Key Trends in Globalisation

US house price fall a significant negative for global economic prospects

One of the biggest questions for the global economy in 2012 will be whether the US follows Europe into recession – the other is whether the large developing economies will be able to repeat their strong growth performance during the previous wave of the financial crisis in 2008-2010 by ‘decoupling’ from the US and Europe.

A significant negative for US prospects came with the release of the latest S&P Case-Schiller house price index. This showed a larger than expected 3.4 per cent annual fall for the latest period for which data was available – October. But much more significant than one month's figures is the overall trend.

As shown in Figure 1 US house prices reached their post-financial crisis low in May 2009 after falling 31.7 per cent from their peak. Recovery continued until May 2010 after which prices began falling again. By October 2011 US house prices were 33.0 per cent below their all-time peak – the worst level since the international financial crisis began.

As housing is, with shares and bonds, one of the three great US asset classes, a significant fell in this category will have an impact across the whole US economy. In particular:

• it will further negatively impact the balance sheets of US banks;
• it will have a dampening effect on US consumer spending

Figure 1

 

The overall view of this blog remains that the US will continue to have historically slow growth rather than re-entering a recession, and the latest US consumer confidence figures for December were the best for eight months. But the fact that the trend of US house prices has now been down for 17 months is a serious negative.

Whatever their immediate mood US consumers are constrained by objective financial factors. With unemployment not falling significantly and incomes not rising falling house prices will further constrain consumers. The recent increase in consumer purchasing in the US has been financed by a reduction in savings levels – which is unsustainable.

The house price data by itself does not lead to a view the US is entering recession, but it pushes US growth towards the ‘slower’ end of the ‘slow’ spectrum.

How severe will the international slowdown be - the story from commodity prices?

Commodity prices are a particularly sensitive indicator for the world economy due to their strong and pro-cyclical price fluctuations. These in turn are linked to supply inelasticities – the obstacles to and pronounced time delays in changing the supply of many commodities.

Agricultural commodities frequently require a minimum of a year to increase output due to seasonal factors, and many minerals require very heavy investment, needing time to implement, before output can be increased. Once such heavy fixed costs have been undertaken it is prohibitively expensive to reduce production. Therefore whereas in manufacturing and services a large part of fluctuations in supply and demand is absorbed by changes in volume, in commodities a much higher part has to be absorbed by changes in price – hence extreme price fluctuations.

In that light Figure 1 shows a sensitive indicator for the world economy – the daily Dow Jones-UBS spot commodity price index for the last 20 years. The story is clear. The first gradual and then rapid surge in commodity price inflation in 2000-2008 is evident, as is the price crash during the international financial crisis. Price recovery occurred during 2009 up to spring 2011, taking commodity prices to higher levels than in 2008. This lay behind the consumer price inflation in India, China and other developing economies.

The peak of commodity prices was reached on 29 April 2011 – the subsequent decline itself being an excellent indicator of a slowing world economy. The subsequent fall, of 17.7 per cent to 21 December, may be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1

 

 

The year on year fluctuation in prices, which is what is reflected in the annual consumer price and producer price index figures, is even more violent. In 2011 the peak annual increase was reached at 46.6 per cent on 7 June and by 21 December it had fallen to minus 6.3 per cent. This largely explained the falling consumer price inflation in first China and now India. This inflation drop gives to gives room to loosen economic policy which is why China, for example, will not have a hard landing.

The present fall in commodity prices is clearly not yet nearly as severe as in 2008. Neither, however, has the decline halted. As they are available on a daily basis monitoring the course of commodity price indexes is a key early warning tool for gauging how severe the international economic slowdown will be.

Fairy stories about China's 'economic crisis'

The present rapid shifts in the international and Chinese economic situations, resulting from the second wave of the international financial crisis centred on the Eurozone, are a challenge both to policy makers and a major opportunity for those with an accurate analysis of China's economy.

 

China speed [By Jiao Haiyang/China.org.cn]

 

The reasons for this are the same as those when I ran a consulting company and knew inaccurate media analysis was an opportunity to make a profit. Businesses need accurate information to take correct decisions. If a newspaper writes an economy is going to boom when actually it suffers recession, the paper doesn't directly lose anything, but a company acting on the wrong analysis can lose a great deal of money. Economic and business writing therefore operates under an objective discipline which doesn't necessarily exist elsewhere - companies rationally pay a great deal of money for accurate information.

