the US) and that in Europe when none exists. Inflated rhetoric is merely a form of destroying the quantitative scale of comparison which is a precondition for rational thought.

The GDP data for China, US and Europe GDP data should also end attempts by Kate Mackenzie the Financial Times and Nouriel Roubini to present the US’s Michael Pettis, and similar analysts, as having had a correct analysis of China. Michael Pettis runs an objectively moderated blog on China but his analysis of China has been factually shown to be quite erroneous – claiming that: 'the US would be the first major economy out of the crisis and China one of the last.’ Evidently a situation where China has grown by 42.2% and the US has grown by 0.6% shows the reverse has been the case. Claims that it is too early to judge whether China or the US has been more successful in coming through the financial crisis are just attempts to avoid the test of facts that has taken place. Even if, against the evidence, China’s economy were now to slow significantly the scale of growth it has already achieved demonstrates that has come through the financial crisis far more successfully than the US or Europe.

The basis of any serious analysis or theory is facts. Those who refuse to refer to the data of the relative performance of China, the US or Europe during the last four years do so only because their analyses will not stand the test of examination by these facts.

Negative trends in world trade - further confirmation of economic slowdown

Attempts to assess current prospects for the world economy have primarily focused on deceleration  in US and European GDP growth. But world trade is clearly also indicating negative trends.

Trade is a particularly sensitive indicator as its fluctuations have had a greater magnitude than those for GDP but have moved in the same direction. Trade data is also useful in indicating current economic trends as it is available for recent periods for developing countries many of which do not publish quarterly, and therefore up to date, GDP data.

It is significant for indicating the state of the world economy that the overall volume of world trade is currently at best entirely static and may have turned down. It is important this is affecting both developed and developing economies.

World trade

Analysing first the overall trend in world trade, this is shown in Figure 1 - which charts percentage volume changes in world trade compared to the pre-financial crisis peak in April 2008. The numbers on the horizontal axis indicate the number of months since the peak. A three month moving average is used to remove the effect of purely monthly fluctuations.

World trade reached its post-crisis trough in May 2009 at 20.1 per cent below the previous peak. By March 2011 world trade had recovered to 3.5 per cent above the pre-crisis peak. World trade maintained that level in May 2011 and fell to 1.2 per cent above the pre-crisis peak in June – the latest available data. The June dip is only one month, and it is therefore too early to say a decline is taking place, but world trade growth has clearly stalled since March - i.e. since the end of the 1st quarter of 2011.

Theoretically, world exports and imports should naturally be identical, but due to problems in recording and calculation, there is always some disparity in the data. To avoid the possibility of statistical distortions Figure 2 therefore confirms that the same trend appears whether measures of exports or imports are taken.

Figure 1

Figure 2

 

Developed economy trade

It is significant that the downturn in trade has affected both developed and developing economies - Figure 3 shows the data for developed economies and Figure 4 that for developing ones.

Considering first trade of developed economies, it may be seen from Figure 3 that this has not yet recovered to pre-crisis levels either in exports or imports. Again using a three monthly moving average,  developed economy imports peaked in May at 4.6 per cent below their pre-crisis highest level and exports peaked in the same month at 6.5 per cent below their pre-crisis highest level.

Figure 3 shows that there is now no substantial increase in developed economies exports or imports.

Figure 3

 

Developing economies trade

Figure 4 shows the data for exports and imports for developing economies. Unlike developed economies, both exports and imports of developing economies rose to exceed pre-crisis peaks. Growth momentum in trade was continued for a slightly longer period in developing than in developed economies but has also recently stalled.

Taking a three month moving average, developing economy imports peaked at 11.2 per cent above their pre-crisis highest level in May 2011 before falling back to 8.4 per cent in June. Perhaps more significantly developing economies exports rose to 16.6 per cent above their highest pre-crisis levels in March and by June had slipped to 13.1 per cent above.

It would not be correct to project that trade of developing economies is falling, data over a longer period would be required to establish this, but it is clear that the upward momentum has ended.

Figure 4

 

This trend for developing economies is significant as recovery in their exports and imports was much more rapid and stronger than in developed economies.

China

Not all economies are witnessing trade stagnation. China's latest available data, for July, shows exports at an all time peak of $175 billion, up 20 per cent year on year, while China's imports were also up 23 per cent over the same period. China, however, clearly does not represent the overall trend in developing economies.

As the biggest factor in China's growth is now expansion of domestic demand, followed by exports to developing countries, and then exports to developed economies, there is no reason to revise the analysis made previously that the current world economic slowdown will not lead to substantial deceleration of China's GDP growth. However clearly trends in other developing, as well as developed, economies must be watched carefully for indications of how much they are able to deal with decelerations in export demand.

Conclusion

Overall the trends in world trade strongly confirm a picture of economic slowdown - and the wide spread of this phenomenon. China continues to stand out as the largest exception to the trend - the situation of other developing economies requires more detailed analysis. The present stagnation, at best, of trade in developed economies is evident.

 

China's growth will not be significantly reduced by slowdown in developed economies - how China can use the global economy's 'countryside' to surround its 'cities'

The recently published European Union (EU) GDP figures, following those for the US and Japan, complete the picture of slow growth in the developed economies. Given weak growth, and possible recession, in the developed economies an evidently important question for the global economy is how much this will affect China – now by all measures the world’s second largest economy?

Should the present economic situation be conceptualised as generalised ‘economic slowdown’

A number of commentators suggest that the present international economic situation should be conceptualised as a generalised phenomenon of slow growth. The headline of an article by the Financial Times economics editor Chris Giles succinctly expressed such a perspective, ‘Fears rise as global output stalls’. Having analysed the well-known negative growth trends in developed economies the article continued: ‘similar gloom was evident in all other leading economies. In China, although the July figure beat expectations, the PMI also slipped for the fourth month in a row to fall 0.2 percentage points to 50.7.’ Similarly, the normally highly balanced John Authers, in The Long View in the same paper, analyzed: ‘alarm at the slowing down of the world economy – which includes China, nucleus of all hopes, as well as Europe and the US.’

Such analyses imply that a slowdown will occur in China in some sense equivalent to that in the US and Europe – otherwise it is misleading to place phenomena in the same category.

Such an analysis is erroneous as it is in contradiction with any quantitative comparison. China’s GDP growth, which was 9.5 per cent in the 2^nd quarter of 2011, cannot be meaningfully compared to the present extremely slow growth in the US and Europe. Nor, for reasons analysed below, will China’s growth slow to any level which would place it in the same category as the US and Europe. As the question of China’s dynamic is of considerable importance for trends in the world economy it is useful to summarise current factual data and analyse the impact of trends in the advanced economies on China.

Slow growth not double dip is the key issue for comparison

The majority of media discussion in the US and Europe focuses on whether these economies face a double-dip recession. Whether this occurs naturally has short term implications for China’s economy, particularly in the balance of negative pressures it has to contend with. Slow growth in advanced economies is already helping commodity prices fall – by 19 August the Dow Jones-UBS spot commodity index had declined by 8.5 per cent since its end of April peak. This aids China in its struggle against inflation, which in turn would allow a more expansionary policy to be pursued by its economic decision makers. However recession in developed economies would be negative for China’s exports and increase pressure within the US for a new round of quantitative easing, with negative international financial consequences.

However the most decisive trend is not whether developed economies face a ‘double dip’. The key fact, which is already confirmed by the recent data, is that even without a new recession growth in all major developed economies is very slow. As shown in Figure 1:

• By mid-2011 no region among the developed economies had recovered its peak level of GDP more than three years after the high point of the previous business cycle.
• US GDP is 0.4 per cent below its peak in the 4th quarter of 2007.
• EU GDP is 1.8 per cent below its peak in the 1st quarter of 2008.
• Japan’s GDP is 6.0 per cent below its peak in the 1st quarter of 2008 – this is of course affected by the earthquake and tsunami.

Overall this represents over three years net negative growth in the developed economies.

Figure 1

 

China’s economic performance

For comparison China’s economy has already grown by over 30 per cent in the last three years – Figure 2. If growth continues throughout 2011 at the same rate as in the year so far i.e. assuming there is no recession in the US and Europe, then between 2007 and 2011:

• China’s GDP will have expanded by 44.5 per cent.
• US GDP will have expanded by 0.8 per cent.
• EU GDP will have contracted by 0.4 per cent.

Figure 2

 

Naturally there will be some modification in the final outcome from the figures projected above, depending on developments in the second half of 2011. But the relative orders of magnitude are already clear.

Scale of economic issues in the US, Europe and China

These figures put into their appropriate context current issues in China’s economy. Naturally all economies continually face problems – China’s most serious current one is inflation, followed by the need to control the build-up of local government and other debt. But China’s current issues, in the context of 40% plus growth in four years, are clearly qualitatively smaller than those in the US and EU where growth in the same period will be essentially zero per cent.

This outcome factually settles the debate among economists outside China on whether China, or the US and Europe, would come most successfully through the financial crisis. Some non-Chinese economists accurately predicted that China would grow rapidly, that inevitably in such a context some problems would arise, that these would be overcome by economic fundamentals, and that China would have a ‘soft landing’ - Jim O’Neill, former chief economist of Goldman Sachs, who coined the term BRIC, is probably the best known of these.

But others predicted China’s economy would perform badly. The most extreme, such as US hedge fund manager Jim Chanos, advised short selling China in expectation of economic catastrophe. Others projected that the US would recover from the financial crisis more rapidly than China. For example US financial analyst Michael Pettis claimed that: 'the US would be the first major economy out of the crisis and China one of the last.' With China’s economy expanding by 40% while the US has not grown at all, even if China’s growth were to slow it is already clear it has come through the financial crisis much more successfully than the US.

China and developing economies

A clear implication for China’s economy of the slow growth in developed economies is that it will have rely even more on a combination of expansion of its domestic demand and growth in developing economies.

The latter, however, have not slowed during the financial crisis in the same way as developed economies. In 2010, measured in dollar terms and not only percentages, seven out of ten of the world’s most rapidly growing economies were developing ones – China, Brazil, India, Russia, South Korea, Indonesia and Mexico. (Figure 3) Current dollar prices are used in this chart for all economies as this best indicates the growth of markets for China’s exports – which are analysed below.

Figure 3

 

Particularly striking is growth in economies classified by the World Bank as ‘middle income’ – all of which are developing, such as Brazil, India, Mexico etc. In 2010 GDP growth in the developed economies was $1.6 trillion, whereas in middle income ones it was $3.3 trillion – twice as much. (Figure 4)

Figure 4

 

Nor is this a short term trend. If a five year period is taken, starting before the financial crisis, average annual growth in developed economies was $1.4 trillion while in middle income economies it was $2.0 trillion. (Figure 5)

The world economy has therefore moved into a period in which, not only in percentage but in absolute dollar terms, growth in developing economies, particularly middle income ones, is either essentially equivalent to or is greater than in developed ones.

Figure 5

 

This trend gives China considerable advantages. China’s companies face tough competition in advanced markets where, in terms of brands, they are up against firms such as Apple. But in developing economies China’s companies such as Haier and Huawei are already building up strong brand positions. Rapid expansion by such companies in developing economies, in turn, gives them rapidly increasing revenue to plough back into R&D which strengthens their challenge in the developed markets.

Some analysts have correctly noted this. In an excellent recent report ‘Heavy Duty, China’s next wave of exports’ (currently available as a free download, which those following China’s economy should take advantage of) the Economist Intelligence Unit accurately notes: ‘In 2012 it is likely that non-OECD will take over as the primary export market for China. If Turkey, Chile and Mexico are excluded from the OECD group, the transition will take place in the second half of 2011. However defined, developing countries – especially emerging markets such as India and Brazil – will be the dominant driving force between China’s export growth in the coming decade.’

The overall trend regarding China’s overall exports is shown in Figure 6. The rapid rise of China's exports to developing economies, to the point where they will overtake those to developed economies, is clear.

Figure 6

 

China uses the countryside of the world economy to surround the cities

A graphic, accurate, and very Chinese way to conceptualise the above trends was succinctly expressed by an exam student at Antai College of Economics and Management in Shanghai - where I lecture. Having had the statistical trends in world trade outlined in an economist's usual prosaic fashion, i.e. more rapid growth in the developing economies and in China’s trade with them, the student remarked that this was a well known strategy: ‘the countryside will surround the cities’.

For those not familiar with China’s history the significance of this phrase is that leading to the creation of the People’s Republic of China, in 1949, Mao Zedong famously remarked that the correct strategy was that ‘the countryside will surround the cities’.

While the vocabulory of economic statistics is more mundane than the student’s graphic characterisation, nevertheless in essence their statement was both vivid and correct. Slow growth in the advanced economies, combined with rapid growth in developing ones, is creating a situation where China’s companies are building up very strong positions in the ‘countryside’ of the world economy from which to launch a challenge in its ‘cities’.

The growth trends in developing economies, underpinning their rapidly expanding position in China’s exports, combines with rapid expansion of its domestic demand to show why China’s economy will not significantly decelerate under the impact of slowdown in the US and Europe.

