Key Trends in Globalisation

US economy - the combination of structural slowdown and cyclical recession

Summary

This article focuses on evidence confirming long-term slowdown, as well as cyclical recession, of the US economy as indicated in the latest release of the 2^nd quarter 2010 US GDP figures.

Introduction

As widely reported, the second estimate of 2^nd quarter 2010 US GDP revised annualised US growth down from 2.4% to 1.6% - i.e. US GDP grew by 0.4% during the 2^nd quarter. The main changes compared to the first GDP estimate, in constant and annualised 2005 price terms, were a downward revision of net exports by -$19bn, due primarily to an upward re-estimation of imports by $14bn, and a revision of inventories downwards by -$13bn. Fixed investment remained essentially unchanged compared to the earlier first GDP estimate, with a revision downwards of -$1bn, and personal consumption was recalculated as $8bn higher than in the first GDP estimate (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2010b) (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2010a). An earlier article made a detailed examination of 2^nd quarter US GDP data and therefore only the implications for long-term trends are dealt with here. (Ross, 2010)

Slow recovery

The downward revision of 2^nd quarter GDP naturally highlights how much slower present US recovery is than in previous post-World War II business cycles. Ten quarters into the downturn US GDP still remains 1.3% below its peak in the 4^th quarter of 2007 – see Figure 1. In the previous worst post-World War II business cycle, that following 1973, recovery to the previous peak level of GDP was complete after eight quarters. Unless there is a significant acceleration of growth, US GDP will not regain its peak level until 2011 – meaning at least three years of net zero percent growth.

Figure 1

This slow recovery is, however, in line with a gradual but clear deceleration of long-term growth in the US economy – see Figure 2. The moving 20 year average of US GDP growth has now fallen gradually to 2.5% - significantly below its 3.5% historical average. Reasons the US is unlikely to reverse this trend in the foreseeable future are analysed below.

Figure 2

Fixed Investment fall

The new GDP figures also cast clear light on the issues of whether the recession in the US is primarily created by trends in consumption or investment. A number of analyses suggested that the core of the US economic crisis would be deleveraging by US consumers– see for example (Roach, 2009). If so the decline in US GDP would be centred in US consumption. The present author has consistently argued that this analysis is in error and that the core of the recession in the US is the decline in fixed investment. (Ross, 2010a) This is again strongly confirmed by the new revision of US GDP data.

Due to the significant downward revision of the US GDP figures, and the small upward revision of the consumer expenditure figures, consumption as a percentage of US GDP clearly remains well above its pre-financial crisis level – see Figure 3. Between the peak of US GDP, in the 4^th quarter of 2007, and the 2^nd quarter of 2010, US personal consumption has risen from 69.9% of GDP to 70.5% and total US consumption has risen from 85.8% of GDP to 87.6%.

Figure 3

The 1.8% of GDP increase in consumption as a percentage of US GDP is accounted for by a 0.8% of GDP increase in the share of military expenditure, a 0.6% of GDP increase in the share of personal consumption, and a 0.4% of GDP increase in the share of Federal non-military consumption.

In contrast the share of fixed investment in US GDP has fallen sharply by 3.6% of GDP. The share of non-residential fixed investment has fallen by 2.1% of GDP and the share of residential fixed investment by 1.5% of GDP.

The changes in components of US GDP, in terms of fixed price annualised 2005 dollars, are shown in Figure 4. US GDP remains $172bn below its previous peak level. However net exports, inventories, and government consumption are already above their 4^th quarter 2007 level – by $116bn, $51bn and $112bn respectively. Personal consumption is below its 4^th quarter 2007 level but only by $72bn. The US recession is entirely dominated by the $410bn decline in fixed investment.

Figure 4

The US economy, therefore, has not responded to the financial crisis primarily by reducing consumption, through personal debt deleveraging or other means, but by sharply reducing fixed investment.

Implications for long term US growth rates

A severe decline in US fixed investment, however, does not have only short term effects. As confirmed in the latest data of Jorgenson and Vu, capital investment continues to account for more than fifty percent of US GDP growth – the percentage for the latest period they analyse, in 2004-2008, is 61%. (Jorgenson & Vu, 2010) Under such conditions a severe decline in US fixed investment, of the type seen during the current recession, in practice excludes a rapid resumption of US GDP growth.

The slowdown that has been witnessed in long term US economic growth is therefore likely to continue. The present recession confirms a pattern of not simply cyclical downturn but structural slowing.

In that context the marked acceleration of US GDP growth which took place in 1995-2000 would appear to be a temporary upward fluctuation, financed by large scale import of capital, within an overall context of a long term structural slowdown of the US economy. It would not appear to mark the beginning of a more rapid US growth period.

The above trends therefore indicate that not only short but medium and long term projections for US economic growth should be assumed to be lower than historical averages. The US economy has been gradually slowing in not only a cyclical but a structural fashion.

Bibliography

Trends in investment and labour inputs with economic development, as indicated in the data of Jorgenson and Vu

Key Trends in Globalisation has published two articles on: (i) the contribution of capital investment to GDP growth in developed and developing economies,(1) (ii) differing patterns of labour inputs in developed and developing economies.(2) These are based on analyses of the major database on international growth published by Jorgenson and Vu (Jorgenson & Vu, 2007b). The reason for such detailed analysis is both the importance of the issues involved and a relation to long standing research topics. The present article introduces these articles.

The most fundamental issue involved is that of the tendency of the contribution of investment to economic growth to increase with economic development. This trend was first analysed by Adam Smith and affirmed by other economists including Keynes.(3)However, it was rejected in analyses of economic growth put forward by various mid 20th century theorists. The latter asserted, against the analysis flowing from Adam Smith, that the division of the economy between investment and consumption remained constant with economic development – this is, of course, a central assumption of the widely employed Cobb-Douglas production function, of the economic growth model put forward by Solow (Solow, 1957), and continues to be repeated in many(4), although no longer all,(5) economic textbooks.