The reason a similar opening exists in China at present is that attempts are being made to convince businesses that China faces an 'economic crisis' on the same scale as that hitting the European Union (EU) and the US. This view is factually nonsense, as any comparison of economic data shows. In the four years to the latest data the US economy grew by 0.5 per cent, the EU's shrank by 0.3 per cent, and China's economy grew by 42.2 per cent. Given such comparisons claims that China is suffering from 'crisis' is rather like saying the US has cholera, the EU has typhoid, and China has a cold and therefore they are basically in the same situation as 'all are ill'. Such claims destroy rational scales of comparison and are therefore wholly misleading in predicting what will happen.

China's economy naturally faces problems - all economies always face problems. It has had excessive house price increases, which are now gradually coming under control, and its consumer price index has been too high - although again it is now falling. Recession in the Eurozone will reduce orders to China's exporters. But China's economic year on year growth rate in the last quarter was 9.1 per cent compared to 1.5 per cent for the US and 1.4 per cent for the EU. If the US and EU were paralleling China's growth far from claiming, this was a 'crisis' they would be calling it an unprecedented boom!

A typical example of such fairy stories regarding China's 'economic crisis' was a recent article in the Wall Street Journal by Nouriel Roubini and Ian Bremmer president of the Eurasia Group - a risk analysis company. This was entitled 'Whose economy has it worst?' and was introduced: 'With Europe, China and the US in crisis, the real question is which of them will stumble first.' The data already given above show such statements are bombast - there is no crisis in China's economy similar to the US or EU.

Why, therefore, are such economic fairy stories published, why are they are publicized, and how to profit, not purely monetarily, from them?

One reason they appear, of course, is simply that people make wrong analyses. But the reason they are publicized is different. Take for example Gordon C Chang. He wrote a book in 2001 entitled 'The Coming Collapse of China'. This argued 'A half-decade ago the leaders of the People's Republic of China had real choices. Today they do not. They have no exit. They have run out of time.'

In the ten years since China's economy more than doubled in size. After such radically wrong predictions you might expect that Chang would find it difficult to obtain coverage for his analysis. But instead he is regularly published by Forbes magazine with articles posing such questions as 'Can Beijing rescue a stumbling economy'. Some 'stumbling' with nine percent GDP growth! Such analyses have nothing to do with reality but fit the politics of Forbes - which specializes in analyzing the ultra-rich in the US and is hostile to China. 

Business people caught up in such political maneuvers can lose huge sums of money. For example, in a case rather similar to the one of China at present, those backing a particular political grouping in Russia in the 1990s persuaded US hedge fund manager George Soros to become involved in a takeover battle around a Russian telecommunications company Svyazinvest. I was retained as a consultant by others involved and concluded Svyazinvest was a terrible investment. Therefore Soros was being pulled in for reasons of political maneuvers and not serious financial analysis. Soros lost approximately a billion dollars.

Companies rightly analyzing that China's economy will continue to grow, GE and Goldman Sachs immediately come to mind, are those most successful in business in China. Equally there are Western analysts who correctly predicted China's growth over the last period - Goldman Sachs Jim O'Neill, who invented the term BRIC, and the specialized consultancy Dragonomics for example.

This gives a major opportunity to those with an accurate analysis of China’s economy. Businesses following the erroneous view that China's economy is going to drastically slow or enter crisis will lose money. Those who rightly predict China's economy will continue to grow rapidly will gain credibility. This requires accurate analysis and reporting - not pretending there are no problems in China's economy but correctly contextualizing that these are far less than in the US and EU. The facts over the next year, as in previous years, will simply show that China’s economy continues to grow strongly, suffering no economic crisis qualitatively equivalent to that in the EU and US at present.

*   *   *

This article originally appeared on China.org.cn. It has been amended to remove references only relevant to readers in China.    

Wrong analyses of China - listed by author and date

Numerous authors make wrong analyses predicting an economic crash or drastic slowdown in China and then, when these fail to occur, nevertheless continue to present themselves as 'China experts'. The ability to do this rests on readers forgetting what they predicted. Given that the test of an analysis and a theory is its ability, or otherwise, to predict real developments this periodically updated article conveniently lists, for reference, by author and date such wrong predictions of coming economic disaster in China so that readers can use it as reference to judge the track record of various analysts they read.