The overall international economic situation should therefore not be conceptualised as one of ‘generalised economic slowdown’. It should be conceptualised as one of significant slowdown in the US and Europe combined with continued rapid growth in China.

*   *   *

A shortened edited version of this article appeared in China Daily.

More than three years without full economic recovery in the developed economies – the latest GDP figures in context

The publication of the European Union (EU) and German 2nd quarter GDP figures, following those for the US and Japan, completes the data regarding the state of the business recovery in the main developed economies. The picture is completely clear – Figure 1:

• By the 2nd quarter of 2011 none of the major regions among the developed economies has recovered their peak level of GDP more than three years after the high point of the previous business cycle.
• US GDP is 0.4% below its peak level in the 4th quarter of 2007.
• EU GDP is 1.8% below its peak level in the 1st quarter of 2008.
• Japan’s GDP is 6.0% below its peak level in the 1st quarter of 2008 – Japan’s data is of course affected by the earthquake and tsunami.

Overall, taking the period as a whole, this represents over three years of net negative growth in the developed economies. The key economic issue is not the possibility of a double dip recession, which the media is speculating on, but this extremely low growth rate even without one.

For comparison it may be noted that China’s economy has grown by over 30% in this same three year period.

Figure 1

What lies behind the renewed international economic crisis - and what policies are required to deal with it?

Given the onset of a renewed round of the international financial crisis it is useful to draw together its various elements in an analysis of its overall determinants, its course, and the policies necessary to deal with it. This is the aim of this article.

* * *

For the second time in three years almost all parts of the world economy are being shaken by a renewed financial and economic crisis. The most important immediate drivers of this are not Standard and Poor's downgrading the US's credit rating, or political struggles between President Obama and Republicans in Congress, but weak US economic recovery, Europe's widening debt crises, the consequent $8 trillion loses on international share markets by 9 August with knock on effects on balance sheets and spending, the continuing decline of US house prices and a new developing crisis of the banking system.

Reasons for the open reappearance of crisis

The reason severe crisis has reappeared, and what determines its dynamic, is the failure of US and European government policies to resolve the issues which created 2008's financial collapse. The policies pursued since then, which were adapted to deal with much more minor economic events than the ones which occurred, postponed the unwinding of the crisis without removing its underlying causes. As a result the focus of the crisis changed but it was not resolved.

The immediate cause of the financial crash of 2008 was an unsustainable build-up of US private sector debt – this debt being accumulated due to the attempt to maintain the growth of the US economy and to ensure political stability by sustaining US living standards. By the 4th quarter of 2007, the peak of US economic expansion, total US household, private non-financial company, and government debt was 218 per cent of US GDP – Figure 1. That the fundamental debt build up was private, and not government, is shown by the fact that household and non-financial company debt was equivalent to 168 per cent of GDP compared to 51 per cent of GDP for government debt - i.e. private debt was more than three times as large as government debt.

Figure 1

 

Interest rate increases introduced leading to 2008, in order to deal with inflation, resulted in the inability of the US private sector to finance this debt burden. The US sub-prime mortgage crisis was simply the weakest link in the overall excessive US private debt.

In 2008 the inability of the US private sector to meet its debt obligations, with consequent falls in asset values, initially in housing and then in shares and other financial instruments, destroyed US financial institutions’ balance sheets. The US financial sector overall became insolvent. Therefore a stronger and more centralized financial instrument, the US state, had to step in to rescue the private financial system - with a similar process occurring in other countries. The new crisis has broken out because of the risk that the tools available to the US and European states themselves will be insufficient to restore stability.

Transfer of private sector debt into the public sector

The debt data clearly show the process of transfer of the original excessive US private debt into the public sector – the changes in US debt since the peak of the previous business cycle are shown in Figure 2.

Following the onset of the US economic downturn in 2008, the overall US debt burden rose, reaching 247 per cent of GDP in the 3rd quarter of 2009 – these changes reflecting the decline in US GDP as well as increasing debt. Since then up to the 1^st quarter of 2011, the latest available data, US debt fell only marginally to 243 per cent of US GDP - still 26 percentage points above pre-recession levels.

However the internal structure of US debt shifted. US private sector debt peaked at 180 per cent of GDP in the 2nd quarter of 2009. It then fell to 163 per cent of GDP – still 5 percentage points above its pre-recession level. But any recent decline in private sector debt has been almost entirely offset by increases in government debt created by budget deficits exceeding 10 per cent of GDP.

Figure 2

 

The US therefore simply ‘nationalized’ its debt problem – replacing private with public debt. The mechanisms by which this occurred were the indirect consequences of the financial crisis, with recession increasing welfare payments and reducing tax receipts, as well as transfer of funds to the private sector in bank bailouts and similar measures.

John Mauldin and Jonathan Tepper therefore put it correctly in their book Endgame: ‘Debt is moving from consumer and household balance sheets to the government. While the debt supercycle was about the unsustainable rise of debt in the private sector, endgame is the crisis we will see in the public sector debt.’ (p25)

In short, although the US crisis may currently appear in the form of a government deficit and debt issue, the origins of the problem lay in the private sector and the government debt issue is the consequence of nationalization of private sector debt.

The European debt crisis

Europe followed a similar path to the US but with some countries, e.g. Greece and Italy, building up large public sector debts alongside the private ones in Spain and other states. Europe’s situation is structurally more potentially threatening than the US as the Federal Reserve has greater resources than the European Central Bank and the US state is able to react in a more centralized way than the decentred structure created by the different states of the European Union.

The European Central Bank simply does not have sufficient resources to be able to deal with a spread of the debt crisis into the larger EU economies such as Spain and Italy. Given the exposure of European banks to national state debt the spreading of the European sovereign state crisis to major economies therefore has the potential to bring down the European banking system. For this reason there have been rising European interbank lending rates, reflecting banks decreasing willingness to lend to each other, extremely high rates for bank insurance in a number of countries, and sharply falling bank share prices in both Europe and the US.

Kenneth Rogoff, author of the notable quantitative study of debt crises This Time is Different, and former chief economist of the IMF, accurately summarized the situation in the financial sector as follows:

‘Securitization, structured finance, and other innovations have so interwoven the financial system’s various players that it is essentially impossible to restructure one financial institution at a time. System-wide solutions are needed… the financial system remains on government respirators… in the US, UK, the euro zone, and many other countries today. 

‘Most of the world’s largest banks are essentially insolvent, and depend on continuing government aid and loans to keep them afloat. Many banks have already acknowledged their open-ended losses in residential mortgages. As the recession deepens, however, bank balance sheets will be hammered further by a wave of defaults in commercial real estate, credit cards, private equity, and hedge funds. As governments try to avoid outright nationalization of banks, they will find themselves being forced to carry out second and third recapitalizations.

‘Even the extravagant bailout of financial giant Citigroup, in which the US government has poured in $45 billion of capital and backstopped losses on over $300 billion in bad loans, may ultimately prove inadequate.’ 

Political struggles are the symptom of the renewed crisis and not its cause

Given the scale of the debt situation none of the means used for tackling the debt problem in the US and Europe can avoid severe economic pain. The political fighting which has broken out is simply over how this pain should be shared. The political struggles which have occurred, for example between President Obama and Republicans in Congress, or between Germany’s government and other European states, are therefore not the cause of the renewed economic crisis but its result. Analysing the different responses however leads directly to the issue of the necessary policies to deal with the financial and economic crisis.

The necessity to run budget deficits

The most ideologically right wing forces - the US Tea Party and those in Europe sharing the views of the British Conservatives - advocate limiting the public debt build up by radically reducing government spending. This is linked to a theory that the state is ‘crowding out’ the private sector. This entire analysis is false. Because of its ideological blinkers it fails to see that the origin of the crisis lay in the private sector debt. It is also extremely dangerous in terms of economic policy.

The main transmission belt from excessive debt into recession is the fall in private investment. As may be seen in Figure 3 the entire decline in GDP in the G7 economies between the 1^st quarter of 2008, the peak of the previous business cycle, and the 1^st quarter of 2011, the latest available data, was accounted for by the decline in fixed investment. In fixed price parity purchasing powers (PPPs) the decline in G7 GDP was $381 billion and the decline in fixed investment was $591 billion – the decline in fixed investment can be greater than the decline in GDP as it is offset by increases in household and government consumption.

Figure 3

 

The theory of ‘crowding out’ argues that resources used to finance the budget deficit would be used to generate economic expansion if released to the private sector – for example US financial analyst John Mauldin argues ‘increasing government debt crowds out the necessary savings for private investment, which is the real factor in increasing productivity.’ (Endgame p59)

But reducing budget deficits by cutting public spending cannot create an economic way out in present conditions. Reducing budget deficits cuts demand. But resources released to the private sector are used to pay down debt, so private spending will not increase sufficiently to compensate for the fall in public spending. Total demand will fall, increasing recessionary pressure.

In short, it is vital in the short term to maintain budget deficit spending, including by targeting maintaining or expanding consumption – state spending on investment is analysed below. Attempts to immediately reduce budget deficits must be strongly resisted. Countries facing an economic slowdown should run, or increase, budget deficits to compensate for the shortfall of private sector demand.

Richard Koo, in his important books Balance Sheet Recession and The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics, has dealt with this correctly in analysing the experience of the decades long fight against the consequences of over-indebtedness in Japan. As Koo noted:

‘What sets Japan’s Great Recession apart from the U.S. Great Depression is that Japanese GDP stayed above bubble peak levels in both nominal and real terms despite the loss of corporate demand worth 20 per cent of GDP and national wealth worth ¥1,500 trillion… The financial deficit of the government sector mounted sharply, leaving in its wake the national debt we face today. But it was precisely because of these expenditures that Japan was able to sustain GDP at above peak-bubble losses despite the drastic shifts in corporate behavior and a loss of national wealth equivalent to three years of GDP. Government spending played a critical role in supporting the economy…

‘Japan was left with a large national debt. But if the government had not responded with this kind of stimulus, GDP would have fallen to between one-half and one-third of its peak – and that is an optimistic scenario. U.S. GNP shrank by 46 per cent after falling asset prices destroyed wealth worth a year’s worth of 1929 GNP during the Great Depression, and the situation in Japan could easily have been much worse. This outcome was avoided only because the government decided early on to administer fiscal stimulus and continue it over many years…

‘In summary, the private sector felt obliged… to pay down debt… Disastrous consequences were avoided only because the government took the opposite course of action. By administering fiscal stimulus, which was also the right thing to do, the government succeeded in preventing a catastrophic decline in the nation’s standard of living despite the economic crisis.’ (The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics p22-25)

Naturally the form the budget deficit takes is itself extremely important. Government spending on those on average and low incomes, and on investment, is not only socially more just but is far more effective as a stimulus than tax cuts for the best-off – who save, rather than spend, a higher proportion of their income. Equally spending on investment is far more effective in expanding the economy that military spending – which does not add to productive capacity. But overall it is necessary to fight moves by fiscal conservatives to reduce the budget deficit in the short term. As an immediate response to the financial crisis countries facing the threat of economic downturn should run or maintain stimulus packages funded, if necessary, by budget deficits.

Budget deficit and the medium term

While budget deficits with a large component targeted at maintaining consumption are immediately vital to prevent short term economic decline they are not sufficient, faced with deep economic problems, to relaunch substantial growth because they do not deal with the most fundamental issue driving the downturn – the investment fall. This is in addition to the fact that few countries have Japan’s financial strength, which enabled it to sustain a very large budget deficit over a long period. For most countries large budget deficits can be run in the short term but are financially unsustainable in the medium term.

A policy of running large budget deficits is often inaccurately described as a 'Keynesian' one  - inaccurately as Keynes own central concern was factors affecting investment and not budget deficits.¹ Paul Krugman in the New York Times, for example, regularly but wrongly argues that the budget deficit is both the most central issue in economic policy and the core of Keynes views. US economist Paul Davidson similarly claims in The Keynes Solution: ‘Anything that increases spending on goods and services increases the profitability of business firms and the hiring of workers.’ (p54) But this is false - for example, an increase in spending on goods and services accompanied by cost increases may lead profits to fall.

However, even if profit did increase due to increases in demand, companies may not reverse the cuts in investment that are the core of the recession. Keynes pointed out that to generate investment a price must be paid to overcome ‘liquidity preference’ - the advantages of holding assets in cash and other liquid forms. In circumstances of high uncertainty, such as at present, the cost of overcoming liquidity preference may be prohibitive and therefore it will prevent investment taking place even if such investment would yield a positive profit.

Low interest rates necessary but not sufficient

Even more fundamental than liquidity preference in the present situation is that, given excessive indebtedness, companies use resources to repay debt, that is to build up their balance sheets, and not to invest even if demand increases. Therefore stimulating demand by budget deficits may prevent worse declines in production but does not produce significant output increases.