As discussed in detail elsewhere (Ross, 2009), the present author from the early 1970s concluded, on the basis of the long term historical data on growth that was then beginning to be published, than Adam Smith and those who followed his analysis were clearly correct. Despite the fact that the theories of Solow et al of a constant contribution of investment to GDP growth were the prevailing orthodoxy they were clearly contradicted by the historical data. Jorgenson has outlined more general reasons for the breakdown of such econometric models. (Jorgenson D. W., 2009) The theory that the proportion of the economy devoted to investment remained constant, rather than rose with economic development, was erroneous and classical economics was correct.

Initial statistical unclarity in this discussion was undoubtedly aided by the fact that the US is untypical in that, unlike the great majority of other economies, the proportion of the US economy devoted to fixed investment has indeed not risen for the approximately 150 year period for which reliable statistical data exists. (Ross, 2008a) (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004).(6) Analyses based on generalisations from the US, therefore, arrived at the erroneous generalisation of a constant, rather than rising, share of investment in GDP.(7)

A consequence of the difference between the pattern in the US economy and the general international trend of a rising share of investment in GDP, is that the US share of fixed investment in GDP, which was above the international average in the 19th and first halt of the 20th century, has now fallen below the international average – in particular the US level of investment in GDP has fallen below the level of rapidly growing Asian economies. This contributes to the slow growth of the US economy compared to Asian competitors, the US balance of payments deficit with Asia, and present international financial developments. (Ross, 2008b)

The question of whether the role of fixed investment in economic growth rises with economic development, or remains constant, has numerous practical economic implications. The key pieces of evidence demonstrating the rising contribution of fixed investment to GDP growth with economic development, prior to the publication of the database of Jorgenson and Vu, included:

1. Trends in leading international growth economies. The analysis of leading growth economies, in successive historical periods of economic development from the 18^th century, carried out by the present author from the 1970s onwards, showed that each such leading economy – in chronological succession the UK, the US, West Germany, Japan, South Korea and now China – was characterised by a higher percentage of fixed investment in GDP than the preceding lead growth economy. This trend is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

2. The comprehensive comparative analyses, published by Angus Maddison, of economic growth in developed economies since World War II, including his Phases of Capitalist Development (Maddison, 1982) and Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development (Maddison, 1991), demonstrated that capital investment was the largest contributor to post-World War II GDP growth in a wide range of advanced economies. Maddison demonstrated over a longer time frame than the post-World War II period that both non-residential fixed investment rates and savings rates, which were correlated with fixed investment rates, rose with time in most advanced economies – the US, as already noted, being an exception and not a rule. (Maddison, 1992)

3. Studies by Jorgenson and his co-authors demonstrated that capital investment was the largest single contribution to GDP growth in the US, the G7 and a number of developed economies.(8)

While these studies analysed a wide range of developed, and a number of leading developing, economies they were however not entirely comprehensive in coverage – in particular they did not include a comprehensive range of developing economies. The publication by Jorgenson and Vu (Jorgenson & Vu, 2007b) of a comprehensive growth accounting base for up to 122 economies, constituting more than 95% of world GDP, therefore provides an opportunity to fill this major gap.

A striking trend that may be analysed in its data, in addition to those drawn attention to by Jorgenson and Vu themselves, is that GDP growth in developed economies is capital-intensive while GDP growth in most developing economies is labour- intensive. The path of economic development is therefore a transition from labour intensive growth to capital intensive growth. The East Asian developing economies may be seen as an intermediate group between the majority of developing economies and the developed economies.

Such a pattern is, of course, consistent with the other evidence showing the rising contribution of investment to GDP growth with economic development. However, such a comprehensive database for evaluation of these trends has not previously been available – in particular it allows an integration of trends in developing economies with those in developed economies. It is for this reason that these three analyses of trends in the data of Jorgenson and Vu for capital and labour inputs in different stages of economic development have been published.

Summary

It is clear on the basis of the above data that there is overwhelming evidence of a tendency for the contribution of investment to GDP growth to rise with economic development. In light of such clear evidence it is evident that the assertion that the contribution of investment to GDP growth remains constant with time, rather than rising, is erroneous.

Economic models and theories therefore must take into account that the contribution of investment to GDP growth increases with economic development - Adam Smith and those who followed him on this issue were correct.

The implications of this for economic theory and practice of such a trend are numerous as has been analysed elsewhere (Ross, 2008a).

The normal disclaimer must, of course, be made that while these papers utilise calculations based on data produced by Jorgenson and Vu they do not bear responsibility for the conclusions drawn.

* * *

Since this analysis was carried out Jorgenson and Vu have extended their data to 2008. (Jorgenson & Vu, 2010) The new data does not alter the main trends analysed above. A detailed analysis from the angle of approach in this article will be published.

Notes

Labour inputs in stages of economic development – trends revealed in the data of Jorgenson and Vu

Summary

An earlier article (Ross, 2010 August) analysed trends in the contribution of capital investment to GDP growth in the database published by Jorgenson and Vu of growth accounting data for economies compromising more than 95% of world GDP. (Jorgenson & Vu, 2007b) Jorgenson and Vu themselves drew attention to two trends:

• Factor inputs of capital and labour greatly predominate over total factor productivity [TFP] in percentage contribution to international GDP growth.
• The increasing role played by capital investment in information technology (IT).

Analysis of this database by the present author showed another trend. (Ross, 2010 August)

• Developed economies have a capital-intensive path of growth compared to developing economies – i.e. the percentage contribution of capital investment to GDP growth is higher in developed than developing economies. The East Asian/Asian developing economies are an intermediate group - the percentage contribution to GDP growth of capital investment in these economies is greater than in the majority of developing economies but less than in developed economies.

This previous article looked only at investment in capital. It did not examine improvements in labour quality, which typically requires investment in human capital. This was because the percentage contribution to GDP growth of investment in physical capital in developed economies considerably exceeds that of improvements in labour quality and, for clarity, it was therefore helpful to concentrate on the primary trend.

It is, however, also revealing to analyse the combined contribution of physical capital and improvements in labour quality – in particular given this has direct practical implications. Investment in physical capital and improvements in labour quality require expenditure/investment – the latter in education, training etc. Taking capital investment and improvements in labour quality together, therefore, gives an indicator of the different patterns of such expenditure and investment in economies at different stages of development.

The present article therefore supplements the previous one by analysing the contribution of labour inputs in different economy groups.

It should be pointed out that while this paper utilises calculations based on data produced by Jorgenson and Vu they do not bear responsibility for conclusions drawn in the present article.