This article was last updated on 28 February 2016.

*   *   *

Bremmer, Ian: 12 November 2011

'The world's three largest economies can't continue along their current paths, and everybody knows it. Investors watch nervously for signs that China is headed toward a hard landing, that America will sink back into recession, and that the euro zone will simply implode.

'In all three cases, kicking the can down the road has staved off disaster so far, but the cans are getting bigger and heavier. Which economy will be the first to stumble on its problems?...

'In China... It has been... three years since the financial crisis made clear that China's growth remains dangerously dependent on exports to Europe, America and Japan.

'To ensure long-term economic expansion (and political stability), Beijing must figure out a way to encourage Chinese consumers to buy more of the products that local manufacturers make. This will demand a massive transfer of wealth from the state and China's state-owned companies to Chinese households.

'But Beijing is moving in the opposite direction. The leadership responded to Western market turmoil not by boosting consumption but by increasing state and private spending on fixed investment, which now accounts for nearly half of China's growth. The result has been an explosion in residential and commercial real estate, more state spending on infrastructure and more cheap loans from state-owned banks to state-owned enterprises.

'Indeed, a key obstacle to reform is that China remains so heavily invested in its state-managed model of capitalism. Of the 42 Chinese companies listed in the 2010 edition of the Fortune 500, 39 were state-owned enterprises, and three quarters of China's 100 largest publicly traded companies are government controlled. Party officials with a stake in the success of state-owned enterprises have amassed considerable power within the leadership, and they ferociously resist efforts to transfer away their wealth to private enterprises and ordinary citizens.

'China has the cash and foreign reserves to postpone a crisis. But growth is slowing, financial stresses are rising, and there is good reason to fear that China's days of can-kicking are numbered as well...

'Make no mistake: The challenges that the U.S. faces are formidable, and persistent political gridlock could delay badly needed fiscal and structural reforms. But everything is relative, and the best can to be kicking down the road just now is undoubtedly the one made in America.' (Written with Nouriel Roubini)

Chang, Gordon:

June 2002 The Coming Collapse of China pxxiii, ''A half-decade ago the leaders of the People's Republic of China had real choices. Today they do not. They have no exit. They have run out of time.'

21 February 2016 Forbes analysis : 'China’s... financial system is falling apart.'

Duncan, Richard: 17 February 2011

'regardless of what happens in the US, China is facing a much more difficult future than is generally believed. Every boom busts. Every bubble pops. China will be no exception.

'It is a serious mistake to believe China’s economy will continue to grow at 8 per cent or more for the next decade. That’s what people believed about Japan in 1989. Today, Japan’s economy is no larger than it was in 1993, if you don’t adjust for deflation. 2 per cent to 4 per cent annual GDP growth would be an excellent outcome for China over the decade, in light of the enormous capital misallocation that has occurred there over the past 10 years.'

Economist, The: 15 June 2002 'A dragon out of puff'

'In the coming decade, therefore, China seems set to become more unstable. It will face growing unrest as unemployment mounts.'

''the economy still relies primarily on domestic engines of growth, which are sputtering. Growth over the last five years has relied heavily on massive government spending. As a result, the government's debt is rising fast. Coupled with the banks' bad loans and the state's huge pension liabilities, this is a financial crisis in the making.'

 Keen, Steve 8 October 2015

'China crash will occur and add to global stagnation caused by excessive private debt.'  

Krugman, Paul: 14 March 2010

'The International Monetary Fund expects China to have a 2010 current surplus of more than $450 billion — 10 times the 2003 figure.' China's actual current account surplus in 2010 turned out to be $237 billion. Krugman never explained why he accepted this wholly inaccurate and unsubstantiated figure.

Magnus, George 16 August 2014

'During Xi’s period in office, which runs to 2022, I expect China’s GDP growth to slide to 4-5%, and there may be periods when growth doesn’t even make it to this level.'

Pesek, William

29 June 2015 in Bloomberg View, '‘Chinese policy makers seem to have exhausted whatever magical powers they had been using to keep their economy aloft.’

‘The world, after all, has had a few years to contemplate a Greek exit from the euro. But if the world's biggest trading nation suddenly hit a wall, it would be a catastrophe of a different order, wreaking havoc on economies near and far.’