In such conditions low interest rates are also insufficient as an economic policy to provide a way out. Low interest rates are necessary to prevent interest payments becoming unsupportable and to remove a block to borrowing for investment. But they do not lead to investment under conditions where companies are intent on paying down debt and have no intention of borrowing for investment.

International redistribution of debt

As any solution to the present situation must involve medium term debt reduction a number of states are seeking to achieve this at the expense of other countries even without formal defaults on debt payments. In particular the US, via falls in the exchange rate of the dollar, reduces the real value of its debt at the expense of countries which hold dollar assets. Such policies however clearly only aid one country at the expense of others, effectively redistributing the debt without reducing the overall debt burden.

Inflation is not a relatively harmless solution

It is important to remove an illusion currently being suggested that inflation would be a relatively painless and non-harmful way to reduce debt. The idea behind this is that while the monetary volume of debt, its nominal value, would remain the same its real size would be reduced. Kenneth Rogoff, for example, has argued this:

‘It is time for the world’s major central banks to acknowledge that a sudden burst of moderate inflation would be extremely helpful in unwinding today’s epic debt morass…. Moderate inflation in the short run – say, 6% for two years – would not clear the books. But it would significantly ameliorate the problems, making other steps less costly and more effective. ‘

Similarly the British economist Will Hutton has argued:

‘As the IMF's chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, has suggested, if the options are public and private default, continuing bank weakness, economic stagnation (perhaps depression), or inflation, then the least bad option is to accept inflation, but to manage it within bounds.

‘Since inflation will happen anyway as governments seek the least bad way out, the choice in reality is whether to accept and manage it or not. Once debt is at a sustainable level and growth has resumed, then the world's financial system can be redesigned to avoid a repeat, and price stability restored.

‘This is the truth that cannot speak its name: as a senior financial policy official told me, even to raise it at home or abroad merely as an issue for debate is to invite universal disapproval. But truth must be faced. Britain should provide a lead – both for its own economic fortunes and to set the new international standard. As a minimum it should announce a new programme of quantitative easing, in effect printing money; insist the Bank of England uses the money it prints to buy the broadest range of private debt; and immediately replace the 2% inflation target with a target for the growth of money GDP – so getting Britain off the hook of its unpayable private debts.’²

However someone will have to suffer the loss in real resources created by the inflation. Usually this is the majority of the population as the rate of increase of incomes fall behind the rate of inflation. Politically a policy of lowering debt by inflation is therefore likely to be drastically unpopular for whoever implements it.

Furthermore economically inflation, striking at the majority of the population by reducing living standards, will actually cut consumption – which strengthens recessionary tendencies. Inflation also does not deal with the issue of increasing investment – the fall in which drove the recession. In short inflation is not a solution either politically or economically to a crisis of the depth which currently exists.

Indirect means of stimulating investment

If the way out is turned to, the necessary policies cannot be separated from the analysis of the depth of the crisis.

If the current economic crisis were of small or moderate dimensions then it could indeed be tackled by increases in budget deficits which primarily raised or maintained consumption. Such deficits would increase demand while liquidity preference, lack of profitability and debt levels would be insufficient to prevent companies responding to the increase in demand by raising investment - therefore substantial economic recovery would occur. This, however, has clearly not occurred in the crisis since 2008 despite large budget deficits being run.

Given budget deficits have been insufficient, attempts are also made to raise investment by extremely low interest rates and by seeking to reduce liquidity preference – the latter being a key goal of the talk regarding the need to ‘restore confidence’. These measures have also clearly not succeeded.

Confronted with this impasse more logical economic commentators are therefore beginning to address the need to raise investment. Such discussion currently primarily centres on advocating indirect means such as tax breaks. For example Joseph Stiglitz recently argued:

‘those worried about the shortage of policy instruments are partially correct. Bad monetary policy got us into this mess but it cannot get us out. Even if the inflation hawks at the Federal Reserve can be subdued, a third bout of quantitative easing will be even less effective than QE2. Even that probably did more to contribute to bubbles in emerging markets, while not leading to much additional lending or investment at home.

‘The Fed’s announcement that it will keep the target federal funds rate near zero for the next two years does convey its sense of despair about the economy’s plight. But, even if it succeeds in stopping, at least temporarily, the slide in equity prices, it won’t provide the basis of recovery: it is not high interest rates that have been keeping the economy down. Corporations are awash with cash, but the banks have not been lending to the small and medium-sized firms… The Fed and Treasury have failed miserably in getting this lending restarted, which would do more to rekindle growth than extending low interest rates though 2015.

‘But the real answer, at least for countries such as the US that can borrow at low rates, is simple: use the money to make high-return investments. This will both promote growth and generate tax revenues, lowering debt to gross domestic product ratios in the medium term and increasing debt sustainability. Even given the same budget situation, restructuring spending and taxes towards growth – by lowering payroll taxes, increasing taxes on the rich, as well as lowering taxes for corporations that invest and raising them on those that do not – can improve debt sustainability. ‘

By identifying raising investment as the key target Stiglitz does address the central dynamic of the recession. But the issue is once again quantitative and related to the depth of the crisis. Will measures such as tax breaks be sufficient to raise investment if they are added to other policies such as running budget deficits and low interest rates? If the economic crisis is not deep they will suffice. If the economic crisis, and the necessity to pay down debt, is stronger then indirect measures to target investment, such as tax breaks, will not be sufficient.

The current indications, given the scale of the economic problems and debt burden, is that indirect means to stimulate investment by policies such as tax breaks will be insufficient to relaunch substantial economic growth.

Direct means of raising investment

The most decisive way to overcome the current situation flows from the above trends. Its practical effectiveness was shown by its use by China in its successful 2008 stimulus package, which was followed by over 30 per cent GDP growth in three years. Keynes also analysed and advised it. This is that the state must overcome the reality or threat of a fall in investment by itself undertaking and organizing investment. Keynes noted this in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money: ‘It seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine an optimum rate of investment. I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment.’ (p378)

Such an analysis flowed from Keynes practical experience regarding the relation between the depth of economic crisis and lack of sufficient efficacy of other economic instruments: 'Only experience… can show how far management of the rate of interest is capable of continuously stimulating the appropriate volume of investment… I am now somewhat sceptical of the success of a merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of interest… I expect to see the State… taking an ever greater responsibility for directly organising investment; since it seems likely that the fluctuations in the market estimation of the marginal efficiency of different types of capital… will be too great to be offset by any practicable changes in the rate of interest.' (p164) Therefore: ‘‘I conclude that the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands.’ (p320)

Keynes naturally did not advocate an administered economy. But he therefore explicitly argued in the General Theory that the state should have the ability to intervene sufficiently to determine overall investment levels.

Keynes also noted that this 'somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment' and 'the duty of ordering the current volume of investment' did not mean the elimination of the private sector, but socialised investment operating together with a private sector: 'This need not exclude all manner of compromises and devices by which public authority will co-operate with private initiative… apart from the necessity of central controls to bring about an adjustment between the propensity to consume and the inducement to invest there is no more need to socialise economic life than there was before…. The central controls necessary to ensure full employment will, of course, involve a large extension of the traditional functions of government.' (p378)

The country which most approximates to this economic system is China. China, of course, describes its economy in a different way and using Marxist terminology. China defines itself as passing through ‘the primary stage of socialism’ and its overall system as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. However it is not the important question whether China’s definition of its own system should be accepted, or whether its economy should instead be regarded as conforming in important features to the system described by Keynes in the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. What is important is understanding how such an economic system works and to note that China has been able to run the world’s largest stimulus package without an unsustainable budget deficit, and why its macroeconomic policy has come through the international financial crisis more successfully than the US and Europe – and why China’s economic system has generated, during the last thirty years, the most rapid economic growth of any major economy in the world.

China’s economy

The difference between China and the US and Europe, of course, lies in economic structure. After its 1978 economic reforms China abandoned an administered economy. But it did not abandon the ability of the state to set the overall level of investment, and it maintains a state owned banking system which is  stronger in a crisis than the ones in the US and Europe and which can be instructed to expand lending in order to sustain stimulus packages. China therefore actually implements Keynes point that ‘the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands.’ That is, a ‘somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment’ does exist in China, not in the sense that the private sector is eliminated, on the contrary China’s private sector is large and dynamic, but in the sense that the state has sufficient levers to determine the overall level of investment. In contrast in the US and Europe the conditions outlined by Keynes do not exist, and the state sector is insufficiently large to deliver an investment-led stimulus.

As a conseuence of these differences China has come through the financial crisis far more successfully than the US or Europe

Implication of the differences

Once again the interaction of these different factors cannot be separated from analysis of the scale of economic crisis itself. China’s economic structure clearly gives it a superiority which has allowed it to avert serious downturns, as shown both in the 1997 Asian debt crisis and in the international financial crisis since 2008, and to maintain very long term rapid economic growth. But how serious the lag in the US and Europe compared to China is depends on how serious the economic crisis is.

If the economic crisis is not deep then gradually time, and greater application of the measures which are available to the US and European economies – budget deficits, low interest rates, tax breaks for investment – will overcome the investment decline. China will still grow more rapidly, but the US and Europe will also resume growth. If the crisis is deep then only adoption of full scale Chinese methods of direct state action to implement ‘the duty of ordering the current volume of investment’ would suffice. That, however, would require a huge extension of the state sector of the economy, and therefore greater application of the indirect methods available in the US and Europe will be tried first.

One clear implication, of course, is that in all these different circumstances China continue to will grow much more rapidly than the US and Europe even if the latter escape a 'double dip' recession.

Conclusion

The realistic conclusions which follow from the present renewal of the international financial crisis, in terms of both analysis and the required policy response, are therefore clear:

• The International financial crisis has recurred because the economic policies to deal with the 2008 crash in the US and Europe did not remove its underlying cause - excessive debt build up in an attempt to sustain US economic growth and living standards. The post-2008 policies failed because they were designed to deal with much less serious economic events than the ones which unfolded.
• The effect of the policies pursued after 2008 has been to nationalize large part of the debt that originated in the private sector. Therefore, in most cases, and in particular in the US, even if the crisis reappears around state finances the actual origins of the problem lay in the private sector debt.
• The strategic failure to overcome the debt crisis creates strong pressure to a renewed crisis of the banking system.
• The debt crisis transmits itself into the real economy above all though a collapse in investment – taking the G7, the entire decline in GDP is due to the fall in fixed investment.
• In the short term it is necessary to deal with the crisis by continuing to run budget deficits, and countries that have not done so may well need to introduce budget deficit spending. China is an exception because its economic structure allows it to run large stimulus packages without budget deficits due to its ability to directly stimulate investment. Only a handful of other countries, however, have a state sector large enough to fund and run such investment programmes and therefore other economies will have to run budget deficits in the short/medium term. However while budget deficits are necessary to avoid sharp economic decline the experience of the last three years has shown that the economic crisis is too deep for budget deficits by themselves to stimulate significant growth because they do target the core of the recession, the investment decline.
• Very low interest rates must be maintained in order to lighten the burden of interest payments on the overextended debt, and to remove an obstacle to investment. However, once again the experience of the last three years has shown that the economic crisis is too deep for low interest rates themselves to relaunch investment and substantial economic growth.
• China possesses the advantage that it can directly stimulate investment. In other countries there is also a growing realisation that the core transmission of the economic problem lies in investment falls. But without a sufficiently large state sector most other countries do not have the means to directly launch investment. Therefore indirect methods such as tax incentives for investment and similar measures are being proposed. It remains to be seen in practice, if these are introduced, whether they are effective. Given the depth of the crisis the probability is that even if such measures are introduced they will not be enough to sufficiently overcome the low investment level. Consequently growth will continue to be very slow in the US and Europe even if a new recession can be avoided.
• The world economy will therefore see a further period in which China’s economy will grow rapidly while the US and Europe remain at best relatively stagnant.

 

Notes

1. See Ross, J. ‘Deng Xiaoping and John Maynard Keynes’. Soundings Winter 2010.

2. The British newspaper The Observer made the same call:

‘The only alternative to default is inflation – governments printing money to get out of the corner they, their banks and their citizens are in. The question facing policymakers in the years ahead will be which of the unpalatable options they confront – economic stagnation, public and private default together with endemic bank weakness, or uncontrolled or managed inflation – they are going to choose…

‘The British government's policies are locked in the same impotent stasis as the rest of the world's – battening down the hatches, cutting public spending and borrowing, and refusing to accept realities. The government should declare independence. It should abandon the suffocating 2% inflation target and replace it with a target for the total volume of spending in the economy. It should prepare to stimulate the economy with more quantitative easing – in effect printing money – using the proceeds to lend directly to public agencies and departments prepared to lift capital spending.’

The financial crash and macro-economic policy - why the US and Europe have budget crises and China does not

The events precipitating the renewed financial crash were the combination of debt crises and confirmation of slow US economic growth. Regarding the former countries were either trying to cut deficits (the US, Greece, Italy, the UK) or feared they will have to bail out those running unsustainable ones (Germany, France). But these large deficits were not accompanied by strong economic growth – although it can be cogently argued that they were necessary to stave off sharp economic downturn.¹

Japan is currently preoccupied with overcoming the consequences of the tsunami and earthquake, but it also will soon have to face the reality that, due to decades of budget deficits, it has the largest government debt as a percentage of GDP of any country – twice that of the US.