Capital-intensive and labour-intensive patterns of growth

The basic data for the present analysis is set out in Table 1 and Table 2. These show the percentage contribution to GDP growth of capital, labour and TFP, and of labour hours and labour quality, in economy groups for the periods 1995-2000, 1995-2000, and 2000-2006 as calculated from the data set out by Jorgenson and Vu (Jorgenson & Vu, 2007b). The pattern of the contribution of capital investment to GDP growth in the different economy groups was already analysed in the previous article and is therefore merely summarised here. (1) If the non-generally applicable case of East European economies, experiencing transition from Communism to capitalism, is left aside the patterns of growth of economies fall into two large groups according to their stage of economic development.

• The first are developed economies – the G7 and the 15 additional non-G7 developed economies. In the developed economies the percentage contribution to GDP growth of capital inputs exceeds the contribution of either labour or TFP in all periods – i.e. developed economies display capital-intensive growth.
• The second group are the majority of developing economies - in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa. In these, with only one exception, Sub-Saharan Africa in 2000-2006, the percentage contribution of labour inputs exceeded the contribution of either capital or TFP in all periods – i.e. the majority of developing economies show labour-intensive growth. (2)

The Asian developing economies, in particular East Asian developing economies, are ‘intermediate’ between the developed and the majority of developing economies.

• In the Asian/East Asian economies the percentage contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth was larger than in the other developing economy groups in all periods. However in no period was the percentage contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth in the Asian/East Asian developing economies as high as in the G7. In two periods out of three the percentage contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth was lower in the Asian/East Asian developing economies than in the non-G7 developed economies.

It is notable that neither in the developed economies groups nor in the majority of developing economies was TFP growth the main percentage contributor to GDP growth. (3) This trend in developed and developing economies is of course in line with the overall conclusion of Jorgenson and Vu: ‘‘We allocate the growth of world output, as measured in the World Bank’s International Comparison Program, between input growth and productivity. We find… that input growth greatly predominates. ‘(Jorgenson & Vu, 2009)

Trends in labour inputs will be analysed in conjunction with this overall framework.

Trends in labour inputs

First labour inputs in the developed economies will be considered in Jorgenson and Vu's data and then those in differing groups of developing economies.

i. The Developed Economies

As already noted, both the G7 and the non-G7 groups of developed economies follow a pattern of capital-intensive growth – i.e. in all periods the contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth exceeds the contribution of either labour or TFP. However, G7 and non-G7 economies differ in the role played by different forms of labour inputs.

The contribution of increases in labour hours in all periods is smaller in the G7 than in the non-G7 economies.

In the G7 economies, in two periods out of three, the percentage contribution of labour quality to GDP growth exceeds that of increase in labour hours, whereas in two periods out of three in non-G7 developed economies the contribution of labour hours exceed the contribution of labour quality. That is, the bias in G7 economies within labour inputs is towards a higher percentage contribution of labour quality than labour hours, whereas in the non-G7 economies the bias is towards a higher contribution of labour hours than labour quality.

There is also a difference between forms of labour input and TFP growth in the G7 and non-G7 developed economies. In the G7 economies, in two out of three periods, the percentage contribution of TFP exceeds the total contribution of labour inputs, and in all periods the percentage contribution of TFP to GDP growth exceeds the contribution of either labour hours or labour quality considered individually. In contrast, in all periods, in the non-G7 developed economies the contribution of labour inputs exceeds the contribution of TFP growth.

In short, in both G7 and non-G7 developed economies the predominant contribution to GDP growth comes from capital inputs. But the pattern of growth in the G7 economies is predominantly based on ‘capital investment, plus increases in TFP and labour quality’, whereas in the non-G7 developed economies the pattern of growth is predominantly based on ‘capital investment, plus increases in labour inputs - in particular increases in labour hours’.

The dominance of capital inputs and labour quality in the G7 economies may be seen clearly in Table 1. The combination of capital inputs plus labour quality inputs plays an overwhelmingly dominant role in the contribution to GDP growth in the G7 economies – accounting in successive periods for 74.9%, 61.6% and 68.5% of GDP growth.

ii. Developing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa

The dominant role played by labour inputs in GDP growth in the developing economies of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa is shown in that in all groups and periods except one, Sub-Saharan in 2000-2006, labour inputs exceeds either the input of capital or the input of TFP to GDP growth.

The contribution of labour inputs to GDP growth exceeds the contribution of TFP in all these economy groups in all periods .

Within this framework the dominance of increases in labour hours over increases in labour quality is clear. The percentage contribution of increases in labour hours exceeds the percentage contribution of increases in labour quality in all three economy groups in all three periods.

The pattern of growth of the majority of developing economies is therefore not only labour-intensive, but within that framework it is dominated by increases in labour hours rather than increases in labour quality.

iii. Developing Asian economies

In the developing Asian economies the percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth exceeds the contribution of labour in all periods. The percentage contribution of TFP also exceeds that of labour in all periods. In this overall pattern of higher inputs of capital and TFP than of labour inputs Asian developing economies are closest to the G7 group.

However, the pattern of labour inputs in the developing Asian economies differs markedly from the G7 economies. In all periods in the developing Asian economies, the percentage contribution of labour hours exceeds the percentage contribution of labour quality.

The pattern of growth of the Asian developing economies is therefore primarily based on inputs of capital, TFP and labour hours with a smaller percentage contribution from improvements in labour quality. If the developing Asian economies resemble the developed economies in the dominance of capital inputs over labour inputs, nevertheless within labour inputs the Asian economies resemble developing economies in that increases in labour hours predominate over increases in labour quality.

The Asian developing economies may therefore be taken as being ‘intermediate’ between the developing and developed economies in a dual sense.

• In terms of the contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth the Asian developing economies have clearly moved out of the ranks of developing economies closer to the capital-intensive pattern of growth in the developed economies - although the contribution of capital investment to growth in the developing Asian economies has still not yet reached the level of the developed economies.
• The developing Asian economies, unlike in particular the G7 economies, however continue to have a pattern of development similar to the majority of developing economies whereby inputs of labour hours are greater contribution to labour inputs than increases in labour quality.

Conclusion

These trends may now be summarised.