Pettis, Michael:

14 August 2009 : 'I continue to stand by my comment last year... that the US would be the first major economy out of the crisis and China one of the last.'

11 March 2012 : ' 'I still maintain that average growth in this decade will barely break 3%.' 

Roubini, Nouriel: 12 November 2011

'The world's three largest economies can't continue along their current paths, and everybody knows it. Investors watch nervously for signs that China is headed toward a hard landing, that America will sink back into recession, and that the euro zone will simply implode.

'In all three cases, kicking the can down the road has staved off disaster so far, but the cans are getting bigger and heavier. Which economy will be the first to stumble on its problems?...

'In China... It has been... three years since the financial crisis made clear that China's growth remains dangerously dependent on exports to Europe, America and Japan.

'To ensure long-term economic expansion (and political stability), Beijing must figure out a way to encourage Chinese consumers to buy more of the products that local manufacturers make. This will demand a massive transfer of wealth from the state and China's state-owned companies to Chinese households.

'But Beijing is moving in the opposite direction. The leadership responded to Western market turmoil not by boosting consumption but by increasing state and private spending on fixed investment, which now accounts for nearly half of China's growth. The result has been an explosion in residential and commercial real estate, more state spending on infrastructure and more cheap loans from state-owned banks to state-owned enterprises.

'Indeed, a key obstacle to reform is that China remains so heavily invested in its state-managed model of capitalism. Of the 42 Chinese companies listed in the 2010 edition of the Fortune 500, 39 were state-owned enterprises, and three quarters of China's 100 largest publicly traded companies are government controlled. Party officials with a stake in the success of state-owned enterprises have amassed considerable power within the leadership, and they ferociously resist efforts to transfer away their wealth to private enterprises and ordinary citizens.

'China has the cash and foreign reserves to postpone a crisis. But growth is slowing, financial stresses are rising, and there is good reason to fear that China's days of can-kicking are numbered as well...

'Make no mistake: The challenges that the U.S. faces are formidable, and persistent political gridlock could delay badly needed fiscal and structural reforms. But everything is relative, and the best can to be kicking down the road just now is undoubtedly the one made in America.' (Written with Ian Bremmer)

Soros, George

21 January 2016 Bloomberg Business: 'A hard landing is practically unavoidable,' 'I’m not expecting it, I’m observing it.'

The statistical data indicates the population and shareholders have counterposed interests - implications of the negative correlation of economic growth and share prices

Summary

The studies on the relation between per capita GDP growth and returns on shares persistently find that the two are negatively correlated - i.e. a higher rate of growth of per capita GDP is associated with a lower return on shares. Cardiff Garcia and Neil Hume, in the Financial Times, recently logically used this data to deal with the relatively narrow issue of questioning analyses that the high growth rates of emerging markets, for example China, will lead to them displaying superior share performance to developed markets. But the implications of the overall finding are much more widespread and fundamental for economic policy. Specifically the implications of a negative correlation of per capita GDP growth and returns on shares include:

• The population's living standard, i.e its consumption, is on average positively determined by, and positively correlated with, growth of per capita GDP. However the return on shares is negatively correlated with per capita GDP growth. It follows that the interests of the population's living standards and the interests of shareholders are counterposed - the population has an interest in higher per capita GDP growth whereas shareholders, in terms of return on shares, would benefit from lower per capita GDP growth.
• Governments targeting high rates of increase in per capita GDP, that is high increases in living standards, should expect lower returns on shares than those with low rates of increase of per capita GDP, that is living standards. Therefore, high rates of per capita GDP and living standards, and high rates of growth of share prices/total return on shares, are counterposed and not complimentary objectives.
• These issues are in addition to the points made in the Financial Times that over the long run the higher economic growth rates of emerging economies would produce lower growth of share prices and total return on shares - this clearly fits China which has the highest rate of growth of any major economy but an underperforming share market. 

It should be stressed that such processes operate 'other things being equal' and over long periods of time. But they provide a long term determinant of economic developments which underlays, and therefore inflects, more short term trends. 

Given the widespread implications of this issue the present article therefore outlines the data and examines in more detail some of the implications.