In contrast China in 2008 launched the world's largest state stimulus package to counter the international financial crisis. But it is not running any substantial budget deficit - this year it will only be around two per cent of GDP. But China has enjoyed rapid economic growth.

It has been claimed that China is applying ‘Keynesianism’, but if budget deficits were the key issue defining such policies then China is clearly not pursuing ‘Keynesianism’ at all.

Actually, the core of Keynes’ analysis did not lie in advocating budget deficits, and in some ways China has a policy which more corresponds to his views than that pursued in the US and Europe. This is is briefly outlined below. But before dealing with this it is illuminating to contrast the nature of the economic policies pursued by the US and Europe in the last three years on the one hand, and by China on the other, and to analyse why the latter was able to launch such a large stimulus package without a significant budget deficit.

The actual core of the Great Recession

The core of the difference between the policies pursued in the US and Europe on the one hand, and that followed in China on the other, requires understanding what actually occurred during the 'Great Recession' after 2008. A more extensive analysis has been given elsewhere but to summarise in the US and Europe the Great Recession was dominated by an investment collapse. To take the largest example, in the 2nd quarter of 2011 US GDP was still $56 billion below its 4th quarter of 2007 peak. However all major components of US GDP except fixed investment were already above their previous peak levels – inventories were $37 billion above, government consumption $51 billion above, personal consumption $66 billion above, and net exports $159 billion above. But US private fixed investment was $388 billion below its 4th quarter 2007 level. The entire decline in US GDP was therefore due to the fixed investment fall.  These changes are shown in Figure 1. A similar pattern exists in almost every major developed country.

Figure 1

 

This investment fall, by driving and maintaining the downturn, produced a decline in personal and company income and therefore a fall in tax revenue – the latter being the primary reason for budget deficits. The crucial issue, both for economic development and to close the budget deficit, is therefore how to relaunch growth.

China's situation was different and explains why it ran no significant budget deficit. China abandoned administrative running of its economy with the economic reforms beginning in 1978, but it still has a sufficiently large state sector that this could be, and was, instructed to increase investment. As the key banks are state owned they could be instructed to increase lending to companies – in the US the opposite occurred and lending to companies fell sharply. The rapid economic growth initially generated by China's state companies in turn stimulated the private sector.

The result, during the crucial period 2008-2009, is shown in Figure 2. Instead of China's investment falling it rose by $420bn. Consequently there was no recession. Under the impact of the increase in jobs and incomes created by the stimulus package, China's household expenditure also rose by $160bn. Therefore despite the combined effect of a fall in net exports and inventories of $160bn China's GDP in 2009 rose by $440bn.

As there was no recession there was no fall in tax revenue and no major budget deficit. As this process continued, by 2011 China's GDP had increased by over 30 per cent, $2.3bn in current price terms, compared to pre-crisis level. In contrast by the 2nd quarter of 2011 US GDP was still 0.4 per cent below its 2007 peak level.

Figure 2

 

In the US and Europe the budget deficits were increased by government attempts to restart growth. China could instruct its state companies to invest and its state banks to lend, but the state sector in the US and Europe is too small for this to be effective. Only indirect means, such as quantitative easing (printing money) and budget deficits were available as policy tools. Both proved ineffective in restarting rapid growth. But the latter policy worsened the deficits. China, due to the rapid growth resulting from the investment stimulus, had no significant budget deficit.

Relative scale of economic problems in the US, Europe and China

Naturally the above does not mean China escaped all economic problems - particularly food price inflation, but these are not on the same scale as the budget deficit crises gripping the US and Europe.

Nor do such developments mean China does not face economic policy choices. It is impossible to judge the size of a stimulus package perfectly in advance. The crucial thing in 2008, confronted with the worst economic crisis for eighty years, was to act rapidly and forcefully to head off downturn. This was achieved.

Indeed, so successful was the stimulus that by the 2nd quarter of 2010 China's GDP growth was 11.9 per cent – well above the average 9.9 per cent since its economic reforms began and unsustainably high. Also, despite the government's efforts, it is always impossible to prevent some part of a stimulus spilling into unintended areas  - creating a too high rate of increase in China's house prices.

In summer 2010 world food price inflation also began. China suffered from this less than other comparable BRIC countries – Brazil, India and Russia. But countering these price rises required monetary tightening and slowing the economy

Finally, a medium term problem must be tackled. It is impossible to implement a huge lending increase, under conditions of international economic downturn, without some increase in bad loans. When China's government launched the 2008 stimulus package it anticipated this by making banks increase provisions for bad loans and stating they would have to raise extra capital. The government's calculation was simply that large scale economic growth resulting from its policies would generate more than sufficient resources to deal with any bad loans problem of the type now appearing in municipal debt – i.e. far more would be gained than lost. With more than 30 per cent growth in three years China's economy has easily enough resources to deal with bad loans.

In short China's economic structure does not produce perfection – which only exists in heaven. But the problems it faces are far smaller than the budget deficit and debt crises in Europe and the US.

China's economy grew by more than 30 per cent in three years while Europe and the US remain below their peak levels of output. It is therefore easy to see which policy has been more successful.

Keynes and Chinese descriptions of China’s economic system

How is such an economic system as that operating in China to be described? China itself, of course, uses Marxist terminology – it describes itself as passing through ‘the primary stage of socialism’ and its overall system as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. However there is another, more familiar in the West, way of looking at it.²

Keynes in the General Theory of Interest, Employment and Money evidently did not advocate an administered economy.³ But he did explicitly argue that the state would have to intervene sufficiently to determine the overall level of investment: ‘I conclude that the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands.’ (p320)

Keynes, as is well known, attached great weight to changes in the rate of interest in affecting the investment level. But he did not believe these would be sufficient by themselves: 'Only experience… can show how far management of the rate of interest is capable of continuously stimulating the appropriate volume of investment… I am now somewhat sceptical of the success of a merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of interest… I expect to see the State… taking an ever greater responsibility for directly organising investment; since it seems likely that the fluctuations in the market estimation of the marginal efficiency of different types of capital… will be too great to be offset by any practicable changes in the rate of interest.' (p164)

This led Keynes to the conclusion: 'It seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine an optimum rate of investment. I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment.' (p378)

Keynes noted that 'somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment' and 'the duty of ordering the current volume of investment' did not mean the elimination of the private sector, but socialised investment operating together with a private sector: 'This need not exclude all manner of compromises and devices by which public authority will co-operate with private initiative… apart from the necessity of central controls to bring about an adjustment between the propensity to consume and the inducement to invest there is no more need to socialise economic life than there was before…. The central controls necessary to ensure full employment will, of course, involve a large extension of the traditional functions of government.' (p378)

It does not seem the most interesting question is whether we should accept China’s definition of its own system, or whether its economy instead should be regarded as conforming in important features to the system described by Keynes in the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. What is important is understanding how China’s economy actually works, why it has been able to run the world’s largest stimulus package without a budget deficit, and why therefore its macroeconomic policy has come through the international financial crisis more successfully than the US and Europe.

Notes

1. For an analysis of this see Richard Koo’s The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession.

2. A more detailed discussion of these issues can be found in Ross, J. ‘Deng Xiaoping and John Maynard Keynes’. Soundings Winter 2010.

3. All page references are to the 1983 Macmillan edition of the The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.

Since the financial crisis began China's economy has expanded by almost 40% and the US and Europe not at all

The publication of GDP data for the first half of 2011 for the world’s two largest economies, the US and China, provides a suitable moment to assess trends in economic growth since the international financial crisis commenced. Publication of 2nd quarter GDP data for the European Union (EU) and Eurozone later this month will alter details but is highly unlikely to alter the overall picture.

Ideally quarter by quarter GDP growth data would be available for all countries but unfortunately, until the beginning of 2011, China only produced figures for quarterly GDP calculated on a year on year basis compared to the same quarter for the previous year. Fortunately for clear analysis, the differences in growth rates between the main economies are sufficiently large that utilising annual data leaves no doubt as to fundamental trends.

The peak of pre-crisis US GDP was in the 4th quarter of 2007 - the peak for the EU and Japan was only one quarter later in the 1st quarter of 2008. Therefore the appropriate starting point for comparison, using annual data, is with the final pre-crisis year of 2007.

Data for GDP growth using a base year of 2007 is therefore shown in Figure 1. As 2011 is not yet over the working assumption has been made that the growth for this entire year is the same as the year on year change in the latest available quarter – the 2nd quarter 2011 for the US and China and 1st quarter 2011 for the EU. These projections will be modified as subsequent data is published.

Both the US and China are slowing – see Figure 2. Therefore, projecting for the whole of 2011 the latest available quarterly year on year change may therefore somewhat exaggerate growth for the year as a whole. However the difference between China on the one hand, and the US and the US and Eurozone on the other, is so large that no significant change in relative positions will result if the eventual 2011 growth rate for all three is altered by any reasonable margin.

Japan’s data will, of course, be highly depressed by the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami. Therefore, apart from noting that the fall in Japan’s GDP during the financial crisis was greater not only than for China but also for the US and Eurozone, emphasis is not given here to quantitative comparisons for Japan.

Taking the above assumptions, then taking the entire period between 2007 and 2011:

• China’s GDP will have expanded by 44.5%.
• US GDP will have expanded by 0.8%.
• Eurozone GDP will have expanded by 0.4%.

Assuming some deceleration during the second half of 2011, the essential qualitative parameters of economic performance during the four years since the beginning of international financial crisis will therefore be that China’s economy has expanded by somewhat over 40% while the US and Eurozone economies have approximately not grown at all.

Such facts evidently have major implications both at the level of the objective development of the world economy and of analysis.

• In terms of development of the world economy, a 40%+ expansion of China’s economy during a four year period, simultaneously with essentially zero growth in the US and Eurozone, is sufficient to significantly alter the balance between the world’s major economies. To take an example of implications, in assessing when China’s GDP will overtake the US to become the largest in the world, the types of assumptions typically employed have been that the US economy will expand at around 2.5% a year and China’s at around 8.0% a year. However at present China is somewhat outperforming this figure, with an annual average growth rate of 9.6% in the last four years, while the US is substantially underperforming. Evidently, projecting US growth continuing at only an annualised 0.2%, as would be the case during the last four years from the data above, would be entirely unreasonable. But any lowering of the US annual growth rate below 2.5%, which appears a clear possibility, would bring forward the data when China’s GDP will overtake the US at market exchange rates from the 8-10 year period which is generally calculated to a 5-7 year period.
• The growth of China’s GDP by around forty per cent in the last four years, while the US has not grown at all, is already sufficient to show as incorrect those analyses, publicised in the Financial Times and elsewhere, which projected that  the US would recover from the financial crisis more rapidly than China. For example Michael Pettis of Beijing University analysed that: ''the US would be the first major economy out of the crisis and China one of the last.' Attempts have been made to defend this and similar analyses by stating that the crisis is not yet over, therefore it is too early to pass judgement. In reality, with China’s economy expanding by 40% while the US has not grown at all, even if China’s growth were to slow it is already clear it has come through the financial crisis far more successfully than the US. Michael Pettis and those with similar views should therefore note that they were wrong, that those such such as this blog and others who analysed the opposite were correct, and begin to examine what errors in economic theory and analysis led to these wrong conclusions.

Growth of 40% in China over a four year period, compared to zero per cent in the US and Eurozone, is a quite sufficient test by facts to establish which analysis was right and which was wrong regarding the relative trajectories of China’s and the US economies during the international financial crisis.

Figure 1

Figure 2

International economic consequences of the Greek debt bailout

The Greek debt crisis is both a significant economic event and a foreign policy success for Germany. It has, for the present, shifted the economic balance of power in Europe, and to some extent more widely, in Germany’s favour and against those in the US and Britain who do not favour the Euro and prefer a weak European Union (EU). These aspects are interlinked and both worth analysing.

Economics of the Greek bailout

At the economic level the media has widely and correctly reported that the new Greek bailout agreement was a step in the direction of European economic integration. It was also a move towards dealing with some of the contradictions that have existed in the Euro since its creation – as analysed below. Most immediately the partial Greek debt default, writing down the value of its bonds by 21 per cent, together with reducing its interest rate on bailout loans from 5.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent, extending the existing repayment period from seven to a minimum of fifteen years, generating debt relief of $19.4 billion or about a quarter of the total, all in the context of an overall $157 billion bailout package, should allow short term stabilization of Greece’s financial situation.

Nevertheless key economic issues remain unresolved. Greece’s debt still stands at 150 per cent of GDP. The 21 per cent write down of its bonds is far less than the 40 per cent by which they were being discounted by the market – an explicit indication the write off may be insufficiently large to generate medium/long term Greek financial stability. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) has not been increased in size to deal with its new obligations. The declaration that this bailout package applies only to Greece is purely words. Despite Ireland and Portugal having had interest rate on bailout funds reduced to 3.5 per cent one or either is likely to enter a new crisis – and the interest rate reduction is already a partial extension of the terms of the Greek bailout.