• The fundamental pattern of development whereby developed economies follow a pattern of capital-intensive growth and developing economies one of labour-intensive growth has already been noted. (Ross, 2010 August)
• Developing Asian/East Asian economies may be understood as occupying a position of transition from developing to developed status, with a capital-intensity of development that is higher than the other groups of developing economies but not as high as that of the developed economies.

In may, however, be seen from the present analysis that a second trend also occurs within labour inputs.

• The pattern of GDP growth of the developing economies is not only labour-intensive but, within that framework, is primarily dominated by increases in labour hours rather than by increases in labour quality.
• In the G7 group, in contrast, increases in labour inputs are somewhat more determined by increases in labour quality than by increases in labour hours.
• In the percentage contribution within labour inputs, the Asian/East Asian developing economies remain closer to developing economies than to the G7 in that the contribution of labour hours is greater than the contribution of labour quality.
• In terms of labour inputs, the Asian/East Asian developing economies are closer to the non-G7 developed economies than the G7, in that, unlike the G7, both groups tend to remain far more dependent on increases in labour hours than increases in labour quality for labour inputs.

There therefore appears to be a progressive development pattern, in terms of labour inputs, whereby most developing economies, including in this case Asia, have a larger contribution of labour hours than labour quality, the non-G7 developing economies retain this characteristic on a lesser scale, and the G7 economies have the greatest percentage contribution of increases in labour quality compared to increases in labour hours.

The pattern of economic development shown in the data of Jorgenson and Vu is therefore of an increase in the percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth compared to labour, and of an increase of improvements in labour quality compared to labour hours.

* * *

Since this analysis was carried out Jorgenson and Vu have extended their data to 2008. (Jorgenson & Vu, 2010) The new data does not alter the main trends analysed above. A detailed analysis from the angle of approach in this article will be published here.

Table 1

Table 2

 

Bibliography

The transition from labour-intensive to capital-intensive growth during economic development – trends revealed in the data of Jorgenson and Vu

Summary

One of the most important databases and analyses regarding the international economy released in the recent period is that calculated by Jorgenson and Vu to evaluate the relative contributions of capital, particularly information technology (IT), and labour inputs compared to that of total factor productivity (TFP) in GDP growth ((Jorgenson & Vu, 2007a), (Vu, 2007)) This has formed part of the World Bank’s International Comparison Programme (Jorgenson & Vu, 2009)). Because of the comprehensive nature of the published data trends can be identified in addition to those emphasised by Jorgenson and Vu themselves.

One of the most important of such trends is clear evidence that as economies become more developed the contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth increases relative to that of labour inputs, i.e. ‘capital-intensive’ growth replaces ‘labour-intensive’ growth. Such a pattern of transition from labour-intensive to capital-intensive growth with economic development would be important in itself and indicate a confirmation of analyses in classical economic theory.

The present article outlines these trends. It should be pointed out that while this paper utilises calculations based on data produced by Jorgenson and Vu they do not bear responsibility for conclusions drawn in the present article.

Source of economic growth in developed and developing economies

Table 1 sets out annual average GDP growth, together with the percentage contributions of capital, labour, and TFP, for 109 economies, 22 developed and 87 developing, for the ten year period 1995-2005. The calculations are from the data set out by Vu (Vu, 2007). Subgroups for developed and developing economies are shown. Table 2 sets out similar calculations from the data for periods defined by Jorgenson and Vu - 1989-1995, 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 (Jorgenson & Vu, 2007b).

In addition to periodisations, other differences between the two tables should be noted. Table 1 shows unweighted means and medians – i.e. the significance of each country is treated as equal, whereas the data of Jorgenson and Vu in Table 2 is weighted. In Table 1 improvements in labour quality are included in TFP, as in the data presented by Vu (Vu, 2007), whereas in Table 2 improvements in labour quality are included in labour inputs (Jorgenson & Vu, 2007b). There are 109 countries in Table 1 compared to 122 countries in Table 2. As will be seen, however, such differences do not alter the qualitative trends found.

The dominance of factor inputs in GDP growth

One of the fundamental findings of Jorgenson and Vu, shown in both Table 1 and Table 2, is the dominance of factor inputs of capital and labour compared to TFP in international economic growth. Taking all economies in Table 1, the mean percentage of growth accounted for by increases in inputs of capital and labour is 74.8% and the contribution of TFP growth is 25.1%. Taking the three periods defined by Jorgenson and Vu in Table 2, the contribution of factor inputs of capital and labour to GDP growth is 83.7%, 76.8% and 64.3%. From their data Jorgenson and Vu conclude: ‘We allocate the growth of world output, as measured in the World Bank’s International Comparison Program, between input growth and productivity. We find… that input growth greatly predominates. ‘(Jorgenson & Vu, 2009)

Role of capital inputs

Turning to a more detailed breakdown, the greatest contribution to GDP growth is from increase in capital inputs. Taking all economies in Table 1, the mean percentage contribution of increases in capital to GDP growth is 39.6% and the median contribution is 42.6% - which is above the mean of 35.2% and median of 35.1% for the contribution of increase in labour hours, which itself exceeds the mean contribution of TFP growth of 25.1% and median contribution of 25.1%.

Taking the periods defined by Jorgenson and Vu, the contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth is greater than either labour hours or TFP in all periods - at 54.1%, 46.4% and 40.7%. Jorgenson and Vu conclude: ‘About 40-45% of world growth can be attributed to the accumulation and deployment of capital and another 25-33% to the use of labour input… productivity accounted for only 20-35% of growth.’ (Jorgenson & Vu, 2009)

The different pattern of growth in developed and developing economies

Taking the data in Table 1, however, there is a clear contrast in the pattern of growth between developed and developing economies. The contribution of increases in capital inputs is significantly greater in the developed economies than in the developing ones – i.e. developed economies follow a ‘capital-intense’ path of development compared to developing economies. Considering all economies in Table 1, the mean contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth in developed economies is 52.9%, significantly above the 36.3% in developing economies. The median contribution of capital inputs to growth in developed economies is 50.6% compared to 39.3% in developing economies. 