*   *   *

Not just emerging but developed economies

The Beyond BRICs section of the Financial Times recently analysed a report by Deutsche Bank's John-Paul Smith which argued that share prices in emerging markets will suffer negative trends due to these countries government policies. The article however failed to provide the essential context that a negative correlation exists between per capita GDP growth and share price growth and total return on shares not only in emerging but in developed economies. It therefore follows, other things being equal, that high per capita GDP growth in some emerging markets would be anticipated to be correlated with underperformance of their shares.

However, this clearly raises a more general issue. Given that the aim of economic policy is to increase sustainable GDP per capita, as this makes possible increased living standards, this goal necessarily means that governments in both emerging and developed economies have to target high GDP per capita growth even although this will be necessarily be associated with lower share price growth and lower return on shares. The opposite course, targeting higher share prices and higher return on shares at the expense of lower GDP per capita growth, and therefore lower living standards, would mean placing the interests of the population lower than that of shareholders - a goal which, if being pursued, should be explicitly stated and would be unlikely to command widespread support. 

More specifically John-Paul Smith criticised governments of emerging markets on the grounds that: ‘GEM (Global Emerging Markets) companies are increasingly seen as “facilitators” for the broader economy, on the Chinese model, across many GEM markets.’ Stefan Wagstyl of the Financial Times paraphrased Smith as arguing: ‘The state will drive the redistribution of resources away from shareholders and in favour of labour.’

However it is well established in the studies on the correlation between share price growth/total return on shares and per capita GDP growth - for example Siegel's Stocks for the Long Run, Dimson, Marsh and Staunton’s Triumph of the Optimists and Ritter’s Economic Growth and Equity Returns - that a negative correlation between per capita GDP growth and share prices exists in both developed and developing economies. Such negative correlation is not due specifically to government policies in emerging markets but is an overall feature of economic growth.¹ 

The data

Turning first to the data establishing the negative correlation between GDP per capita growth and share prices, Siegel found: 'Real GDP growth is negatively correlated with stock market returns. That is, higher economic growth in individual [developed] countries is associated with lower returns to equity investors. Similarly, the stock returns for the developing countries against their GDP growth are plotted in Figure 81-b Again... there is a negative relation between the returns in individual countries and the growth rates of their GDP.' (Siegel p124) Siegel's findings for developed economies are shown in Figure 1 and those for developing economies in Figure 2.

Figure 1

Figure 2

 

Dimson, Marsh and Staunton found, regarding the total real return on equities and GDP per capita growth: ‘statistically, the correlation is -0.27 for 1900-2000 and -0.03 for 1951-2000.' (Dimson et al p156)

Regarding the correlation of GDP per capita growth and share price increases Ritter found: ‘My calculations for… 16 [developed] countries over the 1900-2002 period get a correlation of -0.37.’

In a recent survey Jain and Kranson's ‘The Myth of GDP and Stock Market Returns’ noted: ‘The data shows clearly that, over long periods and when adjusted for inflation, stock market returns and GDP per capital growth are negatively correlated.’

Goldman Sachs private wealth group, in a review, recently noted that the overall negative correlation between GDP per capita growth and share price growth extended to different groups of economies when ranked by growth rate: ‘Dimson et al have shown that if one invested in the slowest growing quintile of countries during this hundred-year- plus period, the equity returns would have outperformed the fastest growing quintile by 3% a year… Our own analysis for emerging market countries since 1991 showed the equity markets of the slowest growing countries within emerging markets outperformed those of the fastest growing countries by nearly 5% a year.’

This relation found by Goldman Sachs is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3

 

China

Goldman Sachs noted China as illustrating this general trend: ‘China probably provides one of the best examples of the lack of correlation between strong economic growth and equity returns… China’s economy has outgrown that of the US by about 8% a year since the end of 1992 (the inception date of the MSCI China equity market index). Its equity market, however, has lagged that of the US by about 8% a year. Over the last 15 years, earnings per share growth in China has been negative 0.9% while that of the S&P 500 companies has been 5.4% a year. Most recently, in 2010, China has outgrown the US by an estimated 7% but the MSCI China Index has returned just 4.8% (the local Shanghai Composite Index is actually down 12.8%). On the other hand, US equities have returned 15.1%. Since the peak of US and Chinese equities in October 2007, China has outgrown the US by an estimated 10% a year, but Chinese equities have lagged the US by 2.7% a year.’ This data is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4