Most fundamentally the Euro still contains a central contradiction as long as a united European state does not accompany European monetary union. A currency union, such as the Eurozone, means the effects of inevitable changes in relative regional productivity, and therefore costs of production, which take place in a continental scale economy can no longer be dealt with, as in Europe’s past, by changes in exchange rates. Those parts of Europe’s economy with relatively low productivity, such as Greece, will inevitably become increasingly uncompetitive compared to economies with higher rates of productivity and productivity growth such as Germany, France or Holland. This will push the weaker states towards economic depression and social crisis.

In a unified state covering a continental scale economy, such as in the US or China, the resulting problems can be dealt with by budget transfers from richer regions to poorer ones. But this in turn is possible because the largest part of taxation goes to the central government which can then redistribute it between regions.

However, in Europe the central EU budget is small compared to the national budgets. Therefore insufficient resources for such redistributive policies exist. The main European governments remain opposed to any EU budget adequate for such transfers. As the Financial Times cited the current position of Angel Merkel: ‘As for a “transfer union”, if it meant paying for other people’s debts, “my conviction is that it will never happen”.’

Of course Chancellor Merkel’s position need not be taken totally at face value – probably a year ago she would have said that the present degree of partial integration arrived at by the Eurozone was also out of the question. But nevertheless a fully-fledged fiscally federated Eurozone is not politically on the cards at present.

Short term trends

This fundamental contradiction at the heart of the Euro, however, need not explode in the short term. If significant European economic growth can be resumed then the resources will be generated to make adequate transfers to save the financial systems of countries such as Greece and to prevent an uncontrollable financial meltdown in major economies such as Italy or Spain. The time thereby gained can potentially be used to shift European institutions, and possibly public opinion, in favour of greater European integration. But the problem is that at present vigorous European growth appears unlikely – a group of economies around Germany and France are growing rapidly, but Europe as a whole remains bogged down by the low growth of the UK, Italy and Spain.

German economic gains from the Euro

The core to the agreement on Greece, and coming events, is that during a difficult period in the European economy German business gains greatly from the Euro. The Eurozone countries cannot carry out competitive devaluations against Germany – and Germany’s economic strength means it can out-compete the other main European economies. Furthermore, whatever the financial transfers required to countries such as Greece, Germany actually gains in exchange rate terms from its association with weaker economies - as these drag down the Euro’s exchange rate. At the time of writing the exchange rate of the Euro against the dollar is 1.44. However without the weaker currencies, that is if Germany was alone, it would face a significantly higher exchange rate, harming German exports.

Naturally Germany suffers some disadvantages – for example transfers to Greece to help pay interest on the latter’s debts, and higher German bond yields, that is higher German interest rates, because of its links to weaker currencies. These drawbacks have led to some leaders of German institutions, as well as large sections of the public, expressing reservations about the deal. These include Jens Weidmann, president of the German Central Bank who stated: ‘By transferring sizeable additional risks to aid-granting countries and their taxpayers, the euro area made a big step toward a collectivisation of risks in cases of unsolid public finances and economic mistakes… That's weakening the foundations of a monetary union founded on fiscal self-responsibility. In future, it will be even more difficult to maintain incentives for solid fiscal policies.’ Also critical of the deal was the influential Ifo think tank.

But these drawbacks are judged by German business to be smaller than the gains – and believing one can have a policy which only has upsides and no downside is entirely unrealistic – hence the necessity to make compromises provided essential German interests are maintained.

Some opponents of the Euro hope that the electorate of Germany will overturn it under the impact of events such as the deal on Greece. Edmund Conway in the British Daily Telegraph for example analysed: ‘At some point the Germans will realise that the package is a thinly-veiled fiscal union which makes the transfers they funnelled into East Germany look like small change, and they will revolt at the ballot boxes.’

But this is naive nonsense. It is a cardinal principle for arriving at an accurate prediction of the economic course of a country to understand that this will be determined, on central matters, by the interests of big business and not the opinions of the electorate – sentimental analysis to the contrary leads to wrong predictions. German big business has an interest in the Euro and for that reason all major political parties in Germany support it. Therefore, in the end, the key measures to support the Euro will be taken. Even if the Social Democrats returned to power in Germany they would follow essentially the same policies on this issue as Angela Merkel. Only fringe German parties, with no chance of coming to power, oppose the Euro and therefore the policies necessary to sustain it. A few concessions to public opinion may therefore be made round the edges, but there will be no electoral revolt in Germany which will overturn the Euro.

Political dimension

The international political dimension of the Greek bailout is linked to these steps taken to maintain the Euro.

The Euro is today the main alternative reserve currency to the dollar. The fact that the Euro’s exchange rate has risen even more strongly against the dollar since 2000 than alternative potential reserve currencies, such as Japan’s yen or China’s RMB, has increased its attractiveness to both Central Banks and private investors – see Figure 1. While in the future China’s RMB is more solidly based as an alternative to the dollar than the Euro, because of China’s economic dynamism and because unlike the Euro it is backed by a united state, nevertheless immediately China’s economy is still too small, and the convertibility of the RMB too limited, for it to function as a real reserve currency alternative to the dollar. In the immediate situation it is therefore the Euro, not the RMB, which is the real alternative reserve currency to the dollar.

Figure 1

 

The decline of the position of the dollar as a reserve currency is slow. As a percentage of allocated foreign exchange reserves for all countries, holdings of dollars have fallen from 71.2 per cent in the first quarter of 1999 to 60.7 per cent in the latest available data from the IMF for the 1^st quarter of 2011 – see Figure 2. The percentage of allocated world reserves held in euros rose from 18.1 per cent to 26.6 per cent in the same period – no other currency has even a five per cent share.

Figure 2

 

However while the decline in the position of the dollar is slow it is clear. Given that the position of the dollar as the effective world reserve currency is one of the fundamentals of the economic position of the US, and of its current economic policies, therefore how to deal with the Euro is a key issue for US economic policy.

US-European political relations

To the economic challenge constituted by the Euro to the dollar was added in 2003 a political issue between the major European states and the US. France and Russia, supported by Germany, made it clear they would veto in the UN any resolution supporting the invasion of Iraq by the US. Subsequent events showed that the European states stance that this invasion was a major miscalculation was correct – and the new US president Obama had himself opposed the war. But US administrations are accustomed to automatic support from Europe for their foreign policy. ‘Neo-con’ circles in the US were therefore determined to secure renewed European support for whatever foreign policy the US adopted.

Important successes in this goal were subsequently gained by Sarkozy being elected President of France – Sarkozy including in his platform a pledge of a new closer relation of France with the US and he has carried out full French re-entry into NATO. In Germany the Social Democrat led government, which had opposed the Iraq war, was replaced by the Christian Democrat led coalition under Merkel. Both events were seen as important US foreign policy successes by neo-con viewpoints.

These successes also allowed the British Conservative Party which, apart from partial independence for a short episode under Edward Heath, has always reflected US foreign policy in Europe to play an aggressive role in rallying forces opposed to deeper European integration. The Conservatives withdrew from the main centre right grouping in the European parliament, on the grounds it was ‘Euro-Federalist’ – and to do this were prepared to align themselves with various unsavoury xenophobic parties in eastern Europe. US policy simultaneously stressed relations with the ‘new Europe’, centred on Poland and other East European states – which were seen as more supportive of United States foreign policy.

Impact of the international financial crisis

The impact of the 2008 financial crisis, and the successive European debt crises, has shaken up this situation. It became clear to the German government, after some initial prevarication, that either greater steps would have to be taken towards greater European economic and fiscal integration or the Euro would unravel thereby greatly harming German economic interests. Germany also had the economic weight within Europe to impose its solution provided it had the will – which is what Chancellor Merkel chose to deploy.

The final terms of the Greek bailout therefore corresponded, in its key terms, to conditions laid down by Merkel in order to safeguard German business interests. There was a private sector write down, in the form of a partial Greek default in order to lessen the burden falling on the German taxpayer, contrary to the earlier declarations of European Central Bank head Trichet. Contrary to the proposals of Sarkozy no European bank tax was introduced.

Furthermore by forcing through a deal consolidating the Euro Merkel also called the bluff of, and defeated, the British Tory Party. The Conservatives were faced with the reality that a deep crisis or collapse of the Euro, with its side effects, would create such international financial dislocation that it threatened to bring down the already weakened big British banks, with consequent worsening of Britain’s already weak economic position, and that the only way to prevent such a crisis of the Euro was to move towards greater integration in Europe. Therefore the Conservatives, previously bitter opponents of deeper European integration, suddenly became favourable to fiscal union in the Eurozone.

As the Financial Times noted: ‘The chancellor [George Osborne]… was “very ­worried” about the possibility of the eurozone crisis spiralling out of control, warning that it posed an additional threat to Britain’s already “tough” economic situation.

‘“We see the potential for a set of economic events that could be as damaging as 2008,” he said...

‘The chancellor was optimistic that the eurogroup of finance ministers would make progress with involving the private sector in reducing Greece’s debts but said this was only the first step towards a necessary fiscal union in the single currency area.

‘He recognised that his enthusiasm for greater eurozone integration turned British policy on its head… He said “the remorseless logic” of monetary union was greater fiscal union…

‘Mr Osborne… called for greater economic integration of the single currency area, adding that the idea of eurozone bonds was “worthy of serious consideration”…

‘Core eurozone countries, such as Germany, would have to stand behind southern European sovereign debt as guarantors, while the periphery would have to accept German-designed economic policy in return.’

The British government then de facto fell into line with the German imposed settlement for Greece by reducing the interest rate on Britain’s loan to Ireland to 3.5 per cent - in line with the policy of the eurozone countries. The cost to the British Exchequer of this step was up to £400 million ($650 million).

Germany looks east

The ability of Germany’s government to determine the essential conditions for a Greek bailout also comes at a time when Germany has been pursuing a more independent economic policy with important success – Germany has become the first major European economy to regain its pre-crisis level of GDP, and from 2010 onwards it began to enjoy rapid economic growth.

To pursue this policy Germany has sought closer relations with China – German exports to China are now greater than to the US, which has meant Germany not significantly supporting US demands that China increase the RMBs exchange rate. The German government has also sought good relations with Russia – although it has also tried to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs by de facto urging President Medvedev to stand for another term as president rather than Vladimir Putin.

Germany has also declined to participate in the NATO military action in Libya, although it has provided limited financial support for the opposition to Gadaffi. This reflects that Germany does not wish to impose an economic burden on itself through higher military expenditure and because Chancellor Merkel knew she had to push through unpopular policies to bail out Greece and did not want simultaneously to face opposition from a German peace movement.

On both economic and political issues, therefore, Germany has taken a position more independent from the US - and this policy has been accompanied by economic success.

Therefore while media attention has focussed on Chancellor Merkel’s short term success in forcing through a private sector 21 per cent debt write down for Greece much more important was the strategic decision taken by, and victory gained, by Germany – which reflected rather broad policy issues.

While Germany’s current policies have brought it economic success, when pursuing a course relatively independent of US administration policy, it is inevitable that there will be a new attempt by neo-con circles in the US aimed at subordinating German economic policy to US interests and policies. It will be interesting to see what occurs with this.

China and the US

As would be anticipated from the above the steps towards at least immediate stabilisation of the Euro constituted by the bailout for Greece were not welcomed by neo-con circles who fear for the dominance of the dollar. The Wall Street Journal, in particular, carried a whole series of negative assessments of the Greek bailout. This paralleled similar positions among Eurosceptics in the UK – who were critical of the new stance taken by the Conservative Party leadership.

China, on the contrary, strongly welcomed the consolidation of the Euro. Its central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan issued a statement declaring: ‘This will help in promoting a resolution of the Eurozone sovereign debt issues, maintaining financial stability in the Eurozone and its member states, and maintaining market confidence.’ He noted: ‘We support the efforts made by the European Union and the Eurozone in combating the global financial crisis and improving their fiscal situation.’ Also he noted: ‘China has always been confident regarding the Eurozone and the euro and will continue to play an active and stable role in the international financial market.’ China is clearly far more supportive of the Euro than many circles in the US.

In short the measures taken around the Euro are far from purely a European matter. They affect the interrelation of Europe, the US and China – the three greatest economic powers in the world. Within that framework Germany has gained a notable foreign policy success. The events round Greece are therefore both a major economic and a political event.

Postscript

The key internal problems of the Euro exposed by the Greek, Irish and Portugese debt crises are not newly discovered but were analysed in advance by the theoretical views which inform this blog. Anyone interested in a more comprehensive analyses of these may therefore like to read the September 1996 article 'Fundamental economic implications of a single European currency.' 

 

 

The Eurozone crisis and China

As Europe’s debt crisis intensifies again an interesting international aspect is the policy choices this poses for China.