Table 1

Table 2 

In contrast to developed economies ‘capital-intense’ path of growth, the contribution of labour inputs to GDP growth is significantly higher in developing economies than in developed ones – i.e. in contrast to developed economies, developing economies have a ‘labour intense’ path of growth. The mean contribution of inputs of labour hours to GDP growth is 38.3% in developing economies compared to only 23.1% for developed economies, while the median contribution of increase in labour hours to GDP growth is 40.6% in developing economies compared to 23.8% for developed economies.

Summary of trends

Consolidating the above data, capital inputs are the dominant contribution to GDP growth in developed economies whereas the role of labour hours exceeds capital inputs in developing economies even if improvements in labour quality are included in TFP. The mean contributions to GDP growth in developed economies are, in order of percentage contribution, capital 52.9%, TFP 24.0%, and labour hours 23.1%, compared to, in developing economies, 38.3% labour hours, 36.3% capital, and 25.4% TFP. The median contributions to GDP growth in developed economies are capital 50.6%, TFP 26.0%, and labour hours 23.8%, compared to 40.6% labour hours, 39.3% capital, and 25.0% TFP in developing economies.

To see these trends visually, the mean percentage contribution of capital, labour hours and TFP to GDP growth for developed and developing countries is shown in Figure 1 and the median contributions in Figure 2.

Figure 1

Figure 2

  
 

Periodisation of Jorgenson and Vu

Jorgenson and Vu in their papers do not present a consolidated figure for all developed and all developing economies but the same pattern as in Table 1 may be seen from the data in Table 2:(1)

• In Jorgenson and Vu’s data, the percentage contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth in the G7 economies is the highest for any group in all periods. In all three periods capital investment contributed more than 50% of GDP growth in G7 economies. The capital-intensive path of development of G7 economies is therefore evident.

• The contribution of capital to GDP growth for the non-G7 developed economies is lower than for the G7 in all periods, but it is also higher than in the non-Asian developing countries in all periods. The contribution of capital to GDP growth for the non-G7 developed economies is higher than in the developing Asian economies for two periods and lower in one. This overall pattern confirms that, after the G7, the group of economies most dependent on capital investment for GDP growth is the non-G7 developed economies - although the gap with the East Asian developing economies is not great.
• The contribution of capital to GDP growth in the developing Asian economies is higher than for all other groups of developing economies in all periods – i.e. among developing economies the Asian economies most resemble the developed economies in the high intensity of capital investment in GDP growth.

• For the Latin American, Sub-Saharan African, and North African and Middle Eastern developing country groups, with only one exception, Sub-Saharan Africa in 2000-2006, the contribution of labour inputs to GDP growth exceeds the contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth in all periods.

• Eastern Europe(2), undergoing transition from Communism to capitalism, differs sharply from all other groups in that growth has weak inputs of capital and labour and relies primarily relied on TFP increases.

Therefore, although Jorgenson and Vu do not present a consolidated figure for developed and developing countries, the more capital-intensive character of economic growth in the developed economies compared to most developing economies is clear in their periodisation. Developing Asian economies constitute an ‘intermediate’ group between the majority of developing economies and the developed economies. The percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth in the periods and for the country groups defined in Jorgenson and Vu is shown visually in Figure 3.

More detailed analysis by country group within the above overall trends will now be considered. 

Figure 3

The G7

The ‘capital-intensive’ pattern of development of the G7 economies is clear.(3) Taking the period 1995-2005 the G7 is the most capital-intensive in terms of its pattern of growth of any economy group. The mean contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth is 60.3% for the G7 compared to 39.6% for all economies, and the median contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth in the G7 is 50.9% compared to 42.6% for all economies - see Table 3.

Taking the periodisations of Jorgenson and Vu, shown in Table 2, the percentage contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth in the G7 is 60.0%, 53.4% and 56.3% - the highest of all groups for all periods.

The relative contribution of increases in labour hours to GDP growth in the G7 economies is low – a mean of 11.3% in the G7 economies compared to 35.2% in all economies and a median of 15.9% in the G7 economies compared to 35.1% for all economies. Taking the periodisation of Jorgenson and Vu the percentage contribution of labour inputs to GDP growth in the G7 is below the average for all economies in all periods.

The G7 economies therefore have a clear ‘capital intensive/low growth of labour inputs’ pattern of development.

Table 3

Non-G7 developed economies

The pattern of development of the non-G7 developed economies also shows a capital intensive path of development compared to developing economies.(4) Taking the period 1995-2005, the mean contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth is 49.5% for non-G7 developed economies compared to 36.3% for developing economies - the median contribution is 50.3% compared to 39.3% for developing economies. Compared to the G7, the contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth for non-G7 developed economies is either slightly lower or the same as for G7 economies – the mean for G7 economies being 60.3% and that for non-G7 developing economies being 49.5%. The median for the G7 economies is 50.9% and the median for non-G7 developed economies is 50.3%.

Taking the periodisation of Jorgenson and Vu, the non-G7 developed economies have a higher percentage contribution to GDP growth of capital inputs than all developing economy groups in all periods with the one exception of the East Asian developing economies in 2000-2005 – i.e. the more capital-intensive path of economic development in the non-G7 developed economies compared to developing economies is clear.

Given both G7 and the non-G7 developed economies have a more capital-intensive pattern of growth than developing economies, the more capital intensive growth of developed economies compared to developing economies is clear. 

Table 4

East Asian and Asian developing economies

Jorgenson and Vu analyse the developing Asian economies as a single group – see Table 2. It may be preferable to divide them into an East Asian and a South Asian group – although the distinction is not vital from the point of view of the trends considered in this article. First the East Asian group will be considered and then the developing Asian economies as a whole.

The pattern of growth of the East Asian developing economies in the period 1995-2005 is shown in Table 5.(5) The East Asian group of developing economies are slightly less capital intensive in their path of development than the G7 and non-G7 developed economies – although the difference is not great. The mean percentage contribution of capital to GDP growth is 60.3% in the G7, 49.5% in the non-G7 Developed Economies and 47.2% in the East Asian Developing Economies, while the median contribution is 50.9% in the G7, 50.3% in the non-G7 Developed Economies and 48.4% in the East Asian economies. Overall, however, the East Asian developing economies clearly show a relatively similar capital-intensive path of GDP growth as the developed economies.