 

Goldman Sachs survey therefore concluded: ‘Whether it is 1 year, 3 years or 18 years, economic growth has not translated into better investment returns in China … The evidence shows that faster economic growth rates do not result in higher equity returns. In fact, if faster growth is priced into the equity markets, the equity markets are most likely going to lag those of slower growth economies.‘

In a recent update of their study, for the Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook, Dimson, Marsh and Staunton concluded: ‘[Our] Figure 2 ranks the real equity return of the 19 Yearbook countries over the period 1900–2009, from lowest to highest…. [our] Figure 2 shows that the supposed association between long-run real growth in GDP per capita and real equity returns is simply not there (the correlation is –0.23).’ This is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5

 

Dividends, share prices and growth

In their study Dimson, Marsh and Staunton however noted an extremely close correlation between share prices/return on shares and dividend payments: ‘there is a high correlation (0.87) between real equity returns and real dividend growth across the 19 countries.’ 

Such a close correlation between dividend payments and share prices is related to the negative correlation between share prices and economic growth: ‘the claim that real dividends grow at the same rate as real GDP is clearly incorrect. Real dividend growth has lagged behind real GDP per capita growth in all but one country, averaging just –0.1%, and the correlation between the two is -0.30.’ Higher economic growth is correlated with lower dividends and vice versa.

Conclusion

The clearly established negative correlation between economic growth and share price growth has a number of implications:

• It must be understood that correlation by itself does not establish causality - i.e. the negative correlation between share price growth and return on shares and GDP per capita growth does not establish whether rapid economic growth causes lower returns on shares, or higher returns on shares causes lower GDP growth, or some other factor(s) causes both. The negative correlation however does exclude that high share prices cause high GDP per capita growth, and therefore that economic policy should aim to have high share price growth in order to stimulate economic growth. The negative correlation shows that high returns on shares are either irrelevant (i.e. non-causal) for economic growth or if causal then higher returns on shares are negative for economic growth.
• Underperformance of shares in emerging economies with high growth rates would be expected to flow from the negative correlation between GDP per capital growth and share prices. Other things being equal, the more rapid the growth of GDP per capita the greater the underperformance of shares that would be anticipated - this clearly fits China.
• As the negative correlation of GDP per capita growth and share prices exists in both developed and developing economies pointing to underperformance of share prices in emerging markets does not justify the claim that underperformance of shares in such markets is due to government policy – except that such an underperformance would necessarily follow from the (desirable) policy of ensuring high GDP per capita growth.
• If share prices are negatively correlated with GDP per capita growth, but dividend payments are positively correlated with returns on shares, this again fits the case of China. China experiences high GDP per capita growth but low dividend payments due in substantial part to the large role played in the economy by State Owned Enterprises which pay extremely low, or zero, dividends to the state.
• Once again correlation does not establish causality, but the negative correlation of share price growth with per capita GDP growth, while dividend payments are positively correlated with share prices, means either that low dividend payments are beneficial for economic growth, that economic growth creates low dividend payments, or some other factor(s) causes both trends.
• Given the rate of growth of living standards is positively correlated with GDP per capita growth, whereas share prices are negatively correlated with GDP per capita growth, there is no reason to assume a positive correlation between rising living standards and rising share prices - i.e. that rising share prices will enhance living standards. Given that the aim is rising living standards there is therefore no reason for governments to target high share prices.

Taking the specific case of China, the negative correlation between share prices and GDP per capita growth is one reason this blog, which has a positive analysis of the growth of China’s economy, has a negative position as regards any major expectations for China’s share market.

Evidently the Financial Times and John-Paul Smith dealt primarily with short term trends in share prices which can can be affected by very different factors to the long term correlations outlined above. However:

• It is misleading to present underperformance of shares in emerging markets as being due to negative government policies when underperformance of shares in rapidly growing developing economies would be precisely expected to be correlated with their rapid growth.
• The implications of the negative correlation between GDP per capita growth and share prices, in both developed and developing economies, are far wider than those raised by John-Paul Smith and in the Financial Times article.