It is a further sign of the growing international effect of China’s economic strength that it had already become part of the discussion on how to resolve Greece's specific debt crisis – which is why Chinese premier’s Wen Jiabao's recent European visit received even more extensive than usual coverage in the continent's media. The new twist of the Eurozone’s crisis, with Italy being drawn in, once more shows the careful calculations that have to be made by China’s economic policy makers.

Overall economic relations between China and the European Union (EU) are clearly advancing. During Wen Jiabao’s visit to Germany contracts worth $15 billion were signed. Germany now exports more to China than to the US. In Hungary, which Wen Jiabao also visited, China's announcement that it would include that country in its international bond purchases was (with some hyperbole) described by Hungary’s government as ‘a decision of historic significance.’ In Britain, where only $2 billion of contracts were signed, prime minister Cameron appears to have soured relations by attempting to lecture China on human rights. The Financial Times reported: ‘a senior Chinese official told the... FT that the UK “is losing its standing in Europe as far as China is concerned and that Britain is now viewed less favorably in Beijing than Germany, France, Italy and Spain.”'

The Economist positively summed up its analysis of Wen’s visit, and of overall EU-China relations, in an editorial: ‘Investment bankers there [in Europe] are now sure to dial Chinese clients if they hear that a firm is a possible bid target. China's banks are rapidly increasing their presence in Europe... Chinese direct investment abroad has increased faster in Europe than in any other region.

‘The Europeans get more than just money. A Chinese partner is a good way for a European brand to gain access to the world's soon-to-be-biggest economy. Ask France's Club Med, which now has a big Chinese shareholder and recently opened its first holiday resort in the country. Or CIFA, an Italian construction equipment maker whose products are now marketed as a premium brand by its Chinese owner. Or Sweden's Volvo, which was bought by Geely, a Chinese carmaker, in 2010 and now calls China its second home market.’ The magazine concluded its editorial: ‘In welcoming China, Europe is swimming with the tide of history. America is struggling against it.’

However the Eurozone crisis is a specific issue within this context regarding which China’s government must be doing careful analysis. At least one of the Eurozone countries is going to have to stage a partial default. For example, Greece's debt next year is projected to reach 159 percent of GDP, its interest rates are 15 percent above German equivalents, and its balance of payments deficit is 5.5 percent of GDP. No serious economic recovery is taking place nor is it likely to under the bailout packages signed with the EU. This combination is totally unsustainable. A starting point has to be that the present bailout packages are not going to work and in the end Greece, and quite likely some other countries, will have to partially default on its debt - to the disadvantage of its creditors.

The overwhelming majority of international analysts are aware of this inevitable default. They are merely divided between those who believe default should occur now or whether it would be better to postpone it. The proclamations by European governments that even partial default is ‘unthinkable’, which has been shown to carry little credibility in markets or among serious analysts, merely means in practice they are going down the road of postponement.

The purpose of this postponement and what is taking place during it is clear - and it is this which brings in China. The core process in the postponement is giving time for European and other banks to exit from holdings of Greek debt and transfer it to governments - which in the real world means taxpayers. The latter will therefore pick up the eventual bill when the partial default comes. This is the reality behind strong public opposition to the European Union’s bailout plans not only in austerity-hit Greece but in creditor countries such as Germany, and it is why Angel Merkel has been periodically threatening to try to make the private sector pick up at least some of the bill.

The eventual division of losses purely between European banks and European taxpayers evidently does not affect China directly financially. But China is being asked to pick up some of the bill when the eventual default comes. The mechanism of this is that a default will have consequences not only for the country concerned but across Europe. China's government is being asked to buy, and indeed is buying, bonds in some European countries on terms that may worsen after a default. China is, of course, directly financially affected by this.

From an economic point of view China purchasing European bonds, even with knowledge that there will be a partial default, may be a sensible step. It may be that the overall benefits of participating in a deal to postpone default, which presumably will also make it more orderly, outweigh any direct financial losses China will incur. Certainly it would be viewed favorably as very responsible behavior by a number of European governments,

But there are several imponderables. First are China’s policy makers fully aware such a partial default will not be avoided? Second, while China has large foreign exchange reserves it also has a need to utilize these efficiently. The overall benefit must outweigh any loss. China, entirely rationally, has no time for approaches such as Cameron’s which consist of wanting China’s business while delivering lectures.

Given the US would gain benefits from the collapse of the Euro, as it would remove an international alternative to the dollar, and will therefore not significantly aid the Eurozone governments, China must weigh both pluses and minuses of any help. While the central drama is in Europe itself we can be sure developments in the Eurozone are being carefully followed in Beijing.

Greece and other failures of EU bailout packages

The great majority of serious economic commentators know that the ‘bailout’ package just agreed between the EU and Greece is going to fail. That in the end Greece will be forced into partial default worsening the terms for its creditors. This will, of course, be politely termed ‘rescheduling’, ‘reprofiling’ or some similar phrase in order to attempt to camouflage reality. The camouflage may, however, be so transparent that the ratings agencies will still declare a default. The main discussion is whether it is better for Greece to default immediately or whether the bailout package is a good idea, not because it will work in the end, but because it will postpone the default.

It is therefore useful to understand that all three bailout packages agreed between the EU and its member countries struck by debt crisis are failing in their declared purpose of promoting economic recovery – that is not only in Greece but also in Ireland and Portugal. This is clear from Figure 1, which shows the trend in GDP for these three countries since its peak in the last business cycle.

As may be seen in none of these countries is serious recovery occurring. Attempts to claim it is, for example by making optimistic publicity about the latest quarter’s GDP figures from Ireland, consists of taking data out of context – Ireland’s GDP figures were better only in comparison to the precipitate collapse which had occurred in the previous quarter.

Taking the three countries which have made agreements with the EU the latest available data, for the 1st quarter of 2011, shows:

• Greece’s GDP is 9.9% below its peak with an insignificant recovery from the low of 10.0% below.
• Portugal had been recovering, but its GDP has turned down in the last two quarters and is now 2.7% below its peak.
• Ireland’s GDP is 11.5% below its peak and is the same level as in the 3rd quarter of 2009 – i.e. no net growth has taken place for the last year and a half of austerity packages.

In short no serious recovery has been created by any EU ‘bailout’.

Figure 1

Need for some realism in EU-China discussions

I have a new article at China.org.cn looking at present China-EU discussions surrounding the European debt crisis.

It analyses that the current negotiating position of the EU is unrealistic: 'the EU is asking China to engage in activity which does carry definite financial risk... With EU encouragement, China has been buying bonds in Spain, Greece, Portugal and some of the other European countries which face risk on their sovereign debt. At least some "restructuring" of this European country debt is realistically inevitable... 

'Take Greece. Its debt is rising towards 160 per cent of GDP. Its interest rate to borrow money on private markets is 16 per cent – meaning in practice Greece is excluded from private finance. The EU already agreed a $156 billion bailout for Greece and this has been insufficient to stabilize the situation. Greece is most unlikely to be able to repay its debts on the originally agreed terms. Astronomical interest rates are the markets estimate of how much the value of Greek debt will be marked down by – in reality an interest rate plus a calculation of by how much the debt will be devalued...

'China is to be asked to put its money into risky European financial instruments without any serious agreement that will bring benefits to China. That is not an approach any country would accept.' The response of China is therefore likely to be limited.

The article looks at the type of broader issues that might bring benefits to both the EU and China and therefore lead to a more significant agreement which would be more stabilising for the European debt crisis.

The full analysis can be found here.

Europe's 'stagnant middle' will determine EU's economic trajectory

Summary

Media attention regarding Europe's economy has largely focussed on the debt crisis in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, together with some discussion of whether the radical cuts in public spending in the UK will undermine its economic recovery. Both are important topics. However they are insufficient to answer a more general question – how well is the European Union (EU) recovering from the Great Recession?

This relates to another misunderstanding of the trend in Europe's economies - a tendency to present the situation as a 'two track Europe'. In this conception, there is primarily a division between ‘northern' and 'southern’ Europe – with the former recovering and the latter not (in this perspective Ireland is an honorary member of southern Europe).

Examination of factual trends, however, shows a different situation. There are three groups, not two, within the EU's economy:

• Significantly recovering economies - centred on Germany and France.
• Small economies which have undergone serious economic decline, of which the most well known cases are Greece and Ireland - but even taken as a group these are too small to determine the course of Europe's economy.
• A group centred on what may be termed the ‘large relatively stagnant economies’ - the UK, Italy and Spain, which underwent substantial economic decline and in which recovery is currently slow.

Due to their size it is likely to be this third group that determines the dynamic of the EUs economy in the coming period.

This article analyses these trends

The overall situation in the EU economy

To give a context for the the EU's economic performance, the overall trends in GDP in the three major centres of developed economies – the US, the EU, and Japan – are shown in Figure 1. This shows GDP since the peak of the previous business cycle.

Regarding the EU, its GDP in the last quarter of 2010 remained 2.8% below in its peak – the latter occurring in the 1st quarter of 2008. It is highly improbable that growth in the 1st quarter of 2011 will be sufficient to take EU GDP back to its previous peak level. Therefore, over a three year period, the EU will have experienced net negative growth.

To take a comparison, three years after the beginning of recession, US GDP just regained its previous peak level in the last quarter of 2010 - technically on OECD data it was 0.1% above it. Japan’s GDP remained 4.2% below its previous peak.

Figure 2 shows that there is no essential difference between the performance of the EU as a whole and that of the Eurozone. Therefore in this article concentration will be on the Eurozone plus the one large European economy outside it – the UK. Together these determine the European economic situation.

Figure 1

 

Figure 2

 

Three groups in the EU

Considering trends within the EU in more detail, three distinct groups in terms of economic recovery can be identified.

• The first group, centred on Germany and France, is enjoying relatively synchronised and significant recovery.
• A second group, consisting of Greece, Ireland, Estonia, and Slovenia has undergone severe economic contraction and recovery in these states is either limited or so far has not occurred. The combined GDP of these countries is, however, too small to determine the overall economic situation in the EU.
• A third group includes three major European economies – the UK, Italy and Spain. These underwent more substantial economic decline than the grouping centred on Germany and France. Recovery in this third group of economies substantially slowed during 2010. Given that these economies have significant economic weight, equal to approximately three quarters of the GDP of the states centred on Germany and France, it is the performance of what may be termed ‘large relatively stagnant economies’ that is likely to determine the course of the EU’s recovery as a whole. These might be termed so far 'Europe's stagnant middle'.

The three groups will be considered in turn.

German/French group of recovering economies

The first group of EU economies centres on Germany and France. Their situation is shown in Figure 3. All have recovered significantly from recession.

Both Germany and France are specified in this group as, contrary to some media impressions, Germany's overall economic performance during the ‘Great Recession’ has not, so far, been notably superior to France’s. While in the most recent quarters German economic growth has been more rapid than French, German economic decline at the beginning of the downturn was significantly greater than in France. Overall, by the 4th quarter of 2010, Germany and France’s economic recovery differed only marginally – Germany’s GDP being 1.4% below its previous peak and GDP in France being 1.6% below its peak.

Continuation of more rapid German economic growth in 2011 would, of course, alter this picture and create a situation of significantly superior German recovery. This trend must therefore be watched. However to date France’s economy has also recovered significantly.

The smaller states in this group of substantially recovering economies are the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, and Luxembourg. The GDP of none, in the 4th quarter of 2010, was more than 2.1% below its previous peak level.

As analysed elsewhere, it remains to be seen if Portugal’s agreement of an austerity package with the EU will lead to it dropping out of this category.

The combined GDP of this group of economies, measured on an annualised basis in the 4th quarter of 2010, was $8.2 trillion, or 55% of the GDP of the combined Eurozone plus UK – Table 1.

The size of this group of economies is therefore substantial, but as it represents only slightly over half the GDP of the Eurozone economies plus the UK it is not sufficient in itself to determine the course of the EU’s economy. Only if these economies can act, together with other factors, as a locomotive for a wider range of states can Europe's broader economy undergo substantial or accelerated recovery.

Figure 3

Table 1

EU economies suffering sharp economic decline

The second economic group, which has received much attention due to the European debt crisis, includes the two economies which have agreed emergency debt packages with the EU – Greece and Ireland. Two other Eurozone economies, Estonia and Slovenia, have also suffered severe economic declines without having to reach debt agreements with the EU. In the case of all these economies, current GDP is at least 6% below the peak of the previous business cycle – Figure 4.

Slovenia and Estonia are undergoing some recovery. Greece and Ireland, in the 4th quarter of 2010 were still undergoing economic decline.

The financial impact of the crises in Greece and Ireland was, of course, considerable. The economic impact of their recessions on the population of these countries is severe. But this entire group of economies is too small to determine the economic course of the EU or Eurozone. Their collective GDP, $0.5 trillion, is significantly smaller than that of the Netherlands alone, and less than 4% of the total GDP of the Eurozone plus the UK. It is only 7% of the size of the recovering economy group centred on Germany and France – Table 2.