Taking the periodisation of Jorgenson and Vu, as shown in Table 2, and considering the developing Asian economies as whole, then as already noted the developing Asian economies have a lower percentage contribution to GDP growth of capital inputs compared to the G7 for all periods and compared to the non-G7 developed economies for two out of three periods. However, the developing Asian economies have a higher percentage contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth than all other groups of developing economies for all periods. The intermediate situation of the Asian/East Asian developing economies, in terms of capital-intensity of growth, between the developed economies and the other developing economies is therefore clear.

The developing East Asian/developing Asian economies are, however, not equidistant between the developed and the developing economies in their pattern of growth. Their pattern of growth, while not as capital-intensive as the developed economies is nevertheless closer, in its capital-intensity, to the developed economies than to the majority of developing economies.

Table 5

Other developing economies

Turning to wider groups of developing economies, Table 6 shows the pattern of GDP growth for the period 1995-2005 for developing economies excluding East Asia, which have already been examined, and Eastern Europe – which is analysed below. This covers 63 developing economies in South Asia, (6) Latin America,(7) Sub-Saharan Africa(8) and the Middle East and North Africa(9). This constitutes the majority of developing economies. The pattern of growth of these developing economies, compared to the developed economies and the developing East Asian/developing Asian economies, is clear. Unlike the developed economies and East Asian developing economies, GDP growth in these other groups of developing economies is dominated by labour inputs.

Taking the period 1995-2005 the mean contribution of inputs of labour hours for the 63 developing economies is 50.1% - compared to 28.8% for the East Asian developing economies, 28.5% for the non-G7 developed economies, and 11.3% for the G7 economies. The median contribution of inputs of labour hours is 44.2% compared to 26.9% for the East Asian developing economies, 24.5% for the non-G7 developing economies and 15.9% for the G7 economies.

Taking the periodisation of Jorgenson and Vu, as set out in Table 2, and taking their groupings of Sub-Saharan African, Latin American, and North African and Middle Eastern developing economies, the percentage contribution of inputs of labour is the highest input to GDP growth in all groups in all the periods up to 2006 except for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2000-2006.

The more labour-intensive path of growth of the majority of developing countries is clear.

Table 6

Eastern Europe and the former USSR

It may be seen from Table 2 that the pattern of economic changes in Eastern Europe in the period studied differed fundamentally from the rest of the world economy.(10)
The East European economies suffered severe falls in production in the early 1990s – this lasting until 1998 in the case of the former USSR.(11) The percentage contribution to GDP growth of input of labour hours in Eastern Europe and the former USSR was negative. The contribution of increase in capital inputs to GDP growth was very weak by comparison to the rest of the world economy. Taking the periodisation of Jorgenson and Vu, as shown in Table 2, after being negative in 1989-95, TFP accounted for 136.1% of GDP growth in Eastern Europe in the period 1995-2000, and for 88.9% in the period 2000-2005 – i.e unlike the rest of the world economy growth in Eastern Europe was overwhelmingly due to TFP increases.

This unique situation in the East European economies statistically raises the percentage contribution of TFP to GDP growth for the total economies in Table 1 and Table 2. However as Eastern Europe accounted for only 6.6% of the GDP of all countries analysed in 1989-1995, and only 5.5% in 1995-2000 and 2000-2005, the combined size of these economies is too small to alter substantively either the overall balance between inputs of capital and labour and TFP, or the capital intensive pattern of GDP growth of the developed economies.

The dependence of economic development on TFP growth in Eastern Europe may be regarded as either a unique one off event, due to the collapse of the former economic system in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, therefore not giving general lessons for economic growth, or treated as that in any period there will be statistical outliers. A case can therefore be made for excluding Eastern Europe and the former USSR from comparisons, on the grounds of their undergoing a unique experience, which would lower the average international contribution of TFP to GDP growth. However, in order to avoid the suggestion of selective inclusion of data, the case considered here is that of all economies including Eastern Europe.

Relevance to the path of development in classical economic theory

The finding that developed economies follow a capital-intensive path of growth compared to most developing economies, with the East Asian/Asian developing economies forming an intermediate group between the developed economies and other developing economies would be, of course, important in itself. It however would also cast light on an important issue in economic theory.

In the classic founding work of modern economics, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith analysed that the role of capital and intermediate inputs, which he jointly termed ‘stock’, would increase as an economy developed. Smith noted: ‘As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in proportion only as stock is previously more and more accumulated… As the division of labour advances, therefore, in order to give constant employment to an equal number of workmen, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater stock of materials and tools than what would have been necessary in a ruder state of things must be accumulated beforehand.’(Smith, 1999, p. 372) Other economists, including Keynes, arrived at the same conclusion of an increasing role of capital investment in economic development via a somewhat different chain of reasoning.(12) (For a wider discussion see Ross, 2009).

Smith, of course, had no systematic econometric data of the modern type with which to verify his findings – his conclusion was based on theoretical reasoning drawn from particular observations. Jorgenson and his collaborators have, however, already found that intermediate inputs, one element of Smith’s category of ‘stock’, grow more rapidly than capital, labour or TFP.(13) The finding in the data of Jorgenson and Vu that the percentage contribution of capital inputs to GDP growth is higher in developed than in developing economies is therefore also in line with, and casts important light on, Smith’s analysis and that of his successors.

Contrast of classical economic formulations with others

The pattern in the data calculated by Jorgenson and Vu is in line with classical economics. It however does not support other more recent theories regarding economic development. These contrasting views of the pattern of economic development are:

• Classical economic theory, as originally formulated by Adam Smith, foresaw a dynamic of transition from labour-intensive growth to more capital-intensive growth during economic development.

• Alternative theories, for example popularised by Krugman in regard to the East Asian economies (Krugman, 1994), instead suggested that the dynamic in economic development is one from growth dominated by factor inputs of capital and labour to one dominated by TFP growth in the most developed economies. (14)

The data presented by Jorgenson and Vu provides substantial evidence for the analysis of classical economics that economic development is accompanied by a transition from labour intensive to capital intensive growth. It however provides no evidence for the view that economic development leads to a greater role being played by TFP rather than factor inputs. Taking the six comparisons in the periodisation of Jorgenson and Vu (the two sets of developed economies, the G7 and the non-G7, times the three periods 1989-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005) TFP growth makes a lower percentage contribution to GDP growth in the developed economies than the average for all economies in four periods and a higher contribution in only two.