Notes & References

Financial Times begins to correct its analysis of China's trade

For several years the Financial Times has been giving widespread publicity to an analysis, particularly promoted by its (rightly respected) chief economics commentator Martin Wolf, and US finance professor Michael Pettis, that China was pursuing a 'mercantalist' policy aimed at creating a large trade surplus. This blog has repeatedly pointed out that this is not the case and what China has aimed at is a high degree of openness of its economy, that is of both exports and imports in GDP. This does not necessarily imply a surplus at all. 

At last, confronted with the decline in China's trade surplus, the message seems to be getting through more generally in the FT. Analysing the latest trade data, and a speech by China's president Hu Jintao, Kathrin Hille and Simon Rabinovitch from the FT' in Beijing note:

'China’s trade surplus is set to decline in 2011 for the third straight year and is on track to be about half the size of the record $298bn surplus in 2008. That would amount to less than 3 per cent of gross domestic product, suggesting that China’s trade relationship with the rest of the world is increasingly balanced.

'Critics in the US continue to point to their country’s yawning trade deficit with China as evidence of Beijing’s unfair support for its exporters, especially through what they allege is an artificially cheap renminbi.

'But the US deficit with China appears to be more the result of the global trade structure than Chinese policy distortions. As a major processing hub in the global supply chain, China runs large bilateral trade deficits with producers of raw materials and large bilateral surpluses with importers of finished products.'

This is entirely correct. Let us hope that the FT from now on will drop its wrong analysis.

 

China's CPI fall confirms its inflation is driven by international commodity prices and China has room for stimulus

The present author has consistently pointed out that China’s consumer price inflation (CPI) is primarily driven by international commodity prices and not, as some have argued, by monetary conditions in China – for a more extended recent analysis see ‘Key Trends in China’s Inflation’ which appeared in China Daily. This fact is strongly confirmed by China’s new CPI data, showing a fall to 4.2% from October’s 5,5% and a peak of 6.5% in July. To illustrate this Figure 1 shows both international commodity prices and China’s CPI. The tight correlation of the two is evident.

Figure 1

 

To deal with the argument that correlation is not necessarily causation, the direction of causation between international commodity price indexes and China’s CPI inflation is clear. China’s CPI is simply not a sufficiently large factor in the world economy to determine world commodity prices. In terms of causality, therefore, either world commodity prices cause the changes in China’s CPI or a third factor, for example international supply and demand, causes parallel changes in both. In either case examining international commodity prices allows trends in China’s CPI to be predicted.

This close correlation gives good news for future trends in China’s CPI and therefore for the ability of its government to stimulate the economy. Year on year changes in international commodity prices are currently falling rapidly. The year on year change in the daily Dow Jones-UBS international commodity index has dropped from a maximum of plus 52.8 per cent in March to minus 0.5 per cent on 7th December. Given the close correlation between China’s CPI and international commodity prices these sharp falls in commodity prices create good conditions for China’s fight with inflation.. This in turn increases the room for the government to stimulate the economy.

At present the international economy as a whole faces overall stagnation in the developed economies rather than a large 2008 style downturn - despite the recession in Europe. China does not require a full scale 2008 type stimulus package, but loosening of economic policy is clearly increasingly possible. This will ensure there is no large fall in China's GDP growth.

China's latest CPI data are therefore important in confirming:

• The real causes and therefore dynamic of China's inflation.
• The slowdown in inflation gives China the economic room for manoeuvre to loosen economic policy and ensure a 'soft' and not a 'hard' landing.

The decline of individual share ownership in the UK

The Financial Times on 8 December carried a long review by Brian Groom and Sylvia Pfeifer of the 25th anniversary of the privatisation of British Gas. This included a highly interesting insert, for which additional research was done by Yan Morrell Y Alcover, on the trends in individual share ownership in the UK. The trend in individual share ownershp was unequivocally and strongly downwards - see Figure 1.

The article noted British Gas and other privatisations 'failed to reverse the decline in private share ownership that began in the 1960s.... By the end of the 1980s... individuals owned 20.3 per cent of UK equities... Although later water and electricity privatisations briefly lifted holdings back to the 1980s levels, they had dropped to 16 per cent by the millenium. Capita Registrars suggests ownership hit an all-time low in May 2010, before recovering to 12 per cent in August 2011. In 1963 private investors had been majority shareholders in UK-listed companies, owning 54 per cent.'

Readers can find the entire analysis here.

Figure 1