While this group of economies has received great publicity due to the impact of the debt crisis, it is therefore too small to directly inflect the course of EU GDP.

Figure 4

Table 2

Large and relatively stagnant EU economies

The third group, which may be charcterised as ‘large and relatively stagnant economies’ –  is constituted by the UK, Italy and Spain. These underwent both more substantial recession than the group centred on Germany and France and their recovery is much weaker. In each case their GDP’s remain 4-6% below previous peak levels – Figure 5. In the 4th quarter of 2010 Spain's GDP was 4.3% below its peak, the UK's 4.6% below, and Italy's 5.2% below. In Italy and Spain, after the decline during the recession, recovery has been extremely weak, while in the UK there was significant recovery during 2009 which then stalled in the the last quarter of 2010.

Finland's much smaller economy falls in the same range of percentage decline but its recent grown has been more dynamic.

These economies are substantial, accounting for 42% of the GDP of the Eurozone plus the UK.

It is clear that without serious recovery in the three large economies in this group, France and Germany by themselves are not large enough to lead to rapid economic recovery in the EU as a whole. It is therefore in these economies constituting 'the stagnant middle' that the trajectory of Europe's economy will be decided.

Figure 5

Table 3

Conclusion

The analysis of Europe's economy as being essentially divided into a 'recovering north' and a 'crisis ridden south' is not accurate. A bloc of countries centring on Germany and France is clearly recovering. A number of states, most spectacularly Greece and Ireland, remain in deep crisis but are too small to determine the overall economic trajectory in Europe. It is therefore likely to be the so far 'stagnant middle' - the UK, Spain and Italy - which detemines whether relatively rapid recovery remains confined to economies centred on Germany and France or spreads to Europe as a whole.

Regarding this group of economies, the evident key factors will be the unwinding of the property bubble in Spain, the impact of the deep cuts in public spending in the UK, and whether Italy can break out of what is now a prolonged economic stagnation - Italy's average annual growth rate over the last 20 years is 0.9%, a performance as bad as Japan's.

The UK, Italian and Spanish cases should therefore be analysed not only individually but in terms of their impact on the trajectory of Europe's economy as a whole.

Debt deals ravage Ireland and Greece's economies - Portugal's package to have the same result?

The full scale of the economic declines in Ireland and Greece, under the impact of the debt agreements and consequent contractionary fiscal policies agreed by their governments, is shown in Figure 1 below. This illustrates the change in GDP, since the peak of the previous business cycle, in the so called ‘PIGS’ economies (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain) compared to Germany and France.

GDP in Greece has fallen by 8.9% since its peak. In Ireland the decline is 14.6%. Both countries saw GDP in the 4th quarter of 2010 fall to its lowest level in the recession – i.e. no recovery had begun. In contrast GDP in Germany is 1.4% below its peak and in France 1.6% below - in both economies recovery has been taking place for seven quarters, since the 1st quarter of 2009.

Figure 1

 

Considering Portugal, the latest country to apply for an EU economic package, it is clear that to date its economy has more closely followed the performance of France and Germany than Greece or Ireland.

Portugal has also outperformed Spain. In the 4th quarter of 2010 Portugal’s GDP was 2.0% below its peak level compared to Spain’s decline of 4.3%.

Furthermore until the 4th quarter of 2010 Portugal’s GDP had been recovering.

Based on the experience of Ireland and Greece, and basic economic analysis. the imposition of a fiscally contractionary debt agreement on Portugal, after its request for an agreement with the EU, will lead to sharp economic decline.

The deep economic contraction in Greece and Ireland has already made it more difficult for them to repay their debts according to the terms agreed. The problem in both economies is not liquidity but their balance sheets. The debt to GDP ratio in Greece, for example, is 140% of GDP. In Ireland exposure to bank bail outs is several times GDP.

The rationale for the loans organised by the EU for Ireland and Greece would be that their economies would grow and therefore make possible repayment of the loans at a future date. In fact the severe economic decline resulting from the contractionary fiscal policies makes this implausible. Figure 1 therefore also indicates the likely consequences if such policy spreads to Portugal.

The depth of the recessions in Ireland and Greece therefore confirms that the EU package to be developed for Portugal is likely to contribute to worsening the consequences of the EU debt situation rather than alleviating it.

 

The pattern of the Great Recession in the US and Europe - by John Ross and Xu Xi Chi

As articles on this blog have noted previously, the core of the Great Recession is the severe fall in fixed investment in developed economies. Factually analysing this is crucial for positively establishing the driving force of developments. It also refutes alternative theories, such as that the dominant factor in the international economic situation is a fall in US consumption – which some projected would be caused by a rise in US saving and deleveraging of US consumers.

Recent publication of the second, revised, estimate of US 3^rd quarter GDP, together with aggregated data for the OECD economies in Europe, allows further verification of the actual international trends. Precise quantitative comparisons of the published data should not be made between the US and Europe, as that for the US is in constant 2005 dollars whereas the aggregated OECD data is calculated in parity purchasing powers (PPPs). But in both cases the trend is quite sufficiently clear as to leave no doubt as to the processes occurring

Europe

Taking first Europe, the changes in components of GDP between the peak of the previous business cycle, in the 1^st quarter of 2008, and the latest available data, for the 2^nd quarter of 2010, are shown in Figure 1. The entire decline in OECD Europe GDP during this period, $387bn in constant PPP terms, is more than accounted for by the decline in fixed investment of $396bn. The fall in personal consumption, $80b, is slightly more than offset by the rise in government consumption, $114bn, while the fall in imports, $374bn, is slightly greater than the decline in exports of $360bn.

Therefore essentially 100% of the decline in GDP in Europe is due to the decline in fixed investment.

Figure 1

 

US

Turning to the US, the revised second estimate for US 3^rd quarter GDP does not show a marked contrast with the first estimate. Annualised GDP growth rate was revised up from 2.0% to 2.5%, which might appear large until it is remembered that, unlike most countries, the US publishes its quarterly GDP changes on an annualised basis. So the upward revision of GDP is only 0.1% or $17bn, in 2005 constant price terms, in a $13,277bn economy.

Taking the components of US GDP, again in constant price terms, US GDP in the 3^rd quarter of 2010 remains $86bn, or 0.6%, below its all time peak in the 4^th quarter of 2007. Over that period net exports have improved by $54bn, inventories by $99bn, and government expenditure by $135bn. Personal consumption has fallen by a marginal $2 billion – confirming that a fall in US consumption is not the driving force of the recession. Indeed total US consumption, that is personal and government consumption combined, is now clearly above its previous peak level in the 4th quarter of 2007.

The driving force of the US recession is the $405bn decline in fixed investment – residential investment down $200bn and non-residential down $207bn.¹ The fall in fixed investment accounts for all the decline in US GDP – indeed the fixed investment drop is approximately five times as large as the entire decline in US GDP and is merely partially offset by expansion in other GDP components.

Figure 2

 

Long term trends

The sharp decline in fixed investment that has driven the Great Recession in both the US and Europe, however, has longer term consequences for their economic growth. Fixed investment is the prime driving force of economic growth, accounting for about 50% of GDP growth in proper growth accounting terms. A sharp decline in fixed investment in the US and Europe will therefore have not merely immediate but medium and longer-term consequences in slowing the trend rate of economic growth.

As may be seen from Figure 3, measured in current price terms, the recent fall in fixed investment in Europe is the culmination of a long decline in the percentage of fixed investment in GDP. This has now dropped, measured in PPP terms, by seven percentage points of GDP from its peak in 1973, at the end of the ‘Golden Age’ of post-World War II economic growth – declining from 25.3% of GDP to 18.2%.

Figure 3

 

In the case of the US, measuring in current dollar terms, the percentage of fixed investment in GDP also fell by seven percent of GDP, from a peak of 18.7% in the third quarter of 1979 to a post-World War II low of 11.7% of GDP at its trough in the first quarter of 2010 – see Figure 4. The recovery to the third quarter of 2010 is purely marginal – to 12.0% of GDP.

The severe fall in investment in both the US and Europe is therefore not simply the driving force of Great Recession but ensures that these economies will experience slower than previously attained levels of growth at least in the medium term.

If the driving force of the Great Recession had been a decline in consumption it could be conceived as a very violent cyclical movement that would be followed by a return to 'normal' - i.e. to previous trend growth rates. The fact that the centre of the Great Recession is a severe decline in investment has longer term consequences in depressing trend and therefore average growth rates.

Accurate diagnosis of the driving force of the recession is therefore important not only for short term but for medium and longer term analysis.

Figure 4

 

Notes

The greater capital intensity of economic growth in developed than developing economies – confirmation in new data from Jorgenson and Vu

Earlier articles have analysed trends in the international growth accounting database, covering the period 1989-2006, published by Jorgenson and Vu (Ross, 2010) (Jorgenson & Vu, 2007b). In their analysis of this data Jorgenson and Vu emphasised that increase in factor inputs, capital and labour, were a much higher percentage contribution to international GDP growth than total factor productivity (TFP) and the major role played by inputs of information technology (IT) capital. The present author, analysing this database, found a clear international pattern that the capital intensity of GDP growth, i.e. the percentage of GDP growth accounted for by capital inputs, was greater in developed than in developing economies. This confirmed other measures showing the same process with economic development. (Ross, 2010)

This trend is of considerable importance:

• Practically, it indicates a pattern that as an economy makes a transition from developing to a developed status it will become more dependent on capital investment for growth.
• Theoretically, it confirms the analysis of classical economics, deriving from Adam Smith, that the contribution of capital to growth increases with economic development.

Since this analysis of their earlier database was carried out, Jorgenson and Vu have published new data covering the period up to 2008. (Jorgenson & Vu, 2010) The present paper analyses this new data. It again clearly confirms that capital intensity of growth is greater in developed than in developing economies. This article focuses on the new database and for a more comprehensive presentation of the issues the earlier paper should be consulted. (Ross, 2010a)

It should be pointed out that while this paper utilises calculations based on data produced by Jorgenson and Vu they do not bear responsibility for the conclusions drawn.

Developed economies

The percentage contribution to GDP growth of capital, labour and TFP, calculated from updated database of Jorgenson and Vu, is set out in Table 1 and illustrated visually in Figure 1.

Jorgenson and Vu divide their data into two groups of developed economies, the G7 and non-G7, and five groups of developing economies – Developing Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern Europe including the former USSR.¹ The pattern that GDP growth is more capital intensive in developed economies than in developing economies, i.e. capital accounts for a greater percentage contribution to GDP growth in developed economies than in developing ones, is clearly confirmed by this data.

Table 1

• In all periods, the percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth in the G7 developed economies is higher than in any group of developing economies.
• In all periods, the contribution of capital to GDP growth in either the G7 or the non-G7 developed economies is higher than in any group of developing economies.
• In all periods, the contribution of capital to GDP growth is higher in both the G7 and the non-G7 developed economies than in the developing economies of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe or the Middle East and North Africa.
• In seven out of eight measurements (i.e. two groups of developed economies times four periods), the contribution of capital to GDP growth of both the G7 and the non-G7 developed economies was greater than in any group of developing economies – the only exception being in 1995-2000, when the contribution of capital to GDP growth in the developing Asian economies exceeded that in the non-G7 developed economies although remaining lower than in the G7 economies.

In short, the pattern is clear that developed economies show capital intensive growth compared to developing economies – i.e. the percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth is higher in developed than in developing economies. These trends may be seen visually in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Developing Asian economies

In an earlier paper it was analysed that the Asian developing economies, in terms of their capital-intensity of development, were an ‘intermediate’ group between the developed economies, which had capital-intensive growth, and the majority of developing economies, which had a pattern of labour-intensive growth. (Ross, 2010a) This is confirmed in Jorgenson and Vu’s new database.

In 15 out of 16 possible measurements (four periods times four sets of comparisons) the developing Asian economies had a higher percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth than the four other groups of developing economies – the only exception being Sub-Saharan Africa in 2004-2008. However in seven out of eight possible measurements the developing Asian economies had a lower percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth than both groups of developing economies and in all periods the developing Asian economies had a lower percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth than in the G7 economies.

Non-Asian developing economies

Eastern Europe, undergoing transition from Communism to capitalism, stands apart from all other groups in that its primary source of GDP growth is TFP – for a detailed discussion see (Jorgenson & Vu, 2010). In terms of developing, as opposed to developed, economies the labour intensive character of growth in the non-Asian developing economies is clearly shown in Jorgenson and Vu’s data.

Taking Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa and the Middle East in 12 possible comparisons (three groups of countries times four periods), labour makes the highest contribution to GDP growth in 10 of these – the exceptions being Sub-Saharan Africa in 2004-2008, when capital made the greatest contribution, and North Africa and the Middle East in 2004-2008 when TFP made the largest contribution.

The pattern of capital-intensive growth in developed economies, of labour-intensive growth in the majority of developing economies, and the Asian developing economies forming an ‘intermediate’ group between the two is therefore clear.