Conclusion

Jorgenson and Vu, in analysing their data, have emphasised:

• that capital and labour inputs predominate over TFP in GDP growth,
• the increasing role of IT investment in GDP growth,

However, a further significant trend is that their data shows a pattern whereby capital is the predominant input to GDP growth in developed economies – i.e. as economies develop they make a transition from labour-intensive to capital-intensive growth. Such a finding is of considerable importance:

• It indicates that, given such a pattern, an economy and its policy makers should anticipate growth becoming more capital intensive as an economy moves towards developed economy status.
• East Asian developing economies form an ‘intermediate’ group between the developed economies on the one side and the majority of developing economies on the other – although in greater reliance on capital inputs for growth than most developing economies they more resemble developed economies.
• Most developing economies are more dependent on labour inputs compared to capital inputs for GDP growth compared to developed economies.
• Such a transition from labour-intensive growth to capital-intensive growth as economies develop is in line with classic formulations of economic theory flowing from Adam Smith.
• Jorgenson and Vu’s data provides clear evidence in line with the classical economic view that as an economy develops its pattern of growth becomes more capital intensive, but it provides no evidence supporting views that as economies become more developed the role of factor inputs in GDP growth declines relative to TFP.
• Such a transition from labour intensive to capital intensive growth with economic development, while foreseen by classical economics, is not theorised in a number of standard contemporary treatments of economic growth – for a brief historical review see (Ross, 2009).(15)

The data produced by Jorgenson and Vu, and the trends it reveals, is therefore of great importance both from the practical point of view of view of study of economic growth and policy making, and from the point of view of economic theory.

* * *

Since this analysis was carried out Jorgenson and Vu have extended their data to 2008. (Jorgenson & Vu, 2010) The new data does not alter the main trends analysed above. A detailed analysis from the angle of approach in this article will be published here.

Notes

China - trade surplus and house price bubble, interrelations between key issues in domestic and international economic policy

China’s short term domestic economic policy in the last period has in large part been directed at dealing with the overheated situation of house prices. The key issue in China's international economic policy continues to be the trade surplus – highlighted by the announcement of a $29.7 billion positive trade balance in July. The aim of this article is to look at some underlying interrelations between these two key issues. As will be seen they are not separate but interconnected.

The real situation in China’s trade

The last two years in China’s international trade, including the July 2010 data, have provided a clear factual test between two theories regarding China’s trade surplus.

• The first, strongly promoted by US 'neo-con' circles, argues that the key factor in China’s trade balance is the RMB’s exchange rate. Therefore, it states, the decisive step to keep down China’s trade surplus is to revalue the RMB. The factual evidence clearly contradicts this view, as will be shown.
• The second theory, argued by this blog and others, is that the key factor in China’s trade balance is China’s relative rate of GDP growth compared to other economies. Therefore, on this analysis, what is required to keep down China’s trade surplus is that China’s economy should grow rapidly.

As most analysts would evidently agree that both exchange rates and relative growth rates affect trade balances, the key question is which of the two is most quantitatively important. It is this that the trade data clearly answers. The decisive factor has been shown to be the relative growth rate of growth of China’s economy not the exchange rate.

July’s trade surplus, as well the dramatic shrinkage of China’s surplus during 2009 and the first quarter of 2010, did not follow changes in the RMB’s exchange rate but did follow extremely closely the acceleration and deceleration of China’s economy.

These trends are examined in more detail below. An analysis is given of the angle of approach to dealing with China’s trade surplus and dealing with inflationary pressures in the real estate sector.

Test of the two analyses

The present author has repeatedly pointed out the errors in economic theory and fact of those who have argued that revaluation of the RMB is the key to reducing China’s trade surplus so it is not required to list these again - a couple of responses to the new July trade data can be noted below.

For a detailed examination of trade trends prior to the 2008 financial crisis, which are consistent with those analysed here, readers are referred to an earlier article on this blog and Figure 3 below. The crucial factual point shown in these is that as the RMB's exchange rate rose, between 2005 and 2008, China's trade surplus did not fall - as would be predicted by the analysis that RMB revaluation would lead to a shrinking trade surplus. On the contrary, a rise in the RMB's exchange rate was accompanied by an increase in China's trade surplus.The reasons for this were dealt with previously.

Turning to July's trade figures, Sophie Leung and Li Yanping note on Bloomberg: ‘China’s trade surplus reached an 18-month high as exports rose to a record and import gains slowed, adding pressure on officials to allow faster appreciation of the yuan.’

Geoff Dyer in the Financial Times wrote: ‘The pace of increase in exports actually fell last month to 38.1 per cent year-on-year, down from 43.9 per cent in June. However, import growth slowed even more, moving up 22.7 per cent against 34.1 per cent in June. The rising trade surplus will increase the political pressure on Beijing to appreciate its currency more rapidly.’

These authors therefore consider the key issue to mention in relation to trade is the RMB’s exchange rate. They do not draw equal attention to the quantitatively dominant trends shown below.

China’s trade pattern

In the last three months China’s trade surplus has begun to expand significantly – see Figure 1 below, which shows the monthly trade balance, and Figure 2 which shows the monthly balance calculated as a three monthly moving average.

Taking the three monthly moving average, to eliminate the effects of purely short term fluctuations, China’s trade surplus fell steadily from a peak of $39bn in January 2009 to a low of $1bn in April 2010. Since then it has expanded again to $23bn in July 2010.

None of these shifts, however, can be explained by changes in the RMB’s exchange rate as throughout this period, until 18 June 2010, the RMB’s exchange rate against the dollar was entirely stable. After this the RMB's exchange rate moved up marginally, by less than one percent – although this change is too recent to have significantly affected the figures. In short, China’s trade surplus fell, practically to the point of disappearance, and then rose again despite a stable exchange rate.