The percentage contributions of labour and TFP to GDP growth by economy grouping are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3.

Figure 2

Figure 3

Conclusion

The present author has previously presented clear evidence of the trend of the rising contribution of capital investment to GDP growth in long term historical development. This includes:

• The historically clear trend for the percentage of fixed investment in GDP to rise in the most rapidly growing economies of each period of growth (Ross, 2008a) (Ross, 2010).
• The demonstration by Maddison and others that over time the percentage of fixed investment in GDP rose in the main developed economies – the historically constant proportion of fixed investment in GDP of the US being clearly the exception and not the rule. (Maddison, 1992) (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p. 15)

While this data was clear in qualitative terms, due to its long term historical framework and coverage of the largest economies, it could be potentially argued that it was not fully comprehensive in scope due to lack of sufficient coverage of developing economies. Jorgenson and Vu’s data however deals with any attempted refutation based on claims of lack of comprehensive coverage – their data includes economies accounting for more than 95% of world GDP including all major developing economies. Jorgenson and Vu’s research is also carried out in the framework of the World Bank’s International Comparison Programme and may be taken as the latest and at present most authoritative database on international economic growth. (World Bank, 2008) 

In light of the historical data and Jorgenson and Vu’s comprehensive international coverage the factual evidence is overwhelming. The contribution of capital to growth increases with economic development whether this is considered historically or in terms of contemporary patterns of economic development. This is not only of practical importance for economic development but, as analysed previously, confirms a key postulate of classical economics originally advanced by Adam Smith.

Notes

¹ For details of the countries in each group see (Jorgenson & Vu, 2010). For brevity “Eastern Europe” in the rest of the article, unless specified otherwise, will be taken to include the former USSR.

Bibliography

Jorgenson, D. W., & Vu, K. M. (2007b). Information technology and the world growth resurgence - updated tables. Retrieved from Dale Jorgenson: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/recent_work_jorgenson

Jorgenson, D. W., & Vu, K. M. (2010). Potential growth of the world economy. Journal of Policy Modeling (doi:10.1016/j.polmod.2010.07.011).

Maddison, A. (1992). A long run perspective on saving. Scandanavian Journal of Economics , 94 (2), 181-196.

Ross, J. (2010a, August 29). The transition from labour-intensive to capital-intensive growth during economic development – trends revealed in the data of Jorgenson and Vu. Retrieved August 29, 2010, from Key Trends in Globalisation: http://ablog.typepad.com/keytrendsinglobalisation/2010/08/capital_intensive_growth.html

Ross, J. (2010, August 29). Trends in investment and labour inputs with economic development, as indicated in the data of Jorgenson and Vu. Retrieved August 29, 2010, from Key Trends in Globalisation: http://ablog.typepad.com/keytrendsinglobalisation/2010/08/trends-in-nvestment-and-labour-inputs-with-economic-development-as-shown-in-the-data-of-jorgenson-an.html

Ross, J. (2008a, September 17). Why Asia will continue to grow more rapidly than the US and Europe - a historical perspective. Retrieved August 22, 2010, from Key Trends in Globalisationi: http://ablog.typepad.com/keytrendsinglobalisation/2008/09/data-on-long-term-trends-in-investment-and-economic-growth--this-post-deals-with-the-historic-trend-of-investment-and-econo.html

World Bank. (2008). Global purchasing power parities and real expenditures: 2005 international comparison programme. Washington DC: World Bank.

Labour inputs in stages of economic development – trends revealed in the data of Jorgenson and Vu

Summary

An earlier article (Ross, 2010 August) analysed trends in the contribution of capital investment to GDP growth in the database published by Jorgenson and Vu of growth accounting data for economies compromising more than 95% of world GDP. (Jorgenson & Vu, 2007b) Jorgenson and Vu themselves drew attention to two trends:

• Factor inputs of capital and labour greatly predominate over total factor productivity [TFP] in percentage contribution to international GDP growth.
• The increasing role played by capital investment in information technology (IT).

Analysis of this database by the present author showed another trend. (Ross, 2010 August)

• Developed economies have a capital-intensive path of growth compared to developing economies – i.e. the percentage contribution of capital investment to GDP growth is higher in developed than developing economies. The East Asian/Asian developing economies are an intermediate group - the percentage contribution to GDP growth of capital investment in these economies is greater than in the majority of developing economies but less than in developed economies.

This previous article looked only at investment in capital. It did not examine improvements in labour quality, which typically requires investment in human capital. This was because the percentage contribution to GDP growth of investment in physical capital in developed economies considerably exceeds that of improvements in labour quality and, for clarity, it was therefore helpful to concentrate on the primary trend.

It is, however, also revealing to analyse the combined contribution of physical capital and improvements in labour quality – in particular given this has direct practical implications. Investment in physical capital and improvements in labour quality require expenditure/investment – the latter in education, training etc. Taking capital investment and improvements in labour quality together, therefore, gives an indicator of the different patterns of such expenditure and investment in economies at different stages of development.

The present article therefore supplements the previous one by analysing the contribution of labour inputs in different economy groups.

It should be pointed out that while this paper utilises calculations based on data produced by Jorgenson and Vu they do not bear responsibility for conclusions drawn in the present article.

Capital-intensive and labour-intensive patterns of growth

The basic data for the present analysis is set out in Table 1 and Table 2. These show the percentage contribution to GDP growth of capital, labour and TFP, and of labour hours and labour quality, in economy groups for the periods 1995-2000, 1995-2000, and 2000-2006 as calculated from the data set out by Jorgenson and Vu (Jorgenson & Vu, 2007b). The pattern of the contribution of capital investment to GDP growth in the different economy groups was already analysed in the previous article and is therefore merely summarised here. (1) If the non-generally applicable case of East European economies, experiencing transition from Communism to capitalism, is left aside the patterns of growth of economies fall into two large groups according to their stage of economic development.

• The first are developed economies – the G7 and the 15 additional non-G7 developed economies. In the developed economies the percentage contribution to GDP growth of capital inputs exceeds the contribution of either labour or TFP in all periods – i.e. developed economies display capital-intensive growth.
• The second group are the majority of developing economies - in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa. In these, with only one exception, Sub-Saharan Africa in 2000-2006, the percentage contribution of labour inputs exceeded the contribution of either capital or TFP in all periods – i.e. the majority of developing economies show labour-intensive growth. (2)

The Asian developing economies, in particular East Asian developing economies, are ‘intermediate’ between the developed and the majority of developing economies.

• In the Asian/East Asian economies the percentage contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth was larger than in the other developing economy groups in all periods. However in no period was the percentage contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth in the Asian/East Asian developing economies as high as in the G7. In two periods out of three the percentage contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth was lower in the Asian/East Asian developing economies than in the non-G7 developed economies.

It is notable that neither in the developed economies groups nor in the majority of developing economies was TFP growth the main percentage contributor to GDP growth. (3) This trend in developed and developing economies is of course in line with the overall conclusion of Jorgenson and Vu: ‘‘We allocate the growth of world output, as measured in the World Bank’s International Comparison Program, between input growth and productivity. We find… that input growth greatly predominates. ‘(Jorgenson & Vu, 2009)

Trends in labour inputs will be analysed in conjunction with this overall framework.

Trends in labour inputs

First labour inputs in the developed economies will be considered in Jorgenson and Vu's data and then those in differing groups of developing economies.

i. The Developed Economies

As already noted, both the G7 and the non-G7 groups of developed economies follow a pattern of capital-intensive growth – i.e. in all periods the contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth exceeds the contribution of either labour or TFP. However, G7 and non-G7 economies differ in the role played by different forms of labour inputs.

The contribution of increases in labour hours in all periods is smaller in the G7 than in the non-G7 economies.

In the G7 economies, in two periods out of three, the percentage contribution of labour quality to GDP growth exceeds that of increase in labour hours, whereas in two periods out of three in non-G7 developed economies the contribution of labour hours exceed the contribution of labour quality. That is, the bias in G7 economies within labour inputs is towards a higher percentage contribution of labour quality than labour hours, whereas in the non-G7 economies the bias is towards a higher contribution of labour hours than labour quality.

There is also a difference between forms of labour input and TFP growth in the G7 and non-G7 developed economies. In the G7 economies, in two out of three periods, the percentage contribution of TFP exceeds the total contribution of labour inputs, and in all periods the percentage contribution of TFP to GDP growth exceeds the contribution of either labour hours or labour quality considered individually. In contrast, in all periods, in the non-G7 developed economies the contribution of labour inputs exceeds the contribution of TFP growth.

In short, in both G7 and non-G7 developed economies the predominant contribution to GDP growth comes from capital inputs. But the pattern of growth in the G7 economies is predominantly based on ‘capital investment, plus increases in TFP and labour quality’, whereas in the non-G7 developed economies the pattern of growth is predominantly based on ‘capital investment, plus increases in labour inputs - in particular increases in labour hours’.

The dominance of capital inputs and labour quality in the G7 economies may be seen clearly in Table 1. The combination of capital inputs plus labour quality inputs plays an overwhelmingly dominant role in the contribution to GDP growth in the G7 economies – accounting in successive periods for 74.9%, 61.6% and 68.5% of GDP growth.

ii. Developing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa

The dominant role played by labour inputs in GDP growth in the developing economies of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa is shown in that in all groups and periods except one, Sub-Saharan in 2000-2006, labour inputs exceeds either the input of capital or the input of TFP to GDP growth.

The contribution of labour inputs to GDP growth exceeds the contribution of TFP in all these economy groups in all periods .

Within this framework the dominance of increases in labour hours over increases in labour quality is clear. The percentage contribution of increases in labour hours exceeds the percentage contribution of increases in labour quality in all three economy groups in all three periods.

The pattern of growth of the majority of developing economies is therefore not only labour-intensive, but within that framework it is dominated by increases in labour hours rather than increases in labour quality.

iii. Developing Asian economies

In the developing Asian economies the percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth exceeds the contribution of labour in all periods. The percentage contribution of TFP also exceeds that of labour in all periods. In this overall pattern of higher inputs of capital and TFP than of labour inputs Asian developing economies are closest to the G7 group.

However, the pattern of labour inputs in the developing Asian economies differs markedly from the G7 economies. In all periods in the developing Asian economies, the percentage contribution of labour hours exceeds the percentage contribution of labour quality.

The pattern of growth of the Asian developing economies is therefore primarily based on inputs of capital, TFP and labour hours with a smaller percentage contribution from improvements in labour quality. If the developing Asian economies resemble the developed economies in the dominance of capital inputs over labour inputs, nevertheless within labour inputs the Asian economies resemble developing economies in that increases in labour hours predominate over increases in labour quality.

The Asian developing economies may therefore be taken as being ‘intermediate’ between the developing and developed economies in a dual sense.

• In terms of the contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth the Asian developing economies have clearly moved out of the ranks of developing economies closer to the capital-intensive pattern of growth in the developed economies - although the contribution of capital investment to growth in the developing Asian economies has still not yet reached the level of the developed economies.
• The developing Asian economies, unlike in particular the G7 economies, however continue to have a pattern of development similar to the majority of developing economies whereby inputs of labour hours are greater contribution to labour inputs than increases in labour quality.

Conclusion

These trends may now be summarised.

• The fundamental pattern of development whereby developed economies follow a pattern of capital-intensive growth and developing economies one of labour-intensive growth has already been noted. (Ross, 2010 August)
• Developing Asian/East Asian economies may be understood as occupying a position of transition from developing to developed status, with a capital-intensity of development that is higher than the other groups of developing economies but not as high as that of the developed economies.

In may, however, be seen from the present analysis that a second trend also occurs within labour inputs.

• The pattern of GDP growth of the developing economies is not only labour-intensive but, within that framework, is primarily dominated by increases in labour hours rather than by increases in labour quality.
• In the G7 group, in contrast, increases in labour inputs are somewhat more determined by increases in labour quality than by increases in labour hours.
• In the percentage contribution within labour inputs, the Asian/East Asian developing economies remain closer to developing economies than to the G7 in that the contribution of labour hours is greater than the contribution of labour quality.
• In terms of labour inputs, the Asian/East Asian developing economies are closer to the non-G7 developed economies than the G7, in that, unlike the G7, both groups tend to remain far more dependent on increases in labour hours than increases in labour quality for labour inputs.

There therefore appears to be a progressive development pattern, in terms of labour inputs, whereby most developing economies, including in this case Asia, have a larger contribution of labour hours than labour quality, the non-G7 developing economies retain this characteristic on a lesser scale, and the G7 economies have the greatest percentage contribution of increases in labour quality compared to increases in labour hours.

The pattern of economic development shown in the data of Jorgenson and Vu is therefore of an increase in the percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth compared to labour, and of an increase of improvements in labour quality compared to labour hours.

* * *

Since this analysis was carried out Jorgenson and Vu have extended their data to 2008. (Jorgenson & Vu, 2010) The new data does not alter the main trends analysed above. A detailed analysis from the angle of approach in this article will be published here.

Table 1

Table 2

 

Bibliography