While China’s trade surplus did not track changes in China’s exchange rate at all, it did track extremely closely the acceleration and deceleration of China’s economy. During the whole of 2009, and right up to the first quarter of 2010, China’s economy was accelerating strongly. The year on year GDP growth rate speeded up progressively from 6.1% in the 1^st quarter of 2009, to 7.9% in the 2^nd, to 8.9% in the 3^rd, to 10.7% in the 4^th and finally to 11.9% in the 1^st quarter of 2010. Throughout this period China’s trade surplus fell.

In the 2^nd quarter of 2010 China’s GDP growth slowed to 10.3%, while China’s trade surplus began to rise.

In short, while China’s trade surplus did not follow its exchange rate it did follow closely the GDP growth rate. China’s growth, not its exchange rate,therefore controlled China’s trade balance.

This analysis that currently China’s trade surplus was controlled by the economy’s rate of growth and not the exchange rate was set out in detail in an article that appeared on this blog in March commenting on a Ministry of Commerce press conference. It noted: ‘the only way to continue reducing China's surplus, as [Ministry of Commerce spokesperson] Yao Jian says, is to take "measures to stimulate imports." This however requires rapid economic growth. China's imports rose faster than exports in 2009 because its economy grew more rapidly than others. While other markets stagnated or declined, China grew at 8.7 percent, and sucked in imports. The most effective way to maintain the import surge is rapid growth.’

The slowing of China’s economy in the second quarter of 2010 shows the same driving force from the opposite perspective – the economy slowed, imports fell, and therefore the trade surplus increased. But the same mechanism, whereby it is China’s growth rate and not the exchange rate that is controlling the trade surplus, continues to operate.

The answer to how to keep down China’s trade surplus is therefore equally evident. It requires rapid economic growth. That in turn, evidently raises the issue of why it was necessary for the Chinese authorities to start slowing the economy from the 1^st quarter onwards?

What will happen?

The reason for the recent steps to cool China’s economy are are well known – inflationary risks and pressures. However China did not face generalised inflationary pressure, indicating an overall and fundamental disequilibrium between demand and supply, but a concentrated inflationary pressure in two areas – food and housing.

The 3.3% increase in China’s consumer price index in July was primarily driven by food prices which rose by 6.8%. Non-food inflation remained subdued at 1.6%. The key factor in asset price inflation is housing - the share market in contrast remains lower than its level a year ago. The annual rate of increase of housing prices in July 2010 fell to 10.3% year from June’s 11.4% but this was still too high - hence economic policy makers determined action to cool the housing market.

Therefore the direction of causation is clear. The situation in the housing market is the key factor in inflation. Inflation is the reason China had to slow its economy - and therefore its trade surplus began to rise. A key to controlling China’s trade surplus, therefore, lies in China’s housing market. The chief domestic issue facing China's economy, and the chief international one, are not separate but interconnected.

This is a far from unique situation - both the UK and the US have frequently seen situations in which severe fluctuations in housing prices were correlated with shifts in the balance of payments.

In such situations macroeconomic fundamentals and the immediate economic situation coincide. A balance of payments surplus, of which the trade surplus is the dominant part, is by accounting identity equal to the deficit of China’s domestic investment compared to its domestic savings. To narrow the trade surplus therefore requires either reducing saving - or raising consumption which is the same thing, or increasing investment. Under conditions of inflationary pressure simply raising consumption demand, without an increase in supply, is not called for – adding to demand and not supply will increase inflationary pressure. The macro-economic way to deal with this situation, under conditions of threatening inflation, must therefore be to raise investment.

The situation in the housing market shows both where supply is lacking compared to demand and the target for such investment. Overall China has experienced a major rise in the percentage of fixed  investment in GDP since 2008. A further general rise therefore does not appear called for. But overheating in the housing market is sufficiently severe that it clearly needs to be addressed not only by dampening demand, which the Chinese authorities have been attempting since early in the year, but also by increasing supply – that is by a large house building programme. Such a policy has been embarked on, but only recently.

Housing and the trade surplus

The above data therefore shows the angle of approach for a key policy by which China’s trade surplus needs to be tackled. To permit resumption of more rapid growth inflation must be contained. A decisive key to containing inflation is the situation in the housing market. An increase in investment in the housing market will help contain inflationary pressures, thereby putting downward pressure on the trade surplus via more rapid growth, and by increasing investment it will act directly to reduce the trade surplus by shifting the balance between investment and saving.

One of the most important ways for China to tackle its trade surplus is to therefore house building. As large scale housing programmes involves financial risk, experience in other countries is that state action is required to underpin very large scale housing construction. Such a housing programme must therefore be underpinned by the state.

Conclusion

To summarise, the facts show the RMB's exchange rate does not control China's trade surplus - indeed, due to J curve effects if the RMB is revalued this will increase China's trade surplus in the next period. If anyone outside China wants to help reduce China’s trade surplus, therefore, they would urge China to accelerate its economic growth and, to achieve this, to embark on a large scale housing programme to help contain real estate asset inflation. Such a policy, not an increase in the RMB’s exchange rate, which has again been shown during the last two years not to control China’s trade balance, is the real way to keep down China’s trade surplus.

Why the correct policy to deal with the trade surplus meets US neo-con opposition

China's economic policy makers do indeed appear to have decided to embark on large scale house building. This is evidently linked to the issue of accelerated urbanisation. Such a programme therefore needs to be seen not only from the housing but from the macroeconomic perspective. A prolonged programme of housing construction is key not only for China's economic development but also for dealing with its trade surplus.

Such a programme of maintained or accelerated growth, to a greater degree powered by housing construction, is however naturally unacceptable to 'neo-con' circles in the US who, above all, want to ensure that the US’s economy remains larger than China’s and for whom, therefore, rapid growth in China is anathema. That is why they continue to promote a course, RMB revaluation, which would not reduce China’s trade surplus but would lower China's growth rate, rather than one that actually would hold down China’s trade surplus.

Those who are interested in co-ordinated international economic growth, as opposed to playing political games, will therefore hope China successfully increases supply in its housing market and, by co-ordinating this with demand side measures, allows rapid economic growth be maintained. That is a key policy to deal with the trade surplus.

So far China’s economic policy makers have shown a markedly clearer understanding of economic fundamentals and required policy than the US – to which the success of China’s economic stimulus package and the weakness of the recovery in the US bears graphic witness. It is to be hoped that this clear grasp of economic fundamentals continues.

Charts

 Